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There is a tall wall between our scientists and 
our decision makers. Scientists do their 
research and lob their information over the 
wall, hoping that somebody on the other side 
will catch it in receptive hands and act on it. 
However, what is on the other side of the wall 
is a big pile of papers and information that the 
decision makers pay no attention to  
 
(Jonathan Foley, 2010) 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the 
observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and 
ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, 
and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased. (IPCC, 2013, p.4) 
 
The Working Group I (WGI) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in the 
Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) states the magnitude of the problem that our planet is 
suffering.  
The climate is changing. It has especially mutated during the last sixty years, though this 
change started earlier. Deviations have been observed from the beginning of the 20th century. 
Even if we know the cause of all this – the excessive and incorrect use of energy resources by 
humankind to meet the increasing demand of energy – the most important aspect is that 
climate change is occurring, and its effects within the coming half century are partially 
inevitable. If we do not do anything to alleviate climate change, the consequences might be 
irreparable for the entire world. 
 
In the last decades the question of climate change has become the focus of international 
concern. The international scientific community concluded that there are two main 
approaches to tackle climate change: mitigation and adaptation. 
Mitigation and adaptation were too often considered as alternative options in the fight against 
the effects of climate change. Mitigation consists of limiting the process of future climate 
change in two ways. The first one is to reduce GHG emissions at the source (from the various 
economic sectors); the second is to develop sinks that can capture and hold GHG separately 
from the atmosphere. Adaptation, instead, is the process of adjustment to actual or expected 
climate and its effects, in order to either lessen or avoid harm or exploit beneficial 
opportunities (IPCC, 2015, p.118). Greenhouse gases have a long lifetime in the atmosphere 
and a certain inertia: thus, the effects of emissions are extended in time. Even if we stop GHG 
emissions immediately, those that have already been issued will still lead to climate changes. 
As we become aware of the difficulties of defining and obtaining mitigation objectives that are 
at the same time mutual, realistic and sufficiently ambitious, adaptation becomes fundamental 
to manage and prevent the inevitable. 
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Until now, most of the debate has been focused on the mitigation aspect. Though, in recent 
time, mostly because of the aforementioned recognition that climate change can not be 
avoided, the adaptation of energy systems has become increasingly relevant and also, by all 
accounts, the best way to deal with climate change. 
 
The topic of this thesis is the study of the prospects for adaptation to climate change of energy 
systems, and especially of the electricity one. Energy demand (that is continuously increasing) 
can not be met without the use of the actual energy system. The supply of energy by means 
of current energy systems, and the consumption of energy resources especially non-
renewable, have ensured the contamination of natural systems and the change of the climate 
system. However, we have to reckon that there is a strong vice-versa relationship between 
energy systems and climate change. The energy generation cause changes on climate: it is also 
true that climate change affects all that is related to energy usage and production. In this 
sense, the concept of adaptation of energy systems to climate change becomes increasingly 
fundamental. It should be the basis for establishing new energy policies, to supply energy 
demand, to preserve energy infrastructures and therefore make the system resilient to climate 
change. 
Not introducing promptly appropriate actions in order to adapt energy systems, the cost of 
system management, energy production and reduction of climate change’s impacts will 
become higher and higher. In the report Global landscape of climate finance 2015 of the 
Climate Policy Initiative, the authors declared that adaptation finance reached $25 billion in 
2014 (Buchner et al., 2015, p.9). But there is the need to do more. In agreement with Global 
Landscape of Climate Finance (2015, n.d.), $13.5 trillion is the investment required over the 
next 15 years in energy efficiency and low-carbon technologies to implement the national 
climate pledges (the so-called “Nationally Determined Contributions”) that countries made 
before the international climate negotiations which will hold in Paris in December 2015. With 
$13.5 trillion pledged, we will make significant progress, but we will not be able to limit the 
global temperature increase to 2°C. The investment required over the next 15 years should be 
$16.5 trillion. 
 
As said before, up to present time, mitigation has been the most studied approach. But 
something has already been done in the adaptation direction. 
The IPCC is the benchmark. Most of the studies in literature refer to the various Assessment 
Reports of the IPCC, and especially to the works of the Working Group II on adaptation to 
climate change. The last WGII report in chronological order is Climate change 2014: impacts, 
adaptation and vulnerability (IPCC, 2014), which is part of the AR5. 
Another reference text is Climate impacts on energy systems: key issues for energy sector 
adaptation (Ebinger and World Bank, 2011). This compendium handles more specifically the 
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energy system topic. For example, the authors mention two case studies on energy adaptation, 
an Albanian one and a Mexican one. 
Then, other institutions and researchers have investigated on adaptation of specific energy 
systems. For example, we can find studies about the Asian and Pacific electric power sector, 
or the Mediterranean region; investigations on adaptation in Nordic and Baltic countries, the 
Canaries Islands or in Europe in general; reports which refer to adaptation of energy 
production and use in the United States; papers about the problems of the nuclear sector and 
projects related to African developing countries. 
 
Researches on this topic are increasingly growing, but most of them do not treat 
comprehensively the adaptation issue. The objective of this thesis is to partially cover this gap. 
The aims that follow are essentially two. The first one is to draw up a comprehensive summary 
of the adaptation topic, analyzing the three important aspects quoted in the title of the thesis: 
climate change, energy systems and adaptation. The second purpose is to apply the method 
of the analysis on specific systems, to set a guideline for the adaptation of whatever electricity 
system.  
The thesis therefore starts with an overview of the state of the art of the adaptation subject. 
It continues with a brief discussion about the studies of the IPCC, illustrating their works on 
the current state of scientific knowledge relevant to climate change. Then, the research is 
carried out for a generic electricity system in order to consider all the aspects which may be 
affected by climate change. It is examined what is known about the impacts of climate change 
on natural system and energy system, clarifying the changes on energy resources, energy 
demand and energy supply. Following, the vulnerabilities of the electricity system due to 
climate change are recognized. Next, the purpose is to identify those solutions which could be 
taken to best adapt the energy systems. Ultimately, a case study is analyzed to put into practice 
the noticed solutions of the generic system. This segment of the thesis is focused on two 
specific electricity systems, the Spanish and the Italian ones. 
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STATE OF THE ART 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the end of the 20th century, after the establishment of the IPCC in 1988, the stipulation 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 and the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol at the COP-3 (Third Conference of the Parties) in 1997, the 
scientific community has been made vivacious on the environmental problem and climate 
change. The issue of adaptation was evaluated as an important way to manage climate change. 
However, at the beginning researchers did not focus much on it. They concentrated more on 
greenhouse gases reduction, better known as mitigation. Gradually, thanks to the 
understanding that we can not avoid climate change, the community has partially moved on 
the adaptation direction. For this reason, now we can rely on lots of records about the 
adaptation issue. 
The Working Group II is the research group of the IPCC that assesses the vulnerability of 
socio-economic and natural systems to climate change, negative and positive consequences of 
climate change and options for adapting to it. It assesses in a general way the issue of 
adaptation. It does not concentrate only on energy systems and adaption of them to climate 
change. It covers all the sectors which could be affected by climate change, as water resources, 
ecosystems, food and forests, coastal systems, industry and human health. In a specific section 
of the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) (IPCC, 2014) it gives an account of the existing and 
possible different solutions to adapt sectors from climate change. 
 
IPCC is only one party that does research on adaptation issue, and that considers globally this 
problem, not focusing on a particular topic. All this kind of researches on adaptation in 
literature differs on some details, but they all have in common a particular pattern. Their 
documents can be divided into two distinct sections: the first one concerns the impacts of 
climate change on the systems that they consider, while the second one treats the adaptation 
of the systems to climate change. This is a constant of the scientific researches on adaptation. 
To define possible solutions to climate changes it is crucial to before identify all the impacts 
that climate change leads to the systems. Later, these general studies examine various topics 
and systems. They obviously also address adaptation: some give general recommendations on 
it, others find more specific solutions to specific sectors or regions. For example the study 
Global climate change impacts in the United States: a state of knowledge report (U.S. Global 
Change Research Program, 2009) summarizes the science of climate change and the impacts 
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of climate change on the United States, now and in the future, but it also deals with some of 
the actions that society is taking or can take to respond to climate challenge, as adaptation. 
Adapting to climate change: the public policy response: public infrastructure (Neumann and 
Price, 2009) assesses the threats and needs that multidimensional climate change imposes for 
public infrastructure. It presents also options for enhancing adaptive capacity through public 
sector investments. It includes an analysis of energy generation and transmission 
infrastructure, but the recommendations and conclusions of the paper concern a general 
adaptation for public infrastructure more than a specific one for energy system. Another 
example is the PESETA Research Project (Ciscar et al., 2009). The main purpose of this 
publication was to summarize the project methodology and present the main results that can 
be relevant for the debate on adaptation policies within Europe. The focus was concentrated 
more on agriculture, river floods, coastal systems, tourism and human health than on energy. 
Nevertheless, this project reflected the commitment of the European Union on the adaptation 
problem. The report descended from the study of the European Commission White Paper 
(Commission of the European Community, 2009a) which noted the need to better know the 
possible consequences of climate change in Europe. The accompanying document Impact 
assessment (Commission of the European Community, 2009b) covered the adaptation 
problem, raising the profile of adaptation and building a coherent approach at institutional 
level across the EU. 
 
Some other scientists focused more specifically on energy sectors. Energy systems are one of 
the major agents which has provoked climate change, therefore the scientific production is 
prolific about this matter. Even in this case the Working Group II of the IPCC covered the 
question in its assessment. Some authors studied more this matter, in a very detailed way. 
The U.S Climate Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research 
in their synthesis and assessment product Effects of climate change on energy production and 
use in the United States (Wilbanks et al., 2008) summarized what was known about effects of 
climate change on energy production and use in the United States, and the need to expand the 
knowledge base about effects of climate change. The main topic was the study of the climate 
impacts on energy systems, because they considered the most likely adaptation measure in 
the near term an increase in perceptions of uncertainty and risk of climate change. Other 
organizations like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the HELIO International, 
carried out more topical research on the adaptation argument. These studies have in common 
a particular intention: as many other studies about adaptation to climate change, they firstly 
give an account of climate impacts. They differ from other studies because they also outline a 
set of recommendations about adapting energy systems, as for the governments as for users. 
Climate impacts on energy systems: key issues for energy sector adaptation (Ebinger and 
World Bank, 2011) is an up-to-date compendium of what was known about weather 
variability, projected climate trends and their impacts on energy service provision and 
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demand. It discusses the emerging adaptation practices and tools which have been observed 
over the world for managing climate impacts. It also takes into consideration the integration 
of climate considerations into planning processes and operational practices. It ends with a 
summary of the essential actions to support adaptation, underlining that without a climate 
information network we can not support the decision making. The Asian development Bank 
study Climate risk and adaptation in the electric power sector (Asian Development Bank, 2012) 
aims to highlight and raise awareness on the exposure and vulnerability of the energy sector 
to climate change in Asia and the Pacific. It also identifies engineering and non-engineering 
adaptation measures available to each source of energy generation as well as for the 
distribution and end use of electrical energy. It highlights also the importance to significantly 
improve coordination and planning among key energy agencies, other governments 
ministries, energy producers, regulators, governments, and users to cope with climate-
induced stresses, which are expected to become significant. Climate-proofing energy systems 
of the HELIO International (Williamson et al., 2009) centers the attention on climate-induced 
impacts on key energy systems and outlines possible adaptation measures. It provides a series 
of recommendations to help reinforce the resilience of energy systems. 
 
Some other researches instead deepened the adaptation issue of particular energy systems or 
particular region, elaborating specific adaptation solution. These studies conducted an in-
depth analysis upon energy systems, accounting (as all the studies about adaptation) the 
impacts of climate on energy systems and revealing emerging adaptation practices and 
concrete measures for adapting systems and actions to support adaptation. The results greatly 
differ from case to case, because they depend on specific circumstances and conditions. In the 
paper Regional energy demand and adaptations to climate change: methodology and 
application to the state of Maryland, USA (Ruth and Lin, 2006) the authors explored potential 
impacts of climate change on natural gas, electricity and heating oil used by residential and 
commercial sectors in the state of Maryland in USA. They concluded that there was not the 
immediate need on large-scale investment in electricity generation and energy delivery 
systems to meet the energy demands induced by climate change, with the exception of 
commercial electricity demand. This consideration is due to the fact that energy demand in 
the region will increase considerably in the future for reasons not directly related to climate 
change. The authors only suggest to adjust the energy use profiles in that region. The paper 
Climate change, nuclear power, and the adaption-mitigation dilemma (Kopytko and Perkins, 
2011) discusses the problem of adaptation and mitigation that descends from the use of 
nuclear power plants. The authors took in considerations several inland and coastal nuclear 
power plants (15 reactors at 9 coastal sites in USA and 44 reactors at 15 inland sites in France) 
to develop five criteria to assess the adaptation-mitigation dilemma. A section of the document 
examines the impacts of extreme events on inland reactors in France and coastal reactors in 
United States. In this section we can deduce some adaptation measures that have been taken 
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during these years to adapt various plants to extreme events. All these measures and their 
results must be considered to develop coherent and useful adaptation strategies to use nuclear 
plants as mitigation tool. In the conference Energy & water of the Canary Island Institute of 
Technology - ITC (Piernavieja Izquierdo, 2015) the lecturer reported the 2 years ITC project 
CLIMATIQUE (Observatorio cambio climático Canarias - Souss-Massa-Drâa, 2015) whose 
objectives is the finding of impacts of climate variables in the energy system and the 
elaboration of particular strategies to cover the adaptation issue on thermal power plants, 
renewable energy technologies and electricity grid in the Canary Island and in the African 
region of Souss-Massa-Drâa. At last in the World Bank Study Climate impacts on energy 
systems: key issue for energy sector adaptation (Ebinger and World Bank, 2011) the authors 
reported two specific studies on Albania’s energy system and Mexico’s electricity utilities, in 
addition to the general analysis of energy systems and actions to support adaptation. The 
World Bank, together with the government of Albania, conducted a series of workshops in 
Tirana in 2009 on climate risks and vulnerability in the country’s energy sector as well as 
opportunities presented by climate change. They concluded that there are several critical 
actions that Albania could take to support optimal use of energy, water resources, and 
operation of hydropower plants. The annex about Mexico discusses Mexico’s Electricity Utility 
Plan for the Attention to Natural Disasters. The objective of the plan is to define the activities 
and control mechanisms that should be followed to affectively deploy the material and human 
resources necessary to restore electricity service after natural disasters. 
 
Finally, some particular papers treat the adaptation problem under a particular point of view. 
These documents normally follow the basic design impacts-adaptation. Nonetheless, in 
addition they discuss on specific points associated to climate change and adaptation matter. 
IDDRI, CIRED-Meteo France and CIRCE produced the report The future of Mediterranean. 
From impacts of climate change to adaptation issues (IDDRI, 2009), in which they provide a 
general framework for the implementation of adaptation in the Mediterranean context, based 
on a number of important clarifications and accompanied by operational recommendations. 
The particular treated question was the linkage between adaptation and mitigation. Too often 
these two strategies were considered as alternative options in the fight against the effects of 
climate change. But, even if we stop GHG emissions immediately (if we only mitigate), those 
that have already been issued will still lead to climate changes. So, the path of adaptation is 
therefore inevitable. Adaptation and mitigation are dealt with by different communities: this 
distinction should not obscure a number of interrelations between mitigation and adaptation. 
There are adaptation actions that have consequences on mitigation, and vice versa mitigation 
actions that have consequence on adaptation. The EEA Technical Report Vulnerability and 
adaptation to climate change in Europe (European Environment Agency, 2005) was prepared 
with the objectives to provide information on vulnerability in Europe, to facilitate information 
sharing among EEA member countries, to contribute on adaptation strategies discussion and 
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to identify current and future information needs. The singular thing here is the particular 
definition of vulnerability reported by authors. Vulnerability is the residual impacts of climate 
change after adaptation measures have been implemented. This means that vulnerability is 
considered as a result of adaptation measures, which is useful to identify challenges for 
climate change adaptation strategies. Next, HELIO International in its Climate-proofing 
energy systems (Williamson et al., 2009) explained its approach in order to help identify 
policies and measures that can best facilitate and support adaptation activities: to develop a 
set of indicators to assess the vulnerability and resilience of national-level energy systems to 
climate change. They chose 10 sub-Saharan countries as first “testing ground” of its indicators, 
because Africa is a very vulnerable continent to climate change and climate variability, as IPCC 
Working Group II also said. Compared to mitigation, where a common metric in terms of “ton 
of CO2 equivalent reduced” has been used for many years, evaluation of adaptation measures 
is still in its infancy. There are no commonly accepted parameters and indicators to compare 
adaptation needs and the effectiveness of adaptation measures. So HELIO International 
developed a methodology and a series of indicators in line with the guiding principle that the 
underlying metric must be generally available for most countries. If calculation is required to 
derive an indicator it must be simple. 
 
Considering the current available studies about adaptation to climate change, we can state 
that there is no research on adaptation of energy systems under a comprehensive point of 
view. Most of the studies discuss the impacts of climate change on natural and human 
systems, and do not focus specifically on energy system. The aim of this thesis is to cover the 
adaptation of energy systems, starting from the evaluation of future climate change, 
continuing with the assessment of impacts of climate change on energy systems and the 
vulnerabilities of these, and concluding with a set of adaptation measures to construct a 
resilient energy structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART A 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND IMPACTS  
ON ENERGY SYSTEMS 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIOS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Human influence on the climate system is clear. This is evident from the increasing 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, positive radiative forcing, observed 
warming, and understanding of the climate system. (IPCC, 2013, p.15) 
 
According to the literature, an essential, necessary and critical step of the adaptation analysis 
is the investigation of the effects of climate change on energy systems. The understanding of 
future climate change and the study of elaborated scenarios have a fundamental importance, 
to find the various impacts that we can notice on different systems comprehensively. To this 
extent the first step of the adaptation research is to understand what are the most used climate 
change scenarios to detect the several effects that climate change may produce on energy 
systems. 
 
The IPCC is the reference for research on climate change: it is the leading international body 
for the assessment of climate change. The essential purpose of the thousands of scientists 
from all over the world that contribute to the work of the IPCC on a voluntary basis is to 
review and to ensure an objective and complete assessment of the current literature on 
climate change and related issues, as adaptation and mitigation. Almost all researchers from 
all over the world that investigate on adaptation base their studies on the work and 
investigations that IPCC does about climate scenarios, which reflect on the elaboration of the 
IPCC Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs). The RCPs are a set of four new 
scenarios developed for the climate modeling community as basis for long-term and near-
term modeling experiments. 
 
Before starting to examine the impacts of climate changes it’s necessary a clarification of the 
latest work of the IPCC – the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) – focusing on the RCP scenarios 
and their structure. 
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1.1 The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report and the Representative Concentration 
Pathways 
The IPCC Working Group I (WGI) assesses the physical scientific aspects of the climate system 
and climate change in the first part of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report Climate change 2013: 
the physical science basis (IPCC, 2013). In this study the various members of the WGI 
introduce a new set of climate change scenarios – the RCPs – which are useful instruments to 
elaborate new projections of climate change and impacts of climate change to natural, human 
and energy systems. The RCPs are an important development in climate research and provide 
a potential foundation for further research and assessment, including emissions mitigation 
and impact analysis. The RCPs are the product of an innovative collaboration between 
integrated assessment, climate and terrestrial ecosystem modelers and emission inventory 
experts. The resulting product forms a comprehensive data set with high spatial and sectorial 
resolutions for the period extending to 2100. 
 
The methodology used to elaborate this set of scenarios of climate and impacts projections is 
completely new. The approach used in the AR5 is totally different from the one utilized in the 
previous assessments. Figure 1.1 (Moss et al., 2007, p.11) shows the differences between the 
old and new one. The new parallel approach should provide better integration, consistency 
and consideration of feedbacks and more time to assess impacts and responses. The research 
community needs new scenarios, as pointed out by Moss et al. (Moss et al., 2010). First, more 
detailed information was needed for running the current generation of climate models than 
that provided by any previous scenarios sets. Second, there was an increasing interest in 
scenarios that explicitly explore the impact of different climate policies in addition to the no-
climate-policy scenarios explored so far (the SRES: Special Report on Emissions Scenarios). 
Finally, there was an increasing interest in exploring the role of adaptation in more detail. 
The Panel also recognized that the development of scenarios for AR5 would not be undertaken 
as part of the IPCC process, leaving new scenario development to the research community. 
The community subsequently designed a process of three phases, which involves the so called 
“parallel approach”: 
1. Development of a scenario set containing emission, concentration and land-use 
trajectories – referred to “Representative Concentration Pathways” (RCPs). 
2. A parallel development phase with climate model runs and development of new socio-
economic scenarios. 
3. A final integration and dissemination phase. 
The climate change scenarios 
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Figure 1.1 Approaches to the development of global scenarios: (a) previous sequential approach; (b) parallel approach. 
Numbers indicate analytical steps (2a and 2b proceed concurrently). Arrows indicate transfers of information (solid), 
selection of RCPs (dashed), and integration of information and feedbacks (dotted) (Moss et al., 2007, p.iv) 
The main purpose of the first phase (the development of the RCPs) is to provide information 
on possible development trajectories for the main forcing agents of climate change, consistent 
with current scenario literature allowing subsequent analysis by both Climate Models (CMs) 
and Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs)1. The crucial point of the new approach is the 
quantification of Radiative Forcing (RF) that forms the Representative Concentration 
Pathways. The procedure is completely different from the previous sequential approach, 
where the emissions and socio-economic scenarios supplied the evaluation of the radiative 
forcing. The RCPs are not associated with unique socioeconomic assumptions or emissions 
scenarios but can result from different combinations of economic, technological, 
demographic, policy, and institutional futures (“Socio-Economic Data and Scenarios,” 2014). 
RF is defined in AR5, as in previous IPCC assessments, as the change in net downward flux 
(shortwave + longwave) at the tropopause after allowing for stratospheric temperatures to 
readjust to radiative equilibrium, while holding other state variables such as tropospheric 
temperatures, water vapor and cloud cover fixed at the unperturbed values (IPCC, 2013, p.53). 
In a simpler way, radiative forcing is a measure of the net change in the energy balance of the 
Earth system in response to some external perturbation, with positive RF leading to a 
                                                   
1 The term “Climate models” is used for all kinds of models used for studying the global climate system, such as Earth-
System Models of Intermediate Complexity (EMICs), Atmosphere-Ocean coupled Global Circulation Models (AOGMCMs) 
and Earth System Models (ESMs). The term Integrated Assessment Model refers to models that combine natural science 
and socio-economic aspects of climate change primarily for the purpose of assessing policy options for climate change 
control.  
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warming and negative RF to a cooling. The external perturbations are especially human 
activities that have changed and continue to change the Earth’s surface and atmospheric 
composition. Some of these changes have a direct or indirect impact on the energy balance of 
the Earth and are drivers of climate change. These drivers are: direct change in the 
atmospheric composition via emissions of gases or particles (CO2, CH4, N2O, CFCs and 
halocarbons); indirect change in the atmospheric composition via atmospheric chemistry; 
anthropogenic aerosols-radiation interaction (ari) and aerosol-cloud interaction (aci); land 
use changes such as deforestation; natural drivers of climate change like solar and volcanic 
forcings. All these drivers turn into a positive total radiative forcing, which has led to an 
uptake of energy by the climate system. The largest contribution to total radiative forcing is 
caused by the increase of CO2 atmospheric concentration since 1750 (IPCC, 2013, p.13). 
Scenarios used in Working Group I have focused on anthropogenic emissions and do not 
include changes in natural drivers such as solar or volcanic forcing or natural emissions. For 
the IPCC AR5 the scientific community identified a specific emission scenario (including data 
on land use and land cover) from the peer reviewed literature to represent the span of the 
radiative forcing literature at the time of their selection and thus facilitate the mapping of a 
broad climate space. These were given the label ‘Representative Concentration Pathways’. The 
term “Representative” signifies that each RCP provides only one of many possible scenarios 
that would lead to the specific radiative forcing characteristics. “Pathway” emphasizes that 
not only the long-term concentration levels are of interest, but also the trajectory taken over 
time to reach that outcome. They were identified by their approximate total radiative forcing 
target in year 2100 relative to 1750: 2.6 W/m2 for RCP2.6, 4.5 W/m2 for RCP4.5, 6.0 W/m2 
for RCP6.0 and 8.5 W/m2 for RCP8.5. In 2011 the total anthropogenic RF relative to 1750 was 
2.29 [1.13 to 3.3] W/m2, and it has increased more rapidly since 1970 than during prior 
decades (IPCC, 2013, p.13). 
 
Climate and impact research communities have cooperated to design the alternative parallel 
approach for creating and using scenarios. In the parallel phase of the process, climate and 
integrated assessment modelers will work simultaneously rather than sequentially (see Figure 
1.2). The climate modelers will conduct new climate model experiments and produce new 
climate scenarios using the time series of emissions and concentrations from the four RCPs. 
The Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) is the new multi-model 
experiment (coordinated through the World Climate Research Programme) that presents an 
unprecedented level of information on which to base assessments of climate variability and 
change. CMIP5 is much more comprehensive than the preceding CMIP3 multi-model 
experiment. CMIP5 has more than twice as many models and many more experiments. A 
larger number of forcing agents are treated more completely in the CMIP5 models, 
particularly on aerosols and land use. Then, in parallel with the development of climate 
scenarios based on the RCPs, new socio-economic scenarios will be developed to explore 
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important socio-economic uncertainties affecting both adaptation and mitigation. The new 
socio-economic scenarios will be integrated with the new climate scenarios. 
Figure 1.2 The process of developing new scenarios that will be used in future climate change research and impact 
assessment (Moss et al., 2010, p.752) 
The result of this process is the achievement of projections of changes in the climate system. 
These projections are made using a hierarchy of climate models ranging from simple climate 
models, to intermediate complexity, to comprehensive climate and Earth System Models, 
which belongs to the framework of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 
(CMIP5) of the World Climate Research Programme. The new set of scenarios, the RCPs, are 
used for the new climate models simulations carried out by the framework of the CMIP5. The 
resulting projections are normally for the end of the 21st century (2081-2100). To place such 
projections in historical context, it is necessary to consider observed changes between 
different periods. The various projections have in common some peculiarities. Projections for 
the next few decades show spatial patterns of climate change similar to those projected for 
the later 21st century but with smaller magnitude. Natural internal variability will continue 
to be a major influence on climate, particularly in the near-term and the regional scale. And 
then, projected climate change based on RCPs is similar to AR4 in both patterns and 
magnitude, after accounting for scenario differences. The overall spread of projections for the 
high RCPs is narrower than for comparable scenarios used in AR4. 
 
As we have seen, the approach used in the AR5 by the scientific community to develop climate 
change projections and emissions and socio-economic scenarios is totally different from the 
previous sequential approach. This dissimilarity causes differences between the results of the 
analysis. Climate change predictions and impacts projections derived from the parallel 
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approach and RCPs scenarios, are different from the ones obtained from the sequential 
approach and the SRES scenarios. But most of the available studies and researches on 
adaptation have still used the data that come from the AR4 and the sequential approach. For 
example, whereas WGI AR5 is based primarily on results from the RCP CMIP5, the WGII AR5 
also uses results from the SRES CMIP3, and thus identifies similar or parallel scenarios from 
each set. (IPCC, 2014, p.178). For this reason, it is essential to outline SRES scenarios and the 
sequential approach, to understand the data we can get from the literature about adaptation, 
climate change and impacts of climate change to natural, human and energy systems. 
 
1.2 The Special Report on Emissions Scenarios and differences with RCPs 
The Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES), published by the IPCC in 2000, describes 
the emissions scenarios that have been used to make projections of possible future climate 
change, for the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR), published in 2001, and in the IPCC 
Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), published in 2007 (“Emission Scenarios | WMO,” n.d.).  
In Emissions scenarios. A special report of IPCC Working Group III (Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change and Working Group III, 2000) there are shown the main characteristics 
of the scenarios used in Third and Fourth Assessment Report. This set of scenarios was 
developed to represent the range of driving forces and emissions in the scenario literature, to 
reflect current understanding and knowledge about underlying uncertainties. 
 
Figure 1.3 Schematic illustration of SRES scenarios (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and Working Group III, 
2000, p.4) 
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The scenarios are based on an extensive assessment of driving forces and emissions in the 
scenario literature, alternative modeling approaches, and an “open process” that solicited 
wide participation and feedback. Four different narrative (illustrated in Figure 1.3) storylines 
were developed to describe consistently the relationships between emission driving forces and 
their evolution and add context for the scenario quantification. 
Each storyline represents different demographic, social, economic, technological, and 
environmental developments, which may be viewed positively by some people and negatively 
by others. The scenarios cover a wide range of the main demographic, economic and 
technological driving forces of GHG and sulfur emissions and are representative of the 
literature. Each scenario represents a specific quantitative interpretation of one of four 
storylines. All the scenarios based on the same storyline constitute a scenario “family”. The 
scenarios do not include additional climate initiatives, which means there are no scenarios 
which include explicitly implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) or emissions targets of the Kyoto Protocol. For each storyline 
several different scenarios were developed using different modeling approaches to examine 
the range of outcomes arising from a range of models that use similar assumptions about 
driving forces. 
 
The differences between the SRES and the RCPs are many and huge. Firstly, the development 
of global scenarios is completely different, as we have already seen. The sequential approach 
ensured that SRES were run in sequence, which implied a loss of time because, in order to 
incorporate new or changed data, you had to go back and re-run all the simulation. The new 
RCPs employ a process intended to make the modelling less time-consuming, more flexible, 
with a reduced economic cost of computation. 
The most innovative aspect of the RCPs is that instead of starting with socio-economic 
‘storylines’ from which emission trajectories and climate impacts are projected (the SRES 
methodology), each RCPs describe an emission trajectory and concentration by the year 2100, 
and consequent forcing. Each trajectory represents a specific synthesis drawn from the 
published literature. From this baseline, researchers can then test various permutations of 
social, technical and economic circumstances. 
For the first time, policy decisions can be tested. Previous scenarios were described as ‘no-
policy’, meaning the scenarios did not respond to changes driven by political or legislative 
inputs, so mitigation or adaptation strategies could not be incorporated. SRES specified the 
socio-economic circumstances for each scenario, which essentially locked in the options for 
socio-economic change (and led to a proliferation of SRES scenarios – 40 in total). Models 
were programmed to generate emissions and subsequent climate scenarios. The socio-
economic variables of the SRES scenarios were socially and policy-prescriptive, the emissions 
were inflexible and climate change outcomes were not. By fixing the emissions trajectory and 
the warming, RCPs come at the problem the other way round. Socio-economic options become 
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flexible and can be altered at will, allowing considerably more realism by incorporating 
political and economic flexibility at regional scales. Policy decisions on mitigation and 
adaptation can be tested for economic efficacy, both short and long term. Researchers can test 
various socio-economic measures against the fixed rates of warming built into the RCPs, to 
see which combinations of mitigation or adaptation produce the timeliest return on 
investment and the most cost-effective response. 
 
Summarizing, this new approach descends from the pathway of radiative forcing and 
emissions that was chosen as new starting point of the analysis. Many different socio-
economic futures are possible leading to the same level of radiative forcing. On the other hand, 
starting with assumptions related to population growth, economic development or technology 
delays the availability of the resulting climate scenarios for impact research and assessment, 
because scenarios were developed and applied sequentially in a strict linear causal chain. 
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A strong, credible body of scientific evidence shows that climate change is occurring, 
is caused largely by human activities, and poses significant risks for a broad range of 
human and natural systems. (The National Academy of Sciences, 2010) 
 
As a result of the growing recognition that climate change is underway and poses serious risks 
for both human societies and natural systems, decision makers are asking what is happening 
and what can we do to respond to it. Nations need a comprehensive, integrated and flexible 
climate change research that should be closely linked with action-oriented programs at all 
levels. The areas of interest for decision makers extend from changes in climate system to 
changes in natural resources as freshwater; from agriculture and fisheries to public health, 
cities, national and human security; from transportation system to energy system and its 
impacts. With regard to these topics, this section will center the attention on climate change 
and its impacts on energy systems.  
 
2.1 The paths of climate impacts 
The diagram of Figure 2.1 shows the various relationships that exist between climate change 
and several sections of the energy system. 
 
As we can see the chart is divided into two parts. The upper concerns natural and physical 
systems that considers the major climatic tendencies which constitute climate change, 
temperature, precipitation and extreme events. The lower part regards the impacts that 
climate change and its consequences produce on all sectors that constitute an energy system. 
This is the main section of this part of the thesis, because the aim of the study is the analysis 
of energy systems and the adaptation of it. 
In the lower portion we consider water as part of energy system because it is a fundamental 
resource for energy demand and supply. Besides, we diversify it from general energy 
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resources because it has a greater importance. Water and energy are linked through 
numerous interactive pathways affected by a changing climate. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Structure of climate change’s impacts on energy systems. Created by author 
 
Many energy sources require significant amounts of water and produce a large quantity of 
wastewater that needs energy for treatment (see Table 2.1). Energy systems should be 
managed considering water system, and its management, because these two areas have a 
strong vice-versa relationship. Thus the analysis, the management and the control of these 
two huge systems can not be divided one from the other, and for this reason we consider it as 
part of the energy system. 
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Table 2.1 The water-energy nexus. Based on Figure WE-1 from Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and 
vulnerability. Part A: global and sectoral aspects (IPCC, 2014, p. 164) 
WATER FOR ENERGY 
Cooling of thermal power plants 
Hydropower 
Irrigation of bioenergy crops 
Extraction and refining 
ENERGY FOR WATER 
Extraction and transportation 
Water treatment/desalination 
Wastewater, drainage, treatment and disposal 
 
The view and the classification proposed here are not exhaustive as the complexity of the 
chains of impact is considerable. The aim is only to give an overview by showing how climate 
change will take place, and the relative magnitude. The same problem comes out for the upper 
and the lower part of the diagram: the arrangement of the numerous impacts of climate 
change on natural system and electric energy system is subjective and debatable. The 
assessment is as much as possible accurate to the literature, but it obviously exhibits a 
subjective perspective. 
 
As regards the structure of the paths of impacts, we can observe that the connection between 
“Climate change” and “Energy supply” is different from the others. The dashed arrow 
represents an instrumental connection between those two elements, used to put in place the 
mitigation issue on the impacts’ analysis. Instead, others connections display a direct impact 
between the elements.    
 
2.2 Climate change, its major consequences and physical impacts 
The point of departure of the entire assessment of climate impacts on energy system is the 
evaluation of physical impacts of climate change on natural systems. 
There is high agreement and robust evidence that climate change occurs, and it is affecting 
natural, physical and human systems. Observations of changes in the climate system, and 
their magnitude, are significant for the adaptation issue, because the wide changes of physical 
system are the drivers that affect the energy system. These drivers could be gathered into 
three major climatic consequences. These are the change of temperatures, of precipitation 
pattern and the frequency and intensity of extreme events. The various shown data are taken 
from the Working Group I contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC, unless 
noted otherwise. 
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Figure 2.2 Physical impacts of climate change on natural systems. Created by author 
Temperature changes  
Each of the last three decades has been successively warmer at the Earth’s surface than any 
preceding decade since 1850. (IPCC, 2013, p.5) 
Climate change has led, is leading and will lead to an increase of temperature in almost all of 
the entire globe. We could observe a raise of temperature in several elements that constitute 
the natural system, as atmosphere, land, ocean, rivers, lakes, and glaciers. To appreciate the 
intensity of the warming, scientists and researchers weigh some parameters as global mean 
surface temperature, free atmospheric temperature, troposphere temperature and ocean 
temperature. Except for some particular cases projections indicate a general warming with 
high confidence. 
The globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature raised by 0.85°C over 
the period 1880 to 2012. Then, ocean warming dominated the increase in energy stored in the 
climatic system, accounting for more than 90% of the energy accumulated between 1971 and 
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2010. The ocean warming is largest near the surface: the upper 700m warmed by 0.11°C per 
decade over the period 1971 to 2010, storing more than 60% of the net energy increase in the 
climate system. The remaining 30% is stored in the ocean below 700m. 
 
Precipitation changes 
Precipitation pattern has changed in the 20th century. Over the mid-latitude land areas of 
Northern Hemisphere precipitation has increased since 1901, with higher confidence after 
1951. But changes in precipitation are hard to measure with the existing records, due to the 
greater difficulty in sampling precipitation. At present there is medium confidence that there 
has been a significant human influence on global scale changes in precipitation patterns, 
including increases in Northern Hemisphere mid-to-high latitudes. It is more likely that the 
changes have been influenced by natural internal variability. Projected changes in the water 
cycle over the next few decades show similar large-scale patterns to those towards the end of 
the century, but with smaller magnitude, and as for precipitation observations it is expected 
that projected changes will be strongly influenced by natural internal variability and may be 
affected by anthropogenic emissions. Anyway, projections show an increase of precipitation 
depending on the latitude: annual mean precipitations will increase in high and mid latitudes 
and in the equatorial Pacific Ocean, and they will not decrease in subtropics. 
 
Extreme events changes 
Changes in many extreme weather and climate events have been observed since 1950. These 
severe episodes appear in different forms, affecting temperature, precipitation and 
atmospheric circulation. 
Cold days and nights has decreased and warm days and nights has increased on the global 
scale. The frequency of heat waves has increased in Europe, Asia and Australia, and scientists 
are almost certain that in the future there will be more frequent hot and fewer cold 
temperature extremes over most land areas. Heat waves will occur with higher frequency and 
duration. However, occasional cold winter extremes will continue to take place. 
The frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation has varied: in North America and Europe 
has likely increased, while in other continents there is not so much confidence about it. For 
the near and long term global projections confirm a clear tendency for increases in heavy 
precipitation events in the global mean, but there are significant variations across regions. 
For example, extreme precipitation events will become more intense and more frequent over 
most of the mid-latitudes land masses and over wet tropical regions. 
Cyclone’s and hurricane’s activity has been altered in the 20th century. AR4 concluded that an 
increasing trend had occurred in intense tropical cyclone activity since 1970 in some regions 
but that there was no clear trend in the annual numbers of tropical cyclones. Subsequent 
assessment and more recent literature indicate that it is difficult to draw firm conclusions 
with respect to the confidence levels associated with observed trends prior to the satellite era. 
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However, future projections of tropical cyclones activity assert that there will be a decrease 
or an unchanged activity during the 21st century. And globally the area encompassed by 
monsoon systems will increase over the century while monsoon winds will weaken and 
monsoon precipitation will intensify due to the increase in atmospheric moisture. 
 
These climatic trends and impacts on natural and physical systems have influenced and will 
influence the energy system, and in particular the electric one, mostly following the pathway 
which is shown in the framework of Figure 2.1.  
 
2.3 Climate change’s impacts on energy system 
This paragraph discusses what is known about how energy systems can be affected by 
changing climate conditions: it can be influenced through many ways. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 General framework about climate change’s impacts on energy system. Created by author 
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Although impacts on energy supply and demand are the most immediate, climate change can 
also affect various other aspects of the energy sector, such as energy endowment, energy 
transportation and infrastructure, or have indirect effects through other economic sector. 
In this section the energy system is considered subdivided into three main aspects, as it can 
be observed in Figure 2.3 (which represent the second part of the diagram of Figure 2.1): 
energy resource, energy demand and energy supply. As above mentioned, in this portion we 
think about water as part of the energy entity. We consider it as an isolated component of the 
system, specifically isolated from energy resource, because it has a greater importance than 
other energy sources; and it is firmly linked and it strongly affects many portions of the 
structure.  
Energy resources concerns the amount of primary energy available. In this field we 
distinguish fossil fuels endowments, which refer to energy stock and how climate change may 
affect access to these resources, and renewable energy endowments, which refer to a flux of 
energy that is closely related to climate parameters. Energy demand relates to final energy 
use. This can be affected by rising temperatures and changes in rainfall patterns. Households 
consumption, industry demand and agriculture requests are part of this area. The analysis of 
how climate variables affect energy demand usually is underrated, but it is an important 
theme for energy planning and operations. Finally, energy supply focuses on the technologies 
that convert primary energy into a form that can be used by consumers. Energy 
transformation facilities can be affected by climate change in different ways. And the major 
share of the current energy system (and even the energy facilities under construction or 
planned to be built in the next years) will likely remain operational under new climate 
conditions given the long life span of energy infrastructure. So an accurate analysis of the 
current energy system supply is necessary and undeniable. 
 
This section will attempt to cover a wide variety of impacts that climate change may have on 
energy systems. Its structure covers the following points: it starts from water and continues 
to other energy resources, energy demand and energy supply. The analysis does not follow 
the cause-and-effect pattern: instead it’s given a backward account of the distinct elements 
which affect each system unit. 
Most of the data and trends are collected from Climate change 2013: the physical science basis: 
Working Group I contribution to the Fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC, 2013). Otherwise it will be mentioned the considered source. 
 
2.3.1 Impacts on water 
In this analysis water is considered as part of energy resources, but also as an independent 
and important entity which has a strong correlation with all that is part of energy system. 
Water, as independent body, influences the various units which constitute the energy system, 
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as energy resource, energy demand and energy supply. Therefore, in this section we outline 
impacts and modification of the water body, considering water as something unrelated to 
energy system. 
In conclusion we describe the impacts of climate change and its consequences on the various 
parts that constitute the water system, as water bodies, glaciers and oceans. Figure 2.4 shows 
the points covered in the analysis. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Climate change’s impacts on water system. Created by author 
Climate change  
Climate change influences numerous elements which are part of the water system. The 
cryosphere is one of them. Cryosphere is the collective term for the components of the Earth 
system that contain a substantial fraction of water in the frozen state. It comprises several 
components: snow, river and lake ice; sea ice; ice sheets, ice shelves, glaciers and ice caps. All 
components of the cryosphere are inherently sensitive to changes in air temperature and 
precipitation, and hence to climate change in general. Arctic and Antarctic sea ice extent 
decreased over the period 1979-2012, and they will continue to shrink and thin all year round 
during the 21st century as the annual mean global surface temperature raises. Snow cover 
extent has decreased in the Northern Hemisphere, especially in spring, and the CMIP5 models 
simulate a weak decrease during the last two decades of the 21st century. Permafrost 
temperatures have increased in most regions since the early 1980s although the rate of 
increase has varied regionally: significant permafrost degradation has occurred in the Russian 
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European North. Recent projections of the extent of near-surface permafrost indicate 
substantial degradation of it, and thaw depth increasing over much of the permafrost area. 
The projected changes in permafrost are a response to warming but also to changes in snow 
conditions, because snow properties and their seasonal evolution exert significant control on 
soil thermal state. 
 
Evaporation is another element of the water system that is affected by climate change. To be 
more accurate, evaporation is a part of the hydrological cycle, and for this reason it is highly 
influenced by the precipitation pattern. On a global scale, evapotranspiration over land 
increased from the early 1980s up to the late 1990s: after 1998 a lack of moisture availability 
in Southern Hemisphere land areas has acted as a constraint to further increase of global 
evapotranspiration. Future evaporation rate will be different from region to region: over land 
it will have the same pattern as increases and decreases in precipitation. 
 
Temperature  
We can state that an element that belongs to the water system is almost influenced only by 
temperature changes and not by climate change in general. This element is the sea.  
It was found that the contributors to global mean sea level rise are the thermal expansion, the 
changes in aggregate glacier volume (land-ice masses), the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheet’s 
mass balance and the water storage on land. Past observations of oceans revealed that the 
warming of the upper 700 m of sea from 1971 to 2010 caused an estimated mean rate of rise 
of 0.6 mm/yr. Observations of the contribution to sea level rise from warming below 700 m 
are still uncertain due to limited historical data, especially in the Southern Ocean. But some 
studies have found a significant warming trend between 1000 and 4000 m: the estimated 
total contribution of warming below 2000 m to global mean sea level rise between about 1992 
and 2005 is 0.1 mm/yr. 
Researchers then have investigated in depth future changes of oceans and sea level rise, 
noticing that the major contributors for future sea level rise are the heat expansion and the 
melting of glaciers. The term “glaciers” excludes contributions of Antarctica’s glaciers but 
includes contributions of the peripheral glaciers of the Greenland ice sheet.  
 
Precipitation 
The change of precipitation pattern causes different repercussions on water system and other 
fields. Principally two effects stand out: floods and droughts. Flooding occurs most commonly 
from heavy rainfall when natural watercourses do not have the capacity to convey excess 
water. Drought conditions occur for many reasons. We most often think about drought in 
relation to precipitation, assessing the degree of dryness and the duration of the dry period. 
This is known as a meteorological drought. But we can also think about hydrological drought, 
or how decreases in precipitation affect streamflow, soil moisture, reservoir and lake levels, 
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and groundwater recharge (“Causes of Drought,” n.d.). To sum up, the variability of 
precipitation pattern could result in floods and droughts presence.  
These events are influenced by climate change: however, there continues to be a lack of 
evidence regarding the sign of trend in the magnitude and frequency of floods and droughts 
on a global scale due to climate change.  
 
The most evident flood trends appear to be in northern high latitudes, where observed 
warming trends have been largest. Some studies for Europe show evidence for upward, 
downward or no trend in the magnitude and frequency of floods: thus, there is currently no 
clear and widespread evidence for observed changes in flooding except for the earlier spring 
flow in snow-dominated regions. The earlier spring flow is caused by changes in precipitation 
pattern and changes in temperatures. The California Climate Change Center elaborated a 
report in which is described the earlier spring flow problem. In this report, Climate change 
impacts on high-elevation hydropower generation in California’s Sierra Nevada: a case study 
in the upper American river (California Climate Change Center, 2006). They explain that 
under a climate change scenario, California’s hydrology would experience an earlier timing of 
streamflows. This shift is associated with the increase in temperature, leading to a higher 
proportion of precipitation falling as rain (as compared to snow) and an earlier spring 
snowmelt runoff. This report confirms that climate change modifies precipitation patterns 
and then the seasonal inflows, which could affect, for example, the hydropower generation in 
a basin. 
 
Assessments of changes in drought characteristics with climate change should be made in the 
context of specific impacts questions (IPCC, 2013, p. 1086). It is known that global climate 
change affects a variety of factors associated with drought. There is high confidence that 
increased temperatures will lead to more precipitation falling as rain rather than snow (that 
change the river streamflow), earlier snowmelt, and increased evaporation and transpiration. 
But there is low confidence in the magnitude of future impact. Low precipitation and timing 
of water availability can cause, for example, agricultural drought, when available water 
supplies are not able to meet crop water demands. For instance, earlier snowmelt may not 
change the total quantity of water available but can lead to earlier runoff that is out of phase 
with peak water demand in summer. These are the impacts of changing precipitation in water 
system. 
 
However, the modification of precipitation’s layout provokes also other variations in water 
systems. Ocean regions of high salinity, where evaporation dominates precipitation, have 
become more saline, while ocean regions of low salinity, where precipitation dominates, have 
become fresher since the 1950s (IPCC, 2013, p.8). These regional trends in ocean salinity 
provide indirect evidence that evaporation and precipitation have changed, and that they will 
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modify aspects of the water system. These trends could be observed also in other regions and 
water elements as watercourses and lakes. In the report Salinity in the Casamance estuary. 
Occurrence and consequences (Blesgraaf et al., 2006) the authors report that since the late 60s 
the rainfall got lower compared with the years before. The period of lower rainfall lasted for 
some years, known also as the Sahelian drought. In this period the estuary has become 
hypersaline (due to evaporation and lower rainfall the salinity of estuary water exceeds the 
ocean salinity), and the conclusion that can be made from the authors’ model is that hyper 
salinity is more or less irreversible. Agriculture and fishery suffer much from high salinities 
and the ecosystem is far from different. Freshwater is scarcer here, since rainfall is often less 
than in the downstream lowlands, thus making the condition for agriculture less favorable. 
So water use for several purposes and water management have become very difficult in this 
region. 
 
2.3.2 Impacts on energy resources 
Energy resources are generally defined as whatever that can be used as a source of energy. 
Another definition could be the sources from which electricity or other forms of energy 
generation can be drawn. 
There are lots of different kind of energy resources, and they fall into two main categories: 
renewable energy sources, as wind, solar, biofuels and water, and nonrenewable energy 
sources, as oil, natural gas and coal. All energy resources that exist in nature could be affected 
by climate change (in different ways): in this section we refer to impacts to energy 
endowment, which concerns the amount of primary energy available. Renewable energy 
resources are fluxes of energy, and their endowment is closely related to climate parameters 
and changes. On the other hand, fossil fuels are stock sources, thus climate change influences 
the access to them and not their endowment. 
All the resources are affected by all the outcomes of climate change. Consequently, we 
aggregate the climatic consequences under a unique parameter, defining climate change as 
the unique cause of endowment affliction. Then, we evaluate water as an independent origin 
of impacts, which affects only a particular energy source, the hydropower one. Hydropower 
endowment is affected by climate change and its consequences as other resources, so we may 
consider it modified by the unique parameter climate change. But, as already stated, we 
consider water as part of energy resources and also as an independent and important system, 
which has a strong correlation with the energy system. And, as energy system and energy 
resource in general, it is influenced by all climate change consequences, as we have explained 
earlier. On account of this, here we emphasize the strong and direct correlation between water 
and energy systems, which can be observed in energy endowment, demand and supply, 
highlighting that a modification of water system originates an alteration of hydropower 
endowment. 
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Figure 2.5 summarizes the particular afflicted areas. 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Climate change’s impacts on energy resources. Created by author 
Climate change 
As just mentioned, this subdivision deals with impacts of climate change on all energy 
resources except for hydropower one. The contemplated renewable resources are wind 
energy, liquid biofuels, wave and tidal energy, while are oil, natural gas and coal for non-
renewable resources. 
 
Leaving aside the physical aspects that generate winds, we focus on the aspects of climate 
change which affect the wind energy endowment. 
The availability and reliability of wind power depend on weather and climate conditions. The 
main mechanism by which global climate change impacts wind energy endowment, is the 
shifts in geographical distribution and variability of wind speed (inter- and intra-annual 
variability) (Schaeffer et al., 2012). Recent findings suggest that climate change may introduce 
this risk on wind power generation. Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel consumption 
are contributing to global warming and are projected to have dramatic impacts on global 
climate on decade to century timescales. These impacts will affect the statistics (maximum, 
minimum, mean and variance) of all meteorological variables, including wind. (Breslow and 
Sailor, 2002). 
We must consider another aspect that will affect wind energy. The amount of energy that 
wind transfers to a wind turbine depends on the wind speed, the area of the turbine’s rotor 
and the density of the air. The effect of air density on energy density is modest but not 
negligible (Pryor and Barthelmie, 2010). An increase in air temperature leads to a decrease of 
air density with a commensurate decline in energy density. 
 
Liquid biofuels are vulnerable to the effects of weather modifications on crops used as raw 
materials to produce ethanol and biodiesel (or other biofuels). Some impacts of climate change 
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on agriculture can be the changes in temperature and rainfall patterns, in the frequency of 
precipitation and extreme events, in the level of carbon dioxide. As well summarized by 
Schaeffer et al. in Energy sector vulnerability to climate change: a review (Schaeffer et al., 
2012), climate change directly affects many key factors of agriculture, like crop yield, 
agricultural distribution zones, incidence of pests and the availability of lands suitable for 
growing some crops: 
 
 Temperature increases can modify soil conditions (water, carbon, nitrogen) and 
impact crop fertility and productivity levels; 
 Higher CO2 levels can cause a positive impact by improving photosynthesis; 
 Alteration in regional temperature variations causes a modification in regional 
agriculture profiles because each plant has a temperature range suitable for his 
growth; 
 Rising temperature leads to a higher rate of evapotranspiration in plants and reduces 
productivity; 
 Temperature increases can affect the metabolism of insects increasing the incidence 
of pests; 
 Extreme climate conditions (droughts, frosts, fires, storms) can affect crops in general. 
 
In terms of resource endowments, the main impact is related to eventual losses in suitable 
areas for growing energy crops due to modifications in climate. 
 
The World Bank Study Climate impacts on energy systems: key issues for energy sector 
adaptation (Ebinger and World Bank, 2011) talks about the several ways in which the ocean 
can provide energy. Wave energy is the most commonly used ocean energy worldwide, 
although it is still not developed or disseminated to the same extent as other renewable energy 
resources. And tidal energy is another kind of ocean energy. 
Climate change impacts on wind energy have direct impacts on wave formation. Wind climate 
effects and wave generation have a nonlinear relationship and show different long-term 
trends around the globe. In some regions a positive impact on wave energy with an increasing 
trend in wave height has been observed. In other regions, there has been an opposite trend, 
with a negative impact on wave energy owning to a decrease in wave height. 
In closing, no references have been found on climate change effects on tidal energy. It is 
possible that sea level rise could alter tidal basins and affect the tidal range. Tidal currents 
may also change as a result of sea level rise. 
 
Although climate change does not impact the actual amount of existing oil, natural gas and 
coal resources, it can affect our knowledge about these resources and the access to them (as 
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mentioned above). For example, climate change may facilitate access to several areas by 
diminishing the ice cover in the Arctic region. Ice-free summers can increase the length of 
drilling seasons, which can affect the rate at which new fields can be developed, so oil and gas 
reserves and resources could be affected positively by new climate conditions (Schaeffer et al., 
2012). Coal quality – and so coal endowment – could be affected positively or negatively by 
new climate conditions, depending on the increasing or decreasing of average precipitation. 
 
Water 
In the introduction of this paragraph it is asserted that we evaluate water as an independent 
origin of impacts to energy system due to climate change. In particular, it mostly influences 
the hydropower endowment in the energy resource sector.  
Assessing all the impacts of climate change on hydropower endowment is not simple. There 
are several factors that influence the availability of water resources for hydropower plants. 
Hydropower generation depends directly on the availability of water resources and the 
hydrological cycle. Hydropower endowments are a result of the excess water that turns into 
runoff. According to IPCC, runoff is that part of precipitation that does not evaporate and is 
not transpired, but flows over the ground surface and returns to water bodies (IPCC, 2013, p. 
1461).  
A variety of hydrological models have been used to evaluate the impacts that climate change 
can have on runoff. They use, basically, precipitation and temperature projections from 
General Circulation Models (GCM) or hypothetical scenarios (e.g. (Arnell, 2004)): essentially 
they translate the climate variables into runoff. The hydropower endowment depends on the 
seasonal pattern of the hydrological cycle. In regions where snowmelt is a relevant factor in 
the annual water cycle, climate change may cause impacts to runoff. This issue can be 
particularly relevant where the glaciers can be affected by higher temperatures (Schaeffer et 
al., 2012). Temperature modifies also the saturation vapor pressure of water in the air: an 
higher temperature implies an increasing evapotranspiration and a reduction of runoff (Milly 
et al., 2005). Another factor that could influence water resource is the regional changes in 
water demand due to changes in population and economic activities (especially irrigation 
demand for agriculture). 
 
2.3.3 Impacts on energy demand 
As the climate of the world warms, the consumption of energy in climate-sensitive sectors is 
likely to change. Possible effects include: 
 
 Decreases in the amount of energy consumed in residential, commercial, and 
industrial buildings for space heating and increases for space cooling; 
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 Decreases in energy used directly in certain processes such as residential, commercial, 
and industrial water heating, and increasing in energy used for residential and 
commercial refrigeration and industrial process cooling (e.g., in thermal power plants 
or steel mills); 
 Increases in energy used to supply other resources for climate-sensitive processes, 
such as pumping water for irrigated agriculture and municipal uses; 
 Changes in the balance of energy use among delivery forms and fuel types, as between 
electricity used for air conditioning and natural gas used for heating; 
 Changes in energy consumption in key-sensitive sectors of the economy, such as 
transportation, construction, agriculture and others (Wilbanks et al., 2008, p. 7). 
 
This section summarizes the potential effects of climate change on energy demand. It mainly 
focuses on the effects of climate change on energy consumption in buildings (emphasizing 
space heating and space cooling), in industry and in agriculture. We may say that this section 
focuses the attention on the impacts on primary, secondary and tertiary economy sectors. 
Energy demand is influenced by climate change and in particular by temperature changes. A 
rise of temperatures implies, for example, a decrease of energy consumption in winter for 
space heating and an increase in summer for space cooling. Temperature variation affects also 
the industrial and agriculture sectors. Industrial energy demand is particularly sensitive to 
climate change and especially to the rise of air temperature. In the agriculture sector climate 
change can affect water and electricity demand for irrigation purposes. Finally, an alteration 
of water source properties, as temperature or availability, causes a change in energy demand 
and use. 
Hence, we could indicate that climate change modifies energy demand through temperature 
changes and water changes. This comment is summarized in Figure 2.6. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Climate change’s impacts on energy demand. Created by author 
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Temperature 
We can notice different effects of temperature change in the demand side: the most evident is 
that higher temperatures imply lower demand for heating and higher demand for cooling. 
The performance of motors and engines can vary with temperature. Furthermore, due to 
temperature rising, water and energy demand can vary in industries and agriculture. 
 
The most assessed 
impact on energy 
demand is the estimation 
of future heating and 
cooling due to 
temperature changes. 
The first studies on this 
subject date from the last 
1980s. They concerned 
the calculation of energy 
demand for heating 
(winter) and cooling 
(summer) in some 
specific regions, or the estimation of changes in consumption and peak load. Anyway, some 
empirical studies have found that total energy demand depends on outdoor temperature in a 
U-shaped fashion: at low temperature there is a relatively high energy demand (for heating), 
at intermediate temperatures the energy demand tend to be lower (no need for heating or 
cooling), high temperatures tend to increase energy demand (for cooling) (see Figure 2.7). 
This U-shaped temperature dependence pattern (TDP) suggests that climate change may have 
ambiguous consequences for future energy demand at the global level, as increasing outdoor 
temperatures could generally reduce heating demand while increasing cooling demand. This 
kind of analysis is usually studied using the concept of heating and cooling degree days. 
 
Industrial energy demand is not particularly sensitive to climate change (Scott and Huang, 
2007, cited in Ebinger and World Bank, 2011). The temperature differences that are covered 
in industrial processes are often much larger than outdoor temperature fluctuations. Many 
continuous processes operate at relatively stable surrounding temperatures and, thus, have a 
relatively stable demand. However, continuous processes related to food processing and 
storage, for example, have relatively small temperature differences to bridge and are possibly 
more sensitive to outdoor temperature variations (especially since these cooling processes 
often exchange heat with the outdoor air). Furthermore, industrial use of water will vary with 
climate change: projections are given, for example, by the MIT Joint Program on the Science 
Figure 2.7 The relationship between building energy use and the outdoor temperature 
(Guan, 2009, p. 794) 
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and Policy of Global Change in its 2014 Energy and climate outlook (MIT Joint Program on the 
Science and Policy of Global Change, 2014). 
 
Agricultural energy use falls into five main categories: equipment operations, irrigation 
pumping, embodied energy in fertilizers and chemicals, product transport, drying and 
processing. A warmer climate might lead to a rising demand for water and irrigation, and 
therefore increase the use of energy for pumping. However, no accurate estimates of these 
effects could be found in available literature. 
 
Water 
The rise of temperatures and the change of precipitation patterns produce regional and 
seasonal changes in water cycle. These modifications could lead to an alteration of energy 
demand in final use. In some regions across the world there are already problems related to 
the availability of freshwater resources for domestic use. 
 
2.3.4 Impacts on energy supply 
Whatever is able to convert primary energy into a form that can be used by consumers is 
considered as a technology which belongs to energy supply system. In this study we take in 
consideration electricity as kind of energy used by consumers. Consequently, in this segment 
we examine those technologies which convert primary resources (in the form of stock or flux 
energy) into electricity and those technologies and facilities correlated with electricity 
generation. Therefore, we point the attention on the facilities which generate electricity, as 
hydropower, nuclear power plants, photovoltaic panels and wind farms and on the 
infrastructures correlated to electricity generation, as refining plants, pipelines and electricity 
grid. 
 
Energy transformation facilities can be influenced by climate change in a variety of ways, 
affecting the system’s capacity to supply energy to consumers and meet specific energy 
services. Great changes of global climate should happen in the near and long term. Global 
climate change is already occurring, but the greatest changes will be in the future, as impacts 
on energy system and energy facilities. Most of the facilities which are now in operation will 
be still operating in the middle and long term, when the new climate conditions occur (such 
as hydropower plants). So, climate impacts analyses must take into account a major share of 
the current energy system and also the energy facilities under construction or planned to be 
built in the next few years. Instead the analysis of short lifespan technologies implies in 
assuming that the facilities would be replaced over time by similar technologies at the same 
location: for some technologies, where there is still some room for advances or relocation, 
climate impacts can be overestimated. 
Chapter 2 
50 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
Climate change as a whole alters the energy supply and the facilities that constitute an energy 
system. Thus, all the impacts should be attributed to climate change. But, as we saw in Figure 
2.1, we consider that more entities afflict the energy supply. This is due to the fact that during 
the analysis we have pointed the attention on some peculiarities of the facilities which supply 
electricity. The energy-natural system causes alterations on energy production in specific 
ways. Air temperature, for example, weighs on the efficiency of photovoltaic cells and thermal 
power plants. Water temperature bears upon the refrigeration system of power plants and 
this fact affects water withdrawal and water consumption. Thus, the links between energy 
supply and temperature and water indicate these particular correlations between energy 
generation and natural environment. 
 
 
Figure 2.8 Climate change’s impacts on energy supply. Created by author 
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Therefore, the next description is structured in a specific way. Firstly, there will be an 
explanation of the influences of temperature and water on energy supply system. Then, there 
will be an account of the impacts of energy resources and extreme events on the supply 
structure. And finally we will give a hint of the adjustment of the share of particular electricity 
supply technologies which will be necessary to respect the established mitigation targets. This 
structure is portrayed in Figure 2.8. 
 
Temperature 
The temperature of the air influences the efficiency of energy generation installations as 
photovoltaic panels and thermal plants, and the efficiency of the transmission, distribution 
and transfer system.  
 
Photovoltaic cells suffer from increasing air temperatures. The energy produced by PV cells 
depends on the cell temperature: an increment of cell temperature due to a rise of air 
temperature reduces the PV electric generation. 
 
The thermal power plant denomination includes several kind of generation technologies, 
which use different fuels to get the electricity output. These technologies use coal, natural gas, 
nuclear, geothermal, solar and biomass energy residues to obtain electricity utilizing two 
different thermal power cycles: the Rankine cycle and the Brayton-Joule cycle. These plants 
need a heating and a cooling system, which are the most affected components of a power 
plant. The average ambient conditions like temperature, pressure, humidity and water 
availability influence the cycles and the supply of energy. In this subsection the analysis 
concentrates on air temperature and the consequent efficiency of the plant.  
In a Rankine cycle based plant the heat from fuels is used to produce high-pressure steam, 
which is expanded over a turbine to produce electricity. The driving force for the process is 
the phase change of the steam to a liquid which follows the turbine (it is realized in a 
condenser), from which arises the demand for cooling water. A vacuum is created in the 
condensation process that draws the steam over the turbine. This low pressure is critical to 
the thermodynamic efficiency of the process. Increased backpressure will lower the efficiency 
of the generation process. Increases in ambient air temperatures and cooling water 
temperatures will rise steam condensate temperatures and turbine backpressure, reducing 
power generation efficiency (U.S. Department of Energy, 2013, pag. 10). 
In The impact of climate change on the electricity market: a review (Mideksa and Kallbekken, 
2010) the authors explain that how efficient is a plant in transforming fuels into electric power 
depends upon the temperature differential between the machine and the external 
environment. The higher is the heat differential, the higher is the efficiency of conversion and 
vice-versa. As climate change is likely to produce higher air temperatures, the heat differential 
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between the machine and the environment will decrease, thus reducing the net power 
generated from a given amount of fuel. 
 
The electricity transmission system is as well affected by the rise of temperatures. Power lines 
suffer electricity losses due to higher temperature of the air and to the resistance it induces 
on the lines. 
 
Water 
Thermal power plants require significant amounts of water for refrigeration, making them 
vulnerable to fluctuations in water supply. For example, each kilowatt-Hour (kWh) of US 
thermoelectric generation requires the withdrawal of approximately 25 gallons (nearly 100 
liters) of water, weighted-average for all thermoelectric power generation (Feeley et al., 
2008). Per unit of energy produced, thermal power plants are the energy sector’s most 
intensive users of water.  
In Chapter 17, Water for energy, of World energy outlook 2012 (IEA, 2012) the authors 
highlight that in future scenarios the trends will be to shift towards higher efficiency power 
plants, with more advanced cooling systems that reduce withdrawals but increase 
consumption of water per unit of electricity produced. Cooling systems will move from once-
through systems (which withdraw freshwater, pass it through a steam condenser to absorb 
heat and return it at higher temperature to a nearby water body) to wet re-circulating systems 
(which withdraw freshwater and pass it through a steam condenser but instead of being 
discharged downstream, the heated water is cooled in a wet tower) and dry cooling systems 
(which use air flow through a cooling water tower to condense steam). 
Projected changes in water availability around the world, point to a lower availability of water 
in some regions. It can be expected, therefore, that power plants will increasingly compete 
with other water users (like agriculture and public supply) in water-stressed areas. 
 
Extreme events 
Extreme events could affect all type of power generation supply and related infrastructure. 
They could influence thermal and nuclear plants, hydropower plants, wind farms, biofuels 
productivity, oil and gas supply facilities, oil and gas pipelines, electricity grid and 
infrastructure in general. Energy supply system is subject to several impacts which may cause 
interruptions of electricity power supply. 
Observed and projected increases in a variety of extreme events like hurricanes, will have a 
significant impact on the energy sector in general. Hurricanes, with their strong winds and 
high waves, can have a debilitating impact on energy supply. But extreme events are not 
restricted to hurricanes. Extreme warm days, cold days and precipitation, droughts and floods 
belong to this category of weather events.  
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Extreme temperatures for example afflict different kind of energy productions. The most 
stressed technologies are thermal power plants, oil and gas platforms and electricity grids. 
Kopytko and Perkins  in Climate change, nuclear power, and the adaptation-mitigation 
dilemma (Kopytko and Perkins, 2011) concentrated their studies on nuclear power plants, 
focusing the attention on inland sites in France and coastal sites in USA. In France, warmer 
than average summers from 2003 to 2006, required extensive operational changes to 
maintain a steady power supply from nuclear power plants. Blackouts were avoided in France 
by exercising several options including the purchase of energy on the wholesale power 
market, the conservation of energy by citizens, the negotiations of lower loads from industry 
consumers and the reduction of exports to Italy. And also, Italy relies on France for much of 
its power supply. In 2003, Italy purchased 35.2% of its energy imports from France and 
consequently many Italian cities experienced blackouts lasting several hours.  
In The impact of climate change on the electricity market: a review (Mideksa and Kallbekken, 
2010) the authors concentrated on the efficiency of plants that depends on temperature 
differential between the machine and the external environment. They reported the words of 
the Associated Press on January 23, 2008: “During Europe’s brutal 2006 heat wave, French, 
Spanish and German utilities were forced to shut down some of their nuclear plants and 
reduce power at others because of low water levels – some for as much as a week.” (“Drought 
could shut down nuclear power plants,” n.d.).  
Burkett in Global climate change implication for coastal and offshore oil and gas development 
(Burkett, 2011) highlighted that warming atmospheric temperatures can have string effects 
on OCS (Outer Continental Shelf) and resource development in the Arctic. Decreasing sea ice 
cover may require design changes to counter effects of increased wave action and storm 
surges. The author also stressed that warming atmospheric temperatures can have various 
effects on the resource development in the Arctic. Decreasing ice cover may require design 
changes to counter effects of increased wave action and storm surges like erosion. However, 
the biggest problem may be the thawing of the permafrost. Permafrost, an essentially 
permanently frozen land, acts as a concrete foundation for all the infrastructures in cold 
climates. As temperatures rise, the permafrost thaw. The ice trapped inside the frozen ground 
liquefies. If there is poor drainage, the water sits on the earth’s surface and floods. If there is 
good drainage, the water runs off, potentially causing erosion and landslides.  
In their above mentioned paper Mideksa and Kallebekken treated also the problems associated 
to transmission lines. They reported a study by Eskeland et al. (The future of European 
electricity: choices before 2020, 2008) in which is stated that there could be an electricity loss 
in transmission due to higher temperature and the resistance it induces on power lines. Then, 
as reported in U.S. energy sector vulnerabilities to climate change and extreme weather (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2013) increasing temperatures are expected to extend transmission 
losses, reduce current carrying capacity and increase stresses on the distribution system. The 
efficiency of the lines is reduced by higher temperatures. Another effect of the increasing 
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temperatures – the thermal expansion – could produce a significant increase in sag, which 
could cause several problems. The transmission lines suffer from high temperatures, but also 
the electric power transformers are affected with them. Transformers could even fail causing 
interruptions of the electric power supply. 
 
Droughts and floods can be associated to extreme precipitations. These variables significantly 
change the supply of electricity in the energy sector. Mideksa and Kallbekken (Mideksa and 
Kallbekken, 2010) commented that climate change affects hydropower production through 
the frequency of erratic river flow and hence dam safety. Most current dams are built without 
taking into account the possible impact of climate change and may have lower reservoir 
capacity to handle frequent extreme events, associated with river flow and snow melt. To the 
extent that climate changes occur abruptly, the dam safety issue becomes relatively more 
important. If the changes take place slowly over time, the dam safety issue becomes relatively 
less important.  
Liquid biofuels then could highly be distressed. Frequency of extreme events like droughts 
and frosts modifies crop yields. Lower water availability caused by increased 
evapotranspiration due to rising temperatures and/or lower precipitation levels can reduce 
crop productivity.  
Furthermore, Kopytko and Perkins (Kopytko and Perkins, 2011) in their paper investigated 
the impacts of inland floods on French nuclear power plants. The 1999 flood of Le Blayais 
revealed that flood protection had to be investigated and improved at many sites. The flooding 
event resulted from a high tide, wind speeds of 100 km/h and storm surge. The three units 
operating when the storm arrived shut down due to loss of off-site power. 
Oil and gas production may be affected by structural damage caused by extreme events like 
flooding from sea level rise and storm surges that may lead to erosion and other damages.  
Oil refining is also a large water consumption activity and can, thus, be affected by a lower 
water availability induced by climate change. Burkett in its Global climate change implication 
for coastal and offshore oil and gas development (Burkett, 2011) summarized other 5 climate 
change variables that are likely to affect oil and gas development in addition to increased 
atmospheric and ocean temperatures. These are changes in precipitation patterns and runoff, 
sea level rise, more intense storm, changes in wave regime and increase in carbon dioxide 
levels and ocean acidity. For example, extreme rainfall events that flood low-lying coastal sites, 
may damage onshore support facilities. 
Also, fuel transport could be impacted by water. Decreased water levels in rivers and ports 
can cause interruptions, delays and increased costs in barge and other fuel delivery 
transportation routes. And, in addition, extreme events like floods could affect the transport. 
Increasing intensity and frequency of flooding increments the risk to rail and barge transport 
of crude oil, petroleum products and coal (U.S. Department of Energy, 2013). 
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Hurricanes distress all kinds of supply facilities. Extreme wind speeds and precipitations 
produce storm surges and floods in the areas affected by hurricanes. Windmills can operate 
only up to wind speeds of around 25 m/s: at higher wind speeds the strain on the turbine 
would be too high.  
Nuclear power plants are highly damaged by hurricanes. Kopytko and Perkins studied the 
operation of US nuclear power plants during hurricane season. Hurricane Andrew in 1992 
caused damage to a number of non-safety structures and equipment at Turkey Point. That 
event demonstrated the need to both design non-safety structures and equipment to 
withstand the postulated events, or assure that the consequence of their failure would not 
disable the safety function of safety-related structures, systems and components. The authors 
of the report in addition highlighted that while shutdowns during storms tend to be only days, 
the change to normal operating procedures that occur when sirens, communication, off-site 
power and site access are lost or restricted, alone or in combination, becomes problematic, 
and the restarting periods need to be shorter.  
In Energy sector vulnerabilities to climate change: a review (Schaeffer et al., 2012) the authors 
reported that oil and gas supply from offshore and coastal low-lying facilities can be disrupted 
by extreme weather events, such as intense hurricanes. Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico in 
2004 and 2005 resulted in a large number of damaged and destroyed offshore oil and gas 
structures: over 115 platforms were destroyed and more than 52 structures were extensively 
damaged. Finally, energy distribution might be impacted by weather events. For instance, 
high winds can damage to distribution network and lead to energy interruptions. 
 
Energy resources 
Energy resources need to be converted into final energy sources in order to meet specific 
energy services. Energy transformation facilities can be affected by climate change in a variety 
of ways, affecting the system’s capacity to supply energy to consumers. But, as we have seen, 
climate change alters the properties and availability of energy resources, which, as a result, 
affect the energy supply system. 
 
The amount of electricity that can be generated from hydropower plants depends not only on 
the installed generation capacity, but also on the variation in water inflows to the power 
plants’ reservoirs. Natural climate variability has already great influence on the planning and 
operations of hydropower systems. Changing climate conditions may affect the operation of 
the existing hydropower system and even compromise the variability of new investments. The 
methodological approach normally used to assess climate impacts on hydropower generation 
uses climate change simulated river flows in an electric power model. A hydrological model is 
used to convert the impact of climate change into water inflows to the reservoirs of 
hydropower plants. An electricity power model is then used to convert hydrological impact 
into variations in electricity production. The models used to assess climate impacts depend on 
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the complexity of the system. Two factors especially influence an hydropower generation 
system (de Lucena et al., 2009). 
 
 The penetration of hydro generation on electricity system (whether hydroelectricity is 
complementary or complemented by other power sources). If it is complementary to 
other generating sources, the average values of hydropower production provide a 
good measure of impact (most of the electricity is produced by other sources, so the 
maximum impact that I can have from hydro generation is the whole hydroelectricity 
power generation). If it is complemented by other generating sources, in practice if 
the electric system is based fundamentally on hydropower, the risk of power shortages 
must be minimized. Thus the measure of impact must be assessed in terms of firm 
power1. In some extreme cases the worst historical hydrological conditions are used 
to assess the firm power. 
 The geographical dispersion and the level of integration through transmission capacity. 
Transmission may play an important role in coping with regional climate variations 
in interconnected power systems that cover a vast area.  
 
Individual plant characteristics also influence the vulnerability of hydropower system to 
climate change, especially in small systems where there are small run-of-river plants. These 
plants offer little operational flexibility. Natural river flow can be highly variable, across 
seasons and years. So reservoir storage capacity can compensate these variations in water 
inflow. 
The paper The vulnerability of energy infrastructure to environmental change (Paskal, 2009) 
aims to identify some of the most susceptible nodes in the global energy infrastructure. It 
focuses on hydropower generation, distinguishing clearly the impacts of two different kind of 
hydropower power plants, the primarily glacier-dependent and the primarily precipitation-
dependent. 
Glacier-dependent hydro plants are those hydroelectric installations that depend primarily on 
glacial thaw, such as some in the Himalayas, Alps and Andes. These installations are likely to 
face difficulties in managing widely varying flows both seasonally and over yeas. In Europe 
for example, mountain areas are likely to see more flooding in winter and spring, and drier 
summers. These fluctuations can disrupt hydroelectric power generation, erode 
infrastructure and damage valuable regional industries. Currently many glaciers are 
retreating, producing more runoff than dams were designed for. Snowpack normally act as a 
natural reservoir during winter, but climate change will modify this attribute. One immediate 
                                                    
1 Firm power: the amount of energy that hydropower system can produce under critical conditions, defined by the level 
of reliability expected from the entire system. 
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impact of the thaw is flooding. Once the glaciers reach a minimal extent, the flow may 
markedly decline, creating a new set of challenges, including a potential decline in 
hydroelectric production. 
Precipitation-dependent hydro plants are those installations that depend primarily on 
predictable seasonal precipitation. They will find it increasingly difficult to anticipate flow. 
This could potentially cause a decline in power generation, floods and irrigation problems. 
Unexpected rainfall has already complicated the management of some dams. Them often 
serve three purposes: flood control, irrigation and power generation. Most rain-dependent 
plants are designed to store water from the rainy season in order to be able to irrigate and 
generate power in the dry season. Those plans rely on predictable rain patterns. If 
precipitations are inadequate, there will be a loss in generation. The situation can be equally 
problematic when there is too much water for the design of the installation. If the reservoir 
fills in the rainy season and then, owing to changing precipitation patterns, the rain keeps 
falling well into what should be the dry season, the reservoir can back up and impart problems 
to the upstream zone. If in order to prevent any damage upstream a higher quantity of water 
is added to the already swollen river, the downstream zones could be flooded and furthermore 
a certain amount of stored energy would be wasted. 
Another factor which affect the hydropower generation is the Glacial Lake Outburst Flooding 
(GLOF). GLOF events occurred in areas where there are lots of glaciers, like in Nepal. Climate 
change and higher temperatures are contributing to a very rapid increase in the volume of 
glacial lakes, which significantly increases the probability of catastrophic events (Agrawala et 
al., 2003, p. 31). 
 
Wind energy cannot be naturally stored. The natural hourly, daily or seasonal variability of 
wind speeds has a significant impact in the energy produced from wind turbines. Power 
demand fluctuations may not match natural variations in wind speeds, rendering the 
operation of wind power more susceptible to changing wind patterns resulting from climate 
change. The energy contained in wind is proportional to the cube of wind speed, which means 
that alterations in the later can have significant impacts on the former. Wind speeds below 
the average yield much less power, while speeds much above the average can overstress 
turbine components and activate the cut-out speed control. This implies that the analysis of 
climate impacts on wind energy supply must be done using the frequency distribution of wind 
speeds, not only average values. Alterations in wind speed frequency distribution can affect 
the optimal match between the energy availability from the natural resource and the power 
curve of wind turbines. However, future climate projections have serious limitations in 
reproducing wind speeds and their frequency distributions or directional changes. 
 
Solar energy generation is affected by increasing air temperature, which modifies the 
efficiency of photovoltaic cells. But in addition to air temperature, also a change in global 
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radiation revises the electricity output of solar cells. Fidje and Martinsen in their article Effects 
of climate change on the utilization of solar cells in the Nordic region (Fidje and Martinsen, 
2006) explained the results of their experiment on PV panels. The effect of climate change on 
PV systems had been investigated using the IPCC scenarios A2 and B2 for the period 2071-
2100. Both scenarios show reduced global solar radiation and increased temperature. 
 
Liquid biofuels production is vulnerable to impacts of climate change on crop production. 
Modification of regional temperature, precipitation, frequency of extreme events and suitable 
lands affect crop yield and consequently liquid biofuels generation. Thus effects on biofuels 
production are directly correlated to climate change impacts on crop production: impacts that 
increase crop productivity raise also biofuels production, impacts that decrease crop 
productivity instead reduce biofuels production. 
 
Mitigation of climate change 
In this specific section the focus is not on those changing parameters which all together affect 
energy supply: in this section the attention is addressed to mitigation. Other specific 
parameters that have an influence on energy supply have already been evaluated. We use the 
connection between climate change and energy supply to place mitigation on the impacts 
analysis. 
Adaptation and mitigation are two different techniques to battle climate change in the energy 
sector. The conventional view is that adaptation and mitigation are incompatible: in reality 
one doesn’t exclude the other. These two methods can work together optimally and give 
benefits one to the other. Implementing mitigation targets helps to adapt in an easier way all 
energy systems and in particular the supply sector. 
Mitigation is a human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse 
gases (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change et al., 2015, p. 4). Mitigation, together 
with adaptation to climate change, contributes to the objective expressed in Article 2 of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC): 
 
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the 
Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to 
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production 
is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner. (United Nations, 1992) 
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A broad range of sectoral mitigation options is available and it can reduce GHG emission 
intensity. Only with the implementation of these strategies we can achieve low-stabilization 
levels of CO2 in the atmosphere. For example, decarbonizing (i.e. reducing the carbon intensity 
of) electricity generation is a key component of cost-effective mitigation strategies. For 
reaching certain levels we must reduce GHG emissions, changing the structure of the 
electricity supply system. 
Recently total anthropogenic GHG emissions have continued to increase, over 1970 to 2010, 
with larger absolute decadal increases toward the end of this period. CO2 emissions from fossil 
fuels combustion and industrial processes contributed about 78% of the total GHG emission 
increase. Globally, economic and population growth continue to be the most important drivers 
of increases in CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. Without additional efforts to reduce 
GHG emissions beyond those in place today, emissions growth is expected to persist driven 
by growth in global population and economic activities. Baseline scenarios studied by IPCC, 
those without additional mitigation, result in global mean surface temperature increases in 
2100 from 3.7°C to 4.8°C compared to pre-industrial levels.  
 
In the following part of the analysis, in which the various future impacts of climate change 
are specifically examined, there is a comprehensive explanation of the actions we must 
undertake to change the electric supply system and reach the desired targets. 
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FUTURE PROJECTIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE’S 
IMPACTS ON ENERGY SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Near and long-term climate change and its impacts on weather variability (and extremes) will 
impact energy resources and their production and use, and they will affect strategies for 
adaptation. Some impacts may be systemic and affect large geographical area. Others may be 
localized and influence only specific infrastructures. 
 
First of all, here we introduce the parameters and characteristics affected by climate change: 
temperature, precipitation, extreme events and water. We give an account of expected future 
projections of these peculiarities, basing on the last assessment of IPCC: Climate change 2013. 
The physical science basis (IPCC, 2013). IPCC provides a clear and up to date view of the 
current state of scientific knowledge about climate change in the Fifth Assessment. Almost all 
data and ranges reported in this chapter are pulled out from the IPCC study, unless it is 
otherwise stated. In AR5 IPCC described and showed two projections at different times: a 
near-term and a long-term climate prediction. They supplied these data both for climate 
parameters and for water. Thereafter, we conclude with all data and ranges about climate 
change on the energy system, specifically on energy resources, energy demand and energy 
supply. These data have not a specific projection period: all the trends and statistics are 
collected from several different studies available in literature, which could have distinct 
horizons of assessment.  
 
The account of future climate impacts on natural and energy system is made with the help of 
a summary table of all the impacts (see Table 3.1), that follows the order described in the 
diagram of Figure 2.1 at page 34, and with the help of a series of tables which introduce and 
summarize the various sections of the account. 
The portrait is divided in two parts: in the first one we illustrate climate change and its 
tendencies, whereas in the second one we define all the repercussions of climate change and 
its tendencies on the energy system, focusing specifically on the electric energy system. Every 
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row of the summary table refers to a specific impact, and every row is expanded during the 
presentation to give more details than those already presented.  
 
Table 3.1 is the result of the sum and the reduction of all the tables which introduce each 
section of the analysis. All the tables together may be useful to get an immediate quantitative 
overview of the various problems facing energy system, caused by climate change. 
 
  
Table 3.1 Summary table of climate change and its impacts on the energy system 
IMPACTS PROJECTIONS / TRENDS REFERENCE 
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+0.3°C to +1.7°C (CMIP5, RCP2.6) 
+2.6°C to +4.8°C (CMIP5, RCP8.5) 
(IPCC, 2013) 
OCEAN Top 100m: warmer (CMIP5, all RCPs) Top 100m: +1°C (RCP2.6) to +3°C (RCP8.5) (IPCC, 2013) 
PRECIPITATION PRECIPITATION PATTERN -7% to +22% (CMIP5, RCP4.5) +0.5 to 4%/°C (CMIP5, RCP2.6) (IPCC, 2013) 
EXTREME EVENTS 
TEMPERATURE 
Annual warm days: 20-30% (CMIP5, RCP8.5) 
Annual cold days: 3.0-6.0% (CMIP5, RCP8.5) 
Annual warm days: 55-70% (CMIP5, RCP8.5) 
Annual cold days: 0.5-1.0% (CMIP5, RCP8.5) 
(IPCC, 2013) 
PRECIPITATION 
Increase in heavy precipitation (CMIP5) 
Daily local extremes: +5 to 10%/°C of warming  
+5% (RCP2.6) to +20% (RCP8.5) (IPCC, 2013) 
ATMOSPHERIC 
CIRCULATION 
Increase of North Atlantic hurricane intensity 
Increase in the frequency of category 4-5 tropical 
cyclones in the North Atlantic and SW Pacific 
(IPCC, 2013) 
SEA LEVEL Increase of sea level extremes  Increase of sea level extremes  (IPCC, 2013) 
W
A
TE
R
 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
CRYOSPHERE    
 SEA ICE EXTENT Nearly ice-free Arctic in Sep by 2037 
NH: -8% (RCP2.6) to -34% (RCP8.5) in Feb 
NH: -43% (RCP2.6) to -94% (RCP8.5) in Sep 
SH: -16% (RCP2.6) to -67% (RCP8.5) in Feb 
SH: -8% (RCP2.6) to -30% (RCP8.5) in Sep 
(IPCC, 2013) 
 SNOW COVER EXTENT 
NH March to April average:  
-5.2%±1.9% (RCP2.6) to -6.0%±2.0%  (RCP8.5)  
NH March to April average:  
-7%±4% (RCP2.6) to -25%±8%  (RCP8.5) 
(IPCC, 2013) 
 PERMAFROST 
Annual mean near-surface permafrost area: 
-21%±5% (RCP2.6) to -20%±5% (RCP8.5) 
Annual mean near-surface permafrost area: 
-37%±11% (RCP2.6) to -81%±12% (RCP8.5) 
(IPCC, 2013) 
EVAPORATION 
Generally +1 to 3% for each degree of increase 
Increases over most of the oceans. Increases or decreases over land following the precipitation pattern over land 
(IPCC, 2013) 
TEMPERATURE 
SEA LEVEL Projections: 2081 – 2100. Reference period: 1986 - 2005  
 GLOBAL 0.40 [0.26 to 0.55] m (RCP2.6) to 0.63 [0.45 to 0.82] m (RCP8.5) (in the period 2081-2100) (IPCC, 2013) 
 HEAT EXPANSION 0.14 [0.10 to 0.18] m (RCP2.6) to 0.27 [0.21 to 0.33] m (RCP8.5) (30 to 55% of the global projections) (IPCC, 2013) 
 GLACIER MELTING 0.10 [0.04 to 0.16] m (RCP2.6) to 0.16 [0.09 to 0.23] m (RCP8.5) (15 to 35% of the global projections) (IPCC, 2013) 
PRECIPITATION 
FLOODS No general global trend. Northern high latitudes: upward trend. Europa and Asia: upward, downward or no trend.  (IPCC, 2013) 
DROUGHTS 
Low confidence on the magnitude of future impacts. Increases of meteorological droughts in the Mediterranean, Central America, 
Brazil, south Africa and Australia. Decreases in high northern latitudes. 
(IPCC, 2013) 
STREAMFLOWS General trend: decline in spring and summer streamflows and an increase in streamflows in winter 
(California Climate 
Change Center, 2006) 
SALINITY Sea Surface Salinity. Subtropical regions and Atlantic more saline. High latitudes and North Pacific less saline. (IPCC, 2013) 
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CLIMATE CHANGE 
WIND 
“Winners” and “losers”: regions where wind energy may benefit and regions where wind energy may be negatively impacted 
(Pryor and Barthelmie, 
2010) 
Reference period: 1964 - 2000  
Northwest U.S. Wind speeds. Summertime: -5-10% (wind power resource: -40%). Wintertime: possible slightly increase 
(Sailor et al., 2008) 
Reference period: 1948 - 1978 
Continental U.S. Wind speeds. -1.0 to -3.2% in the next 50 years. -1.4 to -4.5% over the next 100 years 
(Breslow and Sailor, 
2002) 
Reference period: 1980 - 2000 
Baltic sea region. Wind power potential: +15% 
Ireland. Wind power potential. Wintertime: +4-8%. Summertime: decrease 
UK. Wind speeds. Summertime: -5% (-15% in Northern Ireland). Wintertime: increases 
Eastern Mediterranean. Wind speeds. Increases over land and decreases over sea. Noticeable increase over the Aegean sea 
(Mideksa and 
Kallbekken, 2010) 
BIOENERGY 
Brazil. Projections: 2005-2030. Reference period: 1980-2000 
Sugarcane. Planted are: +148%. Crop yield: +7% (from 77 to 82t/ha). Output: +161% 
Biodiesel. Shift of suitable growing zones for oilseed crops, from northeast to the south   
(de Lucena et al., 
2009b) 
WAVE AND TIDAL 
Relationship wind – wave energy 
+20% in mean wind speed raises mean wave heights around 44%, and raises available power levels by 133% 
-20% in mean wind speed lowers available power levels by 67% 
(Harrison and Wallace, 
2005) 
FOSSIL FUELS 
The access will be affected by climate change 
Coal. Precipitation increase: coal quality decrease, coal availability increase (no seam fires) 
(Williamson et al., 
2009) 
WATER RUNOFF 
Projections: 2050. Reference period: 1900 - 1970 
+10-40% in eastern equatorial Africa, La Plata basin, high-latitude North America and Eurasia 
-10-30% in southern Africa, southern Europe, the Middle East, mid-latitude western North America 
(Milly et al., 2005) 
From 44854 bmc (in 2010) to 52829 bmc (in 2100) (MIT, 2014) 
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TEMPERATURE 
HEATING DEMAND +0.8% a year between 2000 and 2030, and after slowly decrease. -34% worldwide by 2100 
(Isaac and van Vuuren, 
2009) 
COOLING DEMAND 
From 1900 kWh (in 2000) to 4800 kWh (in 2100). +7% a year between 2020 and 2030. Then +1% a year to the end of the century 
+70% greater than projected demand without climate change 
(Isaac and van Vuuren, 
2009) 
INDUSTRY 
U.S. energy consumption per unit of industrial production: +0.0127% per increase in 1 HDD or +0.0032% per increase of 1 CDD 
Annual basis: -6.2% energy demand (a saving of 0.0422 EJ) 
(Wilbanks et al., 2008) 
Use of water: +45% from 763 bcm (2010) to 1098 bcm (2100) (MIT, 2014) 
AGRICULTURE 
-10% from 1551 bcm (2010) to 1389 bcm (2100) (MIT, 2014) 
Water withdrawals (B2 scenario): from 2498 bcm (1995) to 2341 bcm (2025), to 2256 bcm (2055) and 2211 bcm (2075) (Alcamo et al., 2007) 
WATER DOMESTIC USE +100% from 348 bcm (2010) to 698 bcm (2100) (MIT, 2014) 
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TEMPERATURE 
EFFICIENCY   
 SOLAR POWER The increase of air temperature can modify the efficiency of photovoltaic cells and ultimately reduce the PV electric generation 
(Fidje and Martinsen, 
2006) 
 THERMAL PLANTS 
With +1°C: -0.8% nuclear power output. -0.6% coal and gas power output 
U.S.: -1% reduction in electricity generation means a drop in supply of 25 billion kWh 
(Mideksa and 
Kallbekken, 2010) 
 TRANSMISSION California power grid. -7-8% transmission line capacity and -2-4% substation capacity due to +5°C (2100) 
(U.S. Department of 
Energy, 2013) 
WATER REFRIGERATION 
-0.45% power output due to +1°C 
(Mideksa and 
Kallbekken, 2010) 
Between 2010 and 2035: water withdrawals: +20%; water consumption: +85% (IEA, 2012) 
EXTREME EVENTS 
HYDROPOWER Affected by flooding. Shutting down of the turbine operation or (rare) destruction of power plants and/or dams - 
WIND POWER Stressed by extreme wind speeds (25m/s): the strain on the turbine will be too high, and it could provoke serious damages  - 
BIOFUELS 
Reduction of productivity of the crops by droughts, frosts, extreme temperatures and precipitations 
Destruction of biofuels’ production equipment by storms and cyclones  
- 
THERMAL PLANTS 
Inland reactors/plants. Subject to heat waves (reduction of power generation) and inland floods (damage of ancillary facilities) 
Coastal reactors/plants. Subject to the rise of sea level (inundation, erosion), instability of shorelines, storms, flooding   
(Kopytko and Perkins, 
2011) 
FOSSIL FUELS Increase of production shutdowns to avoid life of environmental damage  (Burkett, 2011) 
TRANSMISSION Disruption of infrastructure of the electricity grid by weather phenomena  and permafrost thawing - 
TRANSFER Interruption of barge transport of crude oil, petroleum products and coal due to decreased water levels (droughts) 
(U.S. Department of 
Energy, 2013) 
ENERGY 
RESOURCES 
 
 
 
HYDROPOWER 
U.S. Colorado River: -40% hydropower production by the middle of 21st century 
U.S. Central Valley: -10-12% hydropower production 
(Mideksa and 
Kallbekken, 2010) 
+0.08% of total generation, +2.46 TWh from current generation, reaching 2931 TWh (2050)  
(Hamududu and 
Killingtveit, 2012) 
WIND 
Offshore wind farms around the North Sea: +3-9% due to increases in wind speeds 
(Mideksa and 
Kallbekken, 2010) 
Continental U.S.:-30-40% of wind power generation due to -10-15% mean wind speeds 
(Breslow and Sailor, 
2002) 
BIOFUEL The magnitude of energy generating from biofuels depends on the quantity of energy resource produced - 
SOLAR 
Projections: 2071-2100. Reference period: 1980-2000 
-6% electricity output due to -2% solar radiation (2071-2100) 
(Fidje and Martinsen, 
2006) 
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 
-40-70% GHG emission in 2050 than 2010 to reach 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 (+2°C relative to preindustrial level) 
-25-55% GHG emission in 2050 than 2010 to reach 500 ppm CO2eq by 2100 
-5-45% GHG emission in 2050 than 2010 to reach 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100 
To reach 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100: improvements in efficiency, tripling/quadrupling share of zero carbon energy supply by 2050 
(IPCC, 2015) 
Note. (-) means that there is no a specific document which refers to. GMST means Global Mean Surface air Temperature
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3.1 Expected climate change, its major consequences and physical impacts 
This section of the thesis is based almost exclusively on the work of the IPCC Working Group 
I for the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) (IPCC, 2013). The IPCC Working Group I assesses the 
physical scientific aspects of the climate system and climate change. It reviews and assesses 
the most recent scientific, technical and socio-economic information produced worldwide 
relevant to the understanding of climate change. 
For the IPCC AR5, the scientific community identified a set of four specific emission scenarios, 
the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP), from the peer review literature. Projected 
trends and data of future climate change came out of the multi-model experiment Coupled 
Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5), which used the RCPs as input scenarios. For 
this reason, the diversified projections which came out from the CMIP5 are distinguished from 
each other by referring to the input scenarios, the RCPs. 
 
Climate change appears in many ways. It affects several different elements which belong to 
natural system, as atmosphere, water cycle, atmospheric circulation, oceans and cryosphere. 
The major signs are the increase of temperatures, the alteration of precipitation patterns and 
the change in frequency and magnitude of extreme events. Practically, the changes we notice 
in natural system are the manifestations of climate change.    
 
3.1.1 Projected changes in temperature 
Table 3.2 Projected climate change’s impacts on temperature 
IMPACT NEAR TERM PROJECTIONS LONG TERM PROJECTIONS REFERENCE 
GMST 
 +0.47°C to +1.00°C (CMIP5, RCP4.5) 
 +0.39°C to +0.87°C (CMIP5, RCP4.5, 
ASK approach) 
 +0.3°C to +1.7°C (CMIP5, RCP2.6) 
 +1.1°C to +2.6°C (CMIP5, RCP4.6) 
 +1.4°C to +3.1°C (CMIP5, RCP6.0) 
 +2.6°C to +4.8°C (CMIP5, RCP8.5) 
(IPCC, 2013) 
OCEAN 
In the CMIP5 models under all RCPs 
forcing scenarios, globally average 
surface and near-surface ocean 
temperatures are projected to warm 
 +1.0°C (RCP2.6) to +3.0°C (RCP8.5): 
top 100 m 
 +0.5°C (RCP2.6) to +1.5°C (RCP8.5):    
1 km depth 
(IPCC, 2013) 
Note. Near term projections: 2016-2035. Long term projections: 2081-2100. Reference period: 1986-2005. 
Talk about climate change refers most of the time to temperature change. Temperature is the 
first parameter used to allude to climate change, and it is the simplest. When we reflect on 
future climate change and we want to quantify its magnitude, it has become normal refer to 
global warming and temperature increase. But temperature variation is only one of climate 
change manifestations. 
    
Anyway, it is evident that all land regions and oceans are very likely to warm during the 21st 
century. The WGI of IPCC collected lots of data from literature. All the projections allude to a 
specific reference period. The period we are referring to is the interval from 1986 to 2005. 
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The projections are relative to two different time spans: a near term from 2016 to 2035 and a 
long term from 2081 to 2100. The research group during its review came to these conclusions. 
 
Near term projections of Global Mean Surface air Temperature (GMST) 
Climate projections are subject to several sources of uncertainty. The extent of agreement 
between the CMIP5 projections provides rough guidance about the likelihood of a particular 
outcome. But it must be kept firmly in mind that the real world could fall outside of the range 
spanned by these particular models (see Figure 3.1). 
 
 +0.47°C to +1.00°C, CMIP5 projections under RCP4.5 
 +0.39°C to +0.87°C, CMIP5 projections under RCP4.5, ASK approach (weighting 
models according to some measure of their quality: only some centers participating in 
CMIP5 have the specific integration required by ASK simulations) 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Synthesis of near-term projections of global mean surface air temperature (GMST). (a) Simulations and 
projections of annual GMST 1986-2050 (anomalies relative to 1986-2005). Projections under all RCPs from CMIP5 models. 
(b) As (a) but showing the 5 to 95% range of annual mean CMIP5 projections for all RCPs using a reference period of 1986-
2005 (light grey shade) and all RCPs using a reference period of 2006-2012, together with the observed anomaly for (2006-
2012) to (1986-2005) of 0.16°C (dark grey shade). (IPCC, 2013, p.1011) 
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Long term projections of Global Mean Surface air Temperature (GMST) 
A consistent and robust feature across climate models is the continuance of global warming 
in the 21st century for all the RCP scenarios. Temperature increases are almost the same for 
all the RCP scenarios during the first two decades after 2005. At longer time scales, the 
warming rate begins to depend more on the specified GHG concentration pathway, being 
highest in RCP8.5 and significantly lower in RCP2.6, particularly afterwards 2050 when global 
surface temperature response stabilizes and declines thereafter (see Figure 3.2).   
 
 +0.3°C to +1.7°C, CMIP5 under RCP2.6 
 +1.1°C to +2.6°C, CMIP5 under RCP4.5 
 +1.4°C to +3.1°C, CMIP5 under RCP6.0 
 +2.6°C to +4.8°C, CMIP5 under RCP8.5 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Time series of global annual mean surface air temperature anomalies (relative to 1986-2005) from CMIP5 
concentration-driven experiments. Projections are shown for each RCP for the multi-model mean (solid lines) and ±1.64 
standard deviation (5 to 95%) across the distribution of individual models (shading), based on annual means. (IPCC, 2013, 
p.89) 
 
Figure 3.3 then shows the changes in annual mean temperatures in different time spans in 
the globe. 
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Figure 3.3 Multi-model ensemble average of annual mean surface air temperature change (compared to 1986–2005 base 
period) for 2016–2035 and 2081–2100, for RCP2.6, 4.5, 6.0 and 8.5. (IPCC, 2013, p.89) 
 
Near term projection of ocean temperature 
Globally averaged surface and near-surface ocean temperatures are projected to warm over 
the early 21st century, in response to both present day atmospheric concentrations of GHGs 
and projected future changes in RF (see Figure 3.4).  
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Figure 3.4 Projected changes in annual averaged, globally averaged, surface ocean temperature based on 12 Atmosphere-
Ocean General Circulation Models (AOGCMs) from the CMIP5 multi-model ensemble, under 21st century scenarios RCP2.6, 
RCP4.5, RCP6.0 and RCP8.5. Shading indicates the 90% range of projected annual global mean surface temperature 
anomalies. (IPCC, 2013, p.993) 
Globally averaged sea surface temperature shows substantial year-to-year and decade-to-
decade variability, whereas the variability of depth-averaged ocean temperatures is much less. 
The rate at which globally averaged surface and depth-averaged temperatures rise in response 
to a given scenario for RF shows a considerable spread between models. In the CMIP5 models 
under all RCPs forcing scenarios, globally averaged sea surface temperatures are projected to 
be warmer over the near term relative to 1986–2005. Furthermore, as we can see in Figure 
3.5, there are regional variations in the projected amplitude of ocean temperature change. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 CMIP5 multi-model ensemble mean of projected changes in sea surface temperature for 2016–2035 relative to 
1986–2005 under RCP4.5. The number of CMIP5 models used is indicated in the upper right corner. (IPCC, 2013, p.994) 
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Long term projection of ocean temperature 
Projected increase of sea surface temperature and heat content over the next two decades is 
relatively insensitive to the emissions trajectory. However, projected outcomes diverge as the 
21st century progresses. When sea surface temperatures increase as a result of external 
forcing, the interior water masses respond to the integrated signal at the surface, which is 
then propagated down to the greater depth.  
Surface warming varies considerably between the emission scenarios, from about 1°C 
(RCP2.6) to more than 3°C in RCP8.5. Then depending on the emission scenario, global ocean 
warming between 0.5°C (RCP2.6) and 1.5°C (RCP8.5) will reach a depth of about 1 km by the 
end of the century. The strongest warming signal is found at the surface in subtropical and 
tropical regions. 
 
3.1.2 Projected changes in precipitation 
Table 3.3 Projected climate change’s impacts on precipitation 
IMPACT NEAR TERM PROJECTIONS LONG TERM PROJECTIONS REFERENCE 
PRECIPITATION 
PATTERN 
-7% to +22% (CMIP5, RCP4.5) 
 +0.5 to 4%/°C (CMIP5, RCP2.6) 
 +1 to 3%/°C (CMIP5, other RCPs) 
(IPCC, 2013) 
Note. Near term projections: 2016-2035. Long term projections: 2081-2100. Reference period: 1986-2005. 
The second most obvious climate change manifestation is the change in precipitation pattern. 
Large-scale changes in precipitations are governed by processes, which are implemented in 
the RCP scenarios. These processes control the climatological distribution of precipitation and 
precipitation extremes. Precipitation is sustained by the availability of the moisture and 
energy. In a globally averaged sense the oceans provide an unlimited supply of moisture, 
therefore precipitation formation is energetically limited. Locally precipitation can be greatly 
modified by limitations in the availability of moisture (for instance over land) and the effect 
of circulation systems, although they are subject to local energetic constraints. Moisture and 
energy availability can be altered by climate change and in particular by global warming, the 
increase of radiative forcing caused by an increase in well-mixed GHG concentrations and the 
interactions between aerosol and clouds. 
 
As for temperatures, the Working Group I collected data and supplied projections for two 
different periods, 2016-2035 and 2081-2100, related to the reference period 1986-2005. 
 
Near term changes in precipitation (2016-2035) 
The two graphs in Figure 3.6 show the CMIP5 multi-model projections of changes in annual 
and zonal mean precipitation (a) and annual and zonal precipitation minus evaporation 
[mm/day] (b) under RCP4.5. From these graphs we clearly understand that precipitation 
pattern will depend on the location of the region, because all regions have different 
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peculiarities. Zonal mean precipitation will very likely increase in high and some of the middle 
latitudes and will increase just a bit in the subtropics. At more regional scales precipitation 
change may be influenced by anthropogenic aerosol emissions and will be strongly influenced 
by natural internal variability. From the diagram (a) of Figure 3.6 we can extract the range of 
changes in near term precipitation, which is -7% to +22%. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 CMIP5 multi-model projections of changes in annual and zonal mean (a) precipitation (%) and (b) precipitation 
minus evaporation (mm day–1) for the period 2016–2035 relative to 1986–2005 under RCP4.5. The light blue denotes the 
5 to 95% range, the dark blue the 17 to 83% range of model spread. The grey indicates the 1σ range of natural variability 
derived from the pre-industrial control runs. (IPCC, 2013, p.985) 
Long term changes in precipitation (2081-2100) 
Long term precipitation changes are mainly driven by the increase of the surface temperature 
and other factors, as presented above. Projected precipitation changes vary greatly between 
models, more than temperature’s projections. The precipitation changes exhibit patterns that 
become more pronounced and definite as temperatures increase. 
 
On planetary scale, relative humidity is projected to remain roughly constant, but specific 
humidity is projected to increase due to warming climate. For this reason, in the long term it 
is quite sure that global precipitation will grow with increased GMST (Global Mean Surface 
Temperature). Global mean precipitation will increase at a rate per °C smaller than of 
atmospheric water vapor. It will likely rise by 0.5 to 4%/°C for scenario RCP2.6 at the end of 
the 21st century. The range of sensitivities in the CMIP5 models for other scenarios is 1 to 
3%/°C. Figure 3.7 shows the maps of multi-model results for the various RCPs scenarios in 
2081-2100. 
 
As we can appreciate in Figure 3.7, changes in average precipitation in a warmer world will 
exhibit substantial variation under RCP8.5. Some regions will experience increase, other 
regions will experience decreases and yet others will not experience significant changes at all.  
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Figure 3.7 Maps of multi-model results for the scenarios RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6.0 and RCP8.5 in 2081-2100 of average 
percent change in mean precipitation. Changes are shown relative to 1986–2005. The number of CMIP5 models to 
calculate the multi-model mean is indicated in the upper right corner of each panel. (IPCC, 2013, p.91) 
The contrast of annual mean precipitation between dry and wet regions and the contrast 
between wet and dry seasons will increase over the most of the globe as temperatures 
increase. The general pattern of change indicates that high latitudes are very likely to 
experience greater amounts of precipitation. Many mid-latitude and subtropical arid and 
semi-arid regions will likely experience less precipitation and many moist mid latitude regions 
will likely experience more precipitation by the end of this century under the RCP8.5. 
 
3.1.3 Projected changes in extreme events 
Table 3.4 Projected climate change’s impacts on precipitation 
IMPACT NEAR TERM PROJECTIONS LONG TERM PROJECTIONS REFERENCE 
TEMPERATURE 
Warm days 
 20-26% (CMIP5, RCP2.6) 
 20-28% (CMIP5, RCP6.5) 
 20-30% (CMIP5, RCP8.5) 
Cold days 
 4.0-6.0% (CMIP5, RCP2.6) 
 3.5-6.0% (CMIP5, RCP6.5) 
 3.0-6.0% (CMIP5, RCP8.5) 
Warm days 
 24-34% (CMIP5, RCP2.6) 
 35-45% (CMIP5, RCP6.5) 
 55-70% (CMIP5, RCP8.5) 
Cold days 
 3.0-4.5% (CMIP5, RCP2.6) 
 1.5-3.0% (CMIP5, RCP6.5) 
 0.5-1.0% (CMIP5, RCP8.5) 
(IPCC, 2013) 
PRECIPITATION 
Daily local extremes 
+5 to 10% per °C of warming 
+5% (RCP2.6) to +20% (RCP8.5)  (IPCC, 2013) 
ATMOSPHERIC 
CIRCULATION 
Increase of North Atlantic hurricane 
intensity 
Increase in the frequency of 
category 4-5 tropical cyclones in the 
North Atlantic and SW Pacific  
(IPCC, 2013) 
SEA LEVEL Increase of sea level extremes Increase of sea level extremes (IPCC, 2013) 
Note. Near term projections: 2016-2035. Long term projections: 2081-2100. Reference period: 1961-1990. 
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Several different atmospheric phenomena belong to the category of extreme events. As 
temperature and precipitation, they are not originated by climate change. The magnitude of 
the different kinds of extreme events is what is altered by climate change. As already 
mentioned, changes in many extreme weather and climate events have been observed since 
the middle of 20th century. These changes will be still present in the future and they will be 
even stronger. 
As for temperature and precipitation, the Working Group I of the IPCC in their assessment 
Climate change 2013: the physical science basis: Working Group I contribution to the Fifth 
assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2013) reported 
the data of projected changes they had sifted out from literature in two different time frames: 
in a near term (2016-2035) and in a long term (2081-2100) timeline. Air temperature, 
precipitation, atmospheric circulation and sea are the elements most affected by these 
changes. 
Temperature 
In the AR4 the extreme changes in temperature were analyzed focusing on two different 
measurements: warm days and nights and cold days and nights. Subsequent studies 
confirmed the conclusions of the AR4: cold episodes are projected to decrease significantly in 
a future warmer climate and heat waves would be more intense, more frequent and last longer 
towards the end of the 21st century. These trends were reported in the AR5 in a figure 
portrayed in Figure 3.8. The CMIP5 model ensemble exhibits a significant decrease in the 
frequency of cold nights, an increase in the frequency of warm days and nights and an increase 
in the duration of warm spells. For the next few decades, as we can see in the Figure, these 
changes are remarkably insensitive to the emission scenario considered. In most land regions 
and in the near term, the frequency of warm days and warm nights will thus continue to 
increase, while that of cold days and cold nights will continue to decrease. 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Global projections of the occurrence of (a) warm days (TX90p) and (b) cold days (TX10p). Results are shown 
from CMIP5 for the RCP2.6, RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 scenarios. Solid lines indicate the ensemble median and shading indicates 
the interquartile spread between individual projections (25th and 75th percentiles). (IPCC, 2013, p.990) 
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Anyway, from these diagrams we can extrapolate the future tendencies of warm days and cold 
days, which are reported in the summary table. 
Prior to report a specific number we must describe the meaning of the measurements warm 
days and warm nights. Warm days are the percentage of annual days with daily Tmax exceeding 
90th percentile of Tmax for 1961-1990. Cold days on the other hand are the percentage of annual 
days with Tmax below 10th percentile of Tmax for 1961-1990. Whit these definitions we can report 
future ranges of changes in warm days and cold days. 
 
Near term projections of warm days 
 20-26% CMIP5 under RCP2.6 
 20-28% CMIP5 under RCP6.5 
 20-30% CMIP5 under RCP8.5 
Near term projections of cold days 
 4.0-6.0% CMIP5 under RCP2.6 
 3.5-6.0% CMIP5 under RCP6.5 
 3.0-6.0% CMIP5 under RCP8.5 
Long term projections of warm days 
 24-34% CMIP5 under RCP2.6 
 35-45% CMIP5 under RCP6.5 
 55-70% CMIP5 under RCP8.5 
Long term projections of cold days 
 3.0-4.5% CMIP5 under RCP2.6 
 1.5-3.0% CMIP5 under RCP6.5 
 0.5-1.0% CMIP5 under RCP8.5 
 
It is also very useful to communicate a detail of future long term projection of temperature 
changes. For high emissions scenarios, it is likely that in most land regions a current 1-in-20-
year maximum temperature event will at least double in frequency, but in many regions will 
become an annual or a 1-in 2-year event. 
 
Precipitation 
For the 21st century the AR4 concluded that heavy precipitation events were likely to increase 
in many areas of the globe. Since AR4 larger number of additional studies have been published 
using global and regional climate models. For the near term, CMIP5 global confirm a clear 
tendency for increases in heavy precipitation events in the global mean, but there are 
significant variations across regions. Over most of the mid-latitude land masses and over wet 
tropical regions, extreme precipitation will be more intense and more frequent in a warmer 
world. Even if there has been substantial progress between CMIP3 and CMIP5 in the ability of 
models, to simulate more realistic precipitation extremes, the majority of models 
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underestimate the sensitivity of extreme precipitation to temperature variability or trends, 
which implies that models may underestimate the projected increase in extreme precipitation 
in the future. Anyway, there is high confidence that changes in local extremes on daily and 
sub-daily time scales are expected to increase by roughly 5 to 10% per °C of warming. 
 
The rate of increase air 
temperature is so important for 
the evaluation of precipitation 
because, for some scientists, 
extreme precipitation events occur 
when most of the available 
atmospheric water vapor rapidly 
precipitates out in a single storm. 
The maximum amount of water 
vapor in air (saturation) is 
determined by the Clausius-
Clapeyron relationship. As air 
temperatures increases, this 
saturated amount of water also 
increases. If the amount of water 
vapor content in air is higher, the 
magnitude of the extreme event will be higher. Figure 3.9 shows projected 5-day precipitation 
over land regions obtained from the CMIP5 models. It is projected that during very wet 5-day 
periods at the end of 21st century, there will be a change into the range from 5% (RCP2.6) to 
20% (RCP8.5) of more precipitation. 
 
Atmospheric circulation 
Variations in atmospheric circulation cause modifications in distinct large-scale climate 
phenomena that affect regional climate, as monsoons, cyclones, tropical cyclones, hurricanes 
and El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). There are fewer studies that have explored changes 
in these kind of phenomena: thus there are few results and there is generally medium 
confidence on them. 
 
Global measures of monsoon by the area will increase in the 21st century, while the monsoon 
circulation weakens. Monsoon onset dates are likely to become earlier or not to change much, 
while monsoon withdrawal dates are likely to delay, resulting in a lengthening of the monsoon 
season in many regions. The increase in seasonal mean precipitation is pronounced in the 
East and South Asian summer monsoons, while the change in other monsoon regions is 
subject to uncertainties. However, in South America, Africa, East Asia, South Asia, Southeast 
Figure 3.9 Global average percent change over land regions for the 
RCP2.6, RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 scenarios. (IPCC, 2013, p.1083) 
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Asia and Australia it is almost certain there will be a future increase in precipitation extremes 
related to monsoon.  
 
Tropical rainfall changes are likely shaped by current climatology and ocean warming pattern. 
The first effect is to increase rainfall near the currently rainy regions, and the second effect 
increases rainfall where the ocean warming exceeds the tropical mean. The tropical Indian 
Ocean for example will feature a zonal pattern with reduced warming and decreased rainfall 
in the east and enhanced warming and increased rainfall in the west. However, there is low 
confidence in global projections of trends in tropical cyclone frequency in the 21st century, not 
only in the Indian Ocean but all over the world. Projections indicated that the global frequency 
of tropical cyclones will either decrease or remain essentially unchanged, concurrent with an 
increase in both global mean tropical cyclone maximum wind speed and rain rates. 
 
As reported in the Fifth Assessment Report of IPCC (IPCC, 2013, p.992), hurricanes were 
explored by two studies, in which the authors measured different hurricane intensities. They 
projected near-term increases of North Atlantic hurricane intensity, driven in large part by 
projected reductions in North Atlantic tropospheric aerosols in CMIP5 future forcing 
scenarios. Studies projected near term increases in the frequency category 4-5 tropical 
cyclones in the North Atlantic and southwest Pacific, and also projected a mid-century 
intensification. However, several studies agree on the factors that lead to variations in tropical 
cyclones and hurricanes. Modes of climate variability that in the past have led to these 
variations in the intensity, frequency and structure of these climate phenomena – such as the 
ENSO – will continue influencing these extreme events through the mid-21st century. 
 
El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) will remain the dominant mode of natural climate 
variability in the 21st century, with global influences in the 21st century, and the regional 
rainfall variability it induces will intensify. Natural variations of the amplitude and spatial 
pattern of ENSO are so large that confidence in any projected change for the 21st century 
remains low. In a warmer climate, the increase in atmospheric moisture intensifies temporal 
variability of precipitation even if atmospheric circulation variability remains the same. 
 
Sea level 
The magnitude of extreme sea level events has increased since 1970 and most of this rise can 
be explained by increases in mean sea level. In the future it is very likely that there will be a 
significant increase in the occurrence of sea level extremes and, similarly to past observations, 
this increase will primarily be the result of an increase in mean sea level. These projections 
have been obtained studying several regional storm-surges in the southeastern coast of 
Australia, in the eastern Irish Sea, in the North Sea and in the United Kingdom coasts. 
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3.2 Expected climate change’s impacts on energy system 
This section is the most important part of the first third of the thesis, because in this section 
we display the future expected climate impacts on energy system. This is so important because 
it is the first step to find the vulnerabilities of the system and then an appropriate solution. 
As we have already asserted, we consider the energy sector divided into three main aspects: 
energy resource, energy demand and energy supply. Then we minutely examine apart water, 
because it is firmly linked and strongly affects many portions of the energy structure, even if 
we estimate it as part of a specific sector of energy entity, the resource one. 
Similarly to the accounting of impacts on the elements of energy system, we illustrate the 
various predicted data and ranges of change in an effect-and-cause pattern: it is provided a 
backward account of the distinct elements which affect each unit of the electric energy system.  
 
3.2.1 Expected impacts on water  
Water, judged as an energy resource, might be altered by numerous factors, which we could 
concentrate into three main elements, that are summed up in Figure 2.1. These elements 
specifically are climate change, temperature and precipitation, and they have affected and will 
affect several traits of the water resource, as the level of the sea or water availability for energy 
production. 
A specific description of all the traits of water resource is drawn up in the following passages. 
 
3.2.1.1 Climate change’s impacts on water 
Table 3.5 Projected climate change’s impacts on water resource 
IMPACT NEAR TERM PROJECTIONS LONG TERM PROJECTIONS REFERENCE 
SEA ICE 
EXTENT 
Nearly ice-free Arctic Ocean in 
September (sea ice extent less than 
1 x 106 km2for at least 5 consecutive 
years) before 2050 for RCP8.5 
NH reduction in mean sea ice extent 
 8% for RCP2.6 to 34% for RCP8.5 in 
February 
 43% for RCP2.6 to 94% for RCP8.5 
in September 
NH reduction in mean sea ice 
volume 
 29% for RCP2.6 to 73% for RCP8.5 
in February 
 54% for RCP2.6 to 96% for RCP8.5 
in September 
SH reduction in mean sea ice extent 
 16% for RCP2.6 to 67% for RCP8.5 
in February 
 8% for RCP2.6 to 30% for RCP8.5 in 
September 
SH reduction in mean sea ice volume 
 Nearly ice-free state for RCP8.5 in 
February 
 60% under RCP4.5 in February 
(IPCC, 2013) 
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IMPACT NEAR TERM PROJECTIONS LONG TERM PROJECTIONS REFERENCE 
SNOW COVER 
EXTENT 
NH SCE for a March to April average 
 -5.2%±1.9% under RCP2.6 
 -5.3%±1.5% under RCP4.5 
 -4.5%±1.2% under RCP6.0 
 -6.0%±2.0% under RCP8.5 
NH SCE for a March to April average 
 -7%±4% under RCP2.6 
 -13%±4% under RCP4.5 
 -15%±5% under RCP6.0 
 -25%±8% under RCP8.5 
(IPCC, 2013) 
PERMAFROST 
Annual mean near-surface area 
 -21% ± 5% under RCP2.6 
 -18% ± 6% under RCP4.5 
 -18% ± 3% under RCP6.0 
 -20% ± 5% under RCP8.5 
Annual mean near-surface area 
 -37% ± 11% under RCP2.6 
 -51% ± 13% under RCP4.5 
 -58% ± 13% under RCP6.0 
 -81% ± 12% under RCP8.5 
(IPCC, 2013) 
EVAPORATION 
Generally +1 to 3% for each degree of increase 
Increases over most of the oceans 
Increases or decreases over land following precipitation pattern over land 
(IPCC, 2013) 
Note. Near term projections: 2016-2035. Long term projections: 2081-2100. Reference period: 1986-2005. 
As for temperature, precipitation and extreme events, investigative scientists have conducted 
different projections in different time scales of future impacts of climate change into water 
system. The Working Group I of the IPCC in the Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2013) 
organized all data and ranges in literature into two main categories: near term projections, 
which consider especially as projections’ period the years from 2016 to 2035, and long term 
projections, which on the other hand consider as projections’ period the years from 2081 to 
2100.  
Climate change influences numerous elements, which are part of the water system. We could 
include into two main categories, the cryosphere and the evaporation. 
 
Cryosphere  
Cryosphere is the collective term for the components of the Earth system, that contain a 
substantial fraction of water in the frozen state. It comprises several components, which are 
sensitive to changes in air temperature and precipitation and hence to climate change in 
general. Specifically, researchers have realized projections on three specific components of 
the cryosphere, which are sea ice, snow cover and permafrost. 
 Sea ice extent 
Sea ice extent is one of the most familiar and most sensible data of climate change for 
population, because it is a simple and visible confirmation of global warming. There is lots 
of literature which treats this argument in a very detailed way. Scientists for example 
carried out specific projections on sea ice extent of the Northern Hemisphere (NH) and of 
the Southern Hemisphere (SH) and specific projections for winter months and summer 
months, considering February and September as reference months. 
Changes in external forcing affect interannual and decadal variability of climate and this 
complicates the ability to make specific, precise short-term projections of changes in the 
cryosphere. Data in our possession are principally related to long term, but also near term 
projections are well considered. 
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Figure 3.10 Changes in sea ice extent as simulated by CMIP5 models over the second half of the 20th century and 
the whole 21st century under RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6.0 and RCP8.5 for (a) Northern Hemisphere February, (b) 
Northern Hemisphere September, (c) Southern Hemisphere February and (d) Southern Hemisphere September. 
Changes are relative to the reference period 1986–2005. The solid curves show the multi-model means and the 
shading denotes the 5 to 95% range of the ensemble. (IPCC, 2013, p.1088) 
 
Most of the CMIP5 models project a nearly ice-free Arctic at the end of summer by 2100 
in the RCP8.5 scenario (nearly ice-free Arctic: sea ice extent less than 1 x 106 km2 for at 
least 5 consecutive years). Some other models of the CMIP5 instead show large changes 
in the near term. Previous models project an ice-free summer period in the Arctic Ocean 
by 2040. By scaling six CMIP3 models to recent observed September sea ice changes, a 
nearly ice-free Arctic in September is projected to occur by 2037, reaching the first quartile 
of the distribution for timing of September sea ice loss by 2028. However, a number of 
models that have fairly thick Arctic sea ice, produce a slower near-term decrease in sea 
ice extent compared to observations. An accurate analysis of CMIP3 model simulations 
found out that, for near-term predictions, the dominant factor for decreasing sea ice is 
increased ice melt and reductions in ice growth play a secondary role. This reason may 
explain the underestimation in CMIP3 projections. 
Regarding the end of the 21st century, based on the analysis of CMIP3 climate change 
simulations, the AR4 concludes that the Arctic and Antarctic sea ice covers are projected 
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to shrink under all SRES scenarios (the emission scenarios used by the IPCC in its Third 
and Fourth Assessment). It also stresses that, in some projections, the Arctic Ocean 
becomes almost entirely ice-free in late summer during the second half of the 21st century. 
These conclusions were confirmed by further analyses of the CMIP3 archives and were 
strengthened by the CMIP5. 
 
Experts made projections for the period 2081-2100 on the mean sea ice areal coverage 
and the mean sea ice volume of the NH and SH in February and September related to the 
time period 1986-2005. The results, shown in Figure 3.10, are: 
 
NH reduction in mean sea ice extent 
o 8% for RCP2.6 to 34% for RCP8.5 in February 
o 43% for RCP2.6 to 94% for RCP8.5 in September 
NH reduction in mean sea ice volume 
o 29% for RCP2.6 to 73% for RCP8.5 in February 
o 54% for RCP2.6 to 96% for RCP8.5 in September 
SH reduction in mean sea ice extent 
o 16% for RCP2.6 to 67% for RCP8.5 in February 
o 8% for RCP2.6 to 30% for RCP8.5 in September 
SH reduction in mean sea ice volume 
o Nearly ice-free state for RCP8.5 in February 
o 60% under RCP4.5 in February 
 
As we can notice from the data, CMIP5 models reach nearly ice-free conditions during 
September in the Arctic before 2100 under RCP8.5 (see Figure 3.11). The percentages in 
February of sea ice volume are higher than the corresponding ones for sea ice extent, 
which is indicative of a substantial sea ice thinning. Arctic sea ice cover will continue to 
shrink and thin all year round during the 21st century as the annual mean global surface 
temperature rises. 
 
 Snow cover extent 
We define snow cover extent (SCE) as the snow that covers ice-free land areas, and not 
all the snow on global surface. Analyses of seasonal snow cover changes generally focus 
on the NH, where the configuration of the continents on the Earth induces a larger 
maximum seasonal SCE and a larger sensitivity of SCE to climate changes. Decreases of 
SCE are strongly connected to a shortening of seasonal snow cover duration and are 
related to both precipitation and temperature changes, thus to climate change in general.  
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Figure 3.11 February and September CMIP5 multi-model mean sea ice concentration (%) in the Northern and 
Southern Hemispheres for the periods (a) 1986–2005, (b) 2081–2100 under RCP4.5 and (c) 2081–2100 under RCP8.5. 
(IPCC, 2013, p.1089) 
For example, projected increases in snowfall across much of the northern high latitudes 
act to increase snow amounts, but warming reduces the fraction of precipitation that falls 
as snow. 
  
Figure 3.12 shows the Northern Hemisphere spring (March to April average) snow cover 
extent change (in %) in the CMIP5 ensemble, relative to the simulated extent for the 1986-
2005 reference period. And the projections, in the near and long term, could be recapped 
in this way: 
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NH SCE for a March to April average for period 2016-2035: 
o -5.2%±1.9% under RCP2.6 
o -5.3%±1.5% under RCP4.5 
o -4.5%±1.2% under RCP6.0 
o -6.0%±2.0% under RCP8.5 
NH SCE for a March to April average for period 2081-2100: 
o -7%±4% under RCP2.6 
o -13%±4% under RCP4.5 
o -15%±5% under RCP6.0 
o -25%±8% under RCP8.5 
 
 
Figure 3.12 Northern Hemisphere spring (March to April average) snow cover extent change (in %) in the CMIP5 
ensemble, relative to the simulated extent for the 1986–2005 reference period. Thick lines mark the multi-model 
average, shading indicates the inter-model spread (one standard deviation). (IPCC, 2013, p.1092) 
 
 Permafrost 
The strong projected warming across the northern high latitudes in climate model 
simulations has implications for frozen ground. Recent projections of the extent of near-
surface permafrost degradation continue to vary widely depending on the underlying 
climate forcing scenario and model physics, but virtually all of them indicate substantial 
near-surface permafrost degradation and thaw depth deepening over much of the 
permafrost area. Permafrost at greater depths is less directly relevant to the surface 
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energy and water balance, and its degradation naturally occurs much more slowly. 
Climate models are beginning to represent permafrost physical processes and properties 
more accurately, thus the projections have increased credibility compared to the previous 
generation of models assessed in the AR4. The projected changes in permafrost are a 
response not only to warming but also to changes in snow conditions, because snow 
properties and their seasonal evolution exert significant control on soil thermal state. 
All near term projections indicate a substantial amount of near-surface permafrost 
degradation (typically taking place in the upper 2 to 3 m) and thaw depth deepening over 
much of the permafrost area. The same trend was determined for long term projections. 
The ranges, which are related to the reference period 1986-2005, are shown in Figure 3.13 
and are reported below: 
 
Figure 3.13 Northern Hemisphere near-surface permafrost area, diagnosed for the available CMIP5 models using 20-
year average bias-corrected monthly surface air temperatures and snow depths. Thick lines: multi-model average. 
Shading and thin lines indicate the inter-model spread (one standard deviation). (IPCC, 2013, p.1092) 
o Annual mean near-surface permafrost area 
for period 2016-2035: 
 
-21% ± 5% under RCP2.6 
-18% ± 6% under RCP4.5 
-18% ± 3% under RCP6.0 
-20% ± 5% under RCP8.5 
o Annual mean near-surface permafrost area 
for period 2080-2099: 
 
-37% ± 11% under RCP2.6 
-51% ± 13% under RCP4.5 
-58% ± 13% under RCP6.0 
-81% ± 12% under RCP8.5 
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Evaporation 
Anthropogenic forcing provokes an increase in precipitation in some areas of the world. The 
variability of the atmospheric moisture storage is negligible, thus to balance the increase in 
precipitation (which requires a certain amount of water) it is necessary a global mean increase 
in evaporation. Global atmospheric water content is constrained by the Clausius-Clapeyron 
equation to increase at around 7%/K; however both evaporation and precipitation in global 
warming simulations increase at 1 to 3%/K (IPCC, 2013, p.986). 
 
Annual mean surface evaporation in the models assessed in AR4 showed increase over most 
of the ocean and increases or decreases over land, with largely the same pattern over land as 
increases and decreases in precipitation. Similar behavior occurs in ensemble of CMIP5 
models. Evaporation increases over most of the ocean and land, with prominent areas of 
decrease over land occurring in southern Africa and northwest Africa along the 
Mediterranean. The areas of decrease correspond to areas with reduced precipitation. In fact, 
if we take a look to Figure 3.14 which exhibits the annual mean evaporation change at the end 
of the 21st century, and we compare it with Figure 3.7 which presents the annual mean 
precipitation change for the same period, we can observe that changes in precipitation and 
evaporation go hand in hand: where there is an increase of precipitation there is a similar 
increment also for evaporation. 
 
Figure 3.14 Change in annual mean evaporation relative to the reference period 1986-2005 projected for 2081–2100 from 
the CMIP5 ensemble. The number of CMIP5 models used is indicated in the upper right corner of each panel. (IPCC, 2013, 
p.1082) 
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Figure 3.15 shows the CMIP5 multi-model annual mean projected changes for the period 2016-
2035 relative to 1986-2005 under RCP 4.5 for the evaporation. 
 
Figure 3.15 CMIP5 multi-model annual mean projected changes for evaporation (%) for the period 2016–2035 relative to 
1986–2005 under RCP4.5 The number of CMIP5 models used is indicated in the upper right corner of the panel. (IPCC, 
2013, p.987) 
 
3.2.1.2 Impacts of temperature changes on water  
Table 3.6 Projected impacts of temperature changes on water 
IMPACT PROJECTIONS REFERENCE 
GLOBAL 
Median values and likely ranges for projections of global mean 
sea level (GMSL) rise 
 0.40 [0.26 to 0.55]m (RCP2.6) 
 0.47 [0.32 to 0.63]m (RCP4.5) 
 0.48 [0.33 to 0.63]m (RCP6.0) 
 0.63 [0.45 to 0.82]m (RCP8.5) 
Median values and likely ranges at 2100 
    0.44 [0.28 to 0.61]m (RCP2.6) 
    0.53 [0.36 to 0.71]m (RCP4.5) 
    0.55 [0.38 to 0.73]m (RCP6.0) 
    0.74 [0.52 to 0.98]m (RCP8.5) 
(IPCC, 2013) 
HEAT EXPANSION 
30 to 55% of the global projections 
    0.14 [0.10 to 0.18]m (RCP2.6) 
    0.19 [0.14 to 0.23]m (RCP4.5) 
    0.19 [0.15 to 0.24]m (RCP6.0) 
    0.27 [0.21 to 0.33]m (RCP8.5) 
(IPCC, 2013) 
GLACIER MELTING 
15 to 35% of the global projections 
    0.10 [0.04 to 0.16]m (RCP2.6) 
    0.12 [0.06 to 0.19]m (RCP4.5) 
    0.12 [0.06 to 0.19]m (RCP6.0) 
    0.16 [0.09 to 0.23]m (RCP8.5) 
(IPCC, 2013) 
Note. Projections’ period: 2081-2100. Reference period: 1986-2005. 
Chapter 3 
86 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
Most of the Earth surface is covered by oceans and seas. Climate change as a whole affects the 
water sector and consequently the characteristics of oceans. But specifically global warming, 
which we could measure with the increase of temperatures, is altering and will continue to 
vary the level of seas and oceans. 
Even in this case, all data and ranges of sea level rise summarized in Table 3.6 were collected 
by the Working Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and were 
reported into the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) Climate change 2013: the physical science 
basis: Working Group I contribution to the Fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2013). 
The process-based projections for Global Mean Sea Level rise during the 21st century are the 
sum of contributions derived from models, which were evaluated by authors comparing them. 
The projections of GMSL rise for each RCP scenario are based on results from CMIP5 
Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Models (AOGCMs provide a representation of the 
climate system that is near or at the most comprehensive end of the spectrum currently 
available: they are complex models). Researchers studied the contributors to global mean sea 
level rise, stating that thermal expansion and glacier melting have been the dominant 
contributors in the 20th century and that will be also in the future. But there are other 
contributors, which are: the Greenland ice-sheet surface mass balance change, Greenland ice-
sheet rapid dynamical change, Antarctic ice-sheet surface mass balance change, Antarctic ice-
sheet rapid dynamical change and anthropogenic intervention in water storage on land. 
 
In this description 
we report the sum of 
the projected 
contributions and 
then only the ranges 
about the two 
major’s contributors 
of sea level rise, as 
we can see in Table 
3.6. This is due to the 
fact that thermal 
expansion and 
glacier contribution 
might account the 
90% of future 
projections. However, Figure 3.16 show projections from process-based models, with likely 
ranges and median values for global mean sea level rise and its contributions in 2081-2100 
relative to 1986-2005 for the four RCP scenarios ad scenario SRES A1B used in AR4. 
Figure 3.16 Projections from process-based models with likely ranges and median values 
for global mean sea level rise and its contributions in 2081–2100 relative to 1986–2005 for 
the four RCP scenarios and scenario SRES A1B used in the AR4. (IPCC, 2013, p.1180) 
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By the late 21st century, in the period 2081-2100 relative to 1986-2005, the median values and 
likely ranges for projections of GMSL rise are: 
 
 0.40 [0.26 to 0.55]m under RCP2.6 
 0.47 [0.32 to 0.63]m under RCP4.5 
 0.48 [0.33 to 0.63]m under RCP6.0 
 0.63 [0.45 to 0.82]m under RCP8.5 
 
Looking at these ranges and at Figure 3.16 we can notice that RCP4.5 and RCP6.0 are very 
similar at the end of the century: the difference is that RCP4.5 has a greater rate of rise earlier 
in the century than RCP6.0, which we can perceive in Figure 3.17. In Figure 3.17 we can also 
notice that the rate of rise becomes roughly constant before the middle of the century in 
RCP2.6, while in RCP4.5 and RCP6.0 becomes constant at the end of the century. Whereas in 
RCP8.5 acceleration of the rate continues throughout the century.  
 
Figure 3.17 Projections from process-based models of the rate of GMSL rise and its contributions as a function of time for 
the four RCP scenarios and scenario SRES A1B. The lines show the median projections. (IPCC, 2013, p.1181) 
At 2100 the median values and likely ranges for projections of GMSL rise are: 
 0.44 [0.28 to 0.61]m under RCP2.6 
 0.53 [0.36 to 0.71]m under RCP4.5 
 0.55 [0.38 to 0.73]m under RCP6.0 
 0.74 [0.52 to 0.98]m under RCP8.5 
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These values and likely ranges are drawn in Figure 3.18. 
 
Figure 3.18 Projections from process-based models of global mean sea level (GMSL) rise relative to 1986–2005 as a 
function of time for the four RCP scenarios and scenario SRES A1B. The lines show the median projections. (IPCC, 2013, 
p.1181) 
Figures 3.17 and 3.18 show not only the projections of the rate of Global Mean Sea Level rise 
and of GMSL rise relative to 1986-2005, but also its contributions. As already stated, the two 
major contributors are thermal expansion and glacier melting, whose contributions are: 
 
Heat expansion (30 to 55% of the projections): 
 0.14 [0.10 to 0.18]m under RCP2.6 
 0.19 [0.14 to 0.23]m under RCP4.5 
 0.19 [0.15 to 0.24]m under RCP6.0 
 0.27 [0.21 to 0.33]m under RCP8.5 
 
Glacier melting (15 to 35% of the projections): 
 0.10 [0.04 to 0.16]m under RCP2.6 
 0.12 [0.06 to 0.19]m under RCP4.5 
 0.12 [0.06 to 0.19]m under RCP6.0 
 0.16 [0.09 to 0.23]m under RCP8.5 
 
The projections of thermal expansion do not include an adjustment of volcanic forcing in 
AOGCMs, as this is uncertainty and relatively small. Glacier melting excludes glaciers of 
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Greenland and Antarctica, but includes glaciers peripheral to the Greenland ice-sheet. By 
2100, 15 to 55% of the present volume of glaciers outside Antarctica is projected to be 
eliminated under RCP2.6, and 35 to 85% under RCP8.5. 
 
3.2.1.3 Impacts of precipitation changes on water 
Table 3.7 Projected impacts of precipitation’s changes on water 
IMPACT PROJECTIONS REFERENCE 
FLOODS 
No general global trend. Northern high latitudes: upward trend. 
Europa and Asia: upward, downward or no trend. 
(IPCC, 2013) 
DROUGHTS 
Low confidence on the magnitude of future impacts. Increases of 
meteorological droughts in the Mediterranean, Central America, 
Brazil, south Africa and Australia. Decreases in high northern 
latitudes. 
(IPCC, 2013) 
STREAMFLOWS 
General trend: decline in spring and summer streamflows and an 
increase in streamflows in winter 
(California Climate 
Change Center, 
2006) 
SALINITY 
Sea Surface Salinity. Subtropical regions and Atlantic more saline. 
High latitudes and North Pacific less saline. 
(IPCC, 2013) 
 
As already widely discussed, the several consequences of climate change into the natural 
system, as a whole, are affecting and will increasingly impact the systems that constitute the 
energy system, as the water system. But we could associate some specific repercussions on 
water system with the changes of precipitation patterns. These effects are floods, droughts, 
changes in streamflows and salinity. 
 
Flooding principally occurs from heavy rainfall, but especially when natural watercourses do 
not have the capacity to convey excess water. Thus the causes could be associated to a natural 
event but also to system incapacity. For these reasons it is difficult to find a general global 
trend of floods, as the Working Group II of the IPCC concluded in the AR4. However, in the 
AR5 WGII assesses floods in regional detail, justifying this stance with the fact that trends in 
floods are strongly influenced by changes in river management. The most evident flood trends 
appear to be in northern high latitudes, where observed warming trends have been largest. 
Studies for Europe and Asia show evidence for upward, downward or no trend in the 
magnitude and frequency of floods, so that there is currently no clear and widespread 
evidence for observed changes in flooding except for the earlier spring flow in snow-
dominated regions. In summary, there continues to be a lack of evidence on flood projections 
and thus low confidence regarding the sign of trend in the magnitude and frequency on a 
global scale. 
 
Drought condition may occur for many reasons, but the main is the change of precipitation 
pattern. If a reduction of precipitation takes place, it is very likely that a meteorological 
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drought occurs. Dry periods, in any case, could result from other changes in the precipitation 
pattern, associated with additional agents. Increased temperatures for example will lead to 
more precipitation falling as rain rather than snow, earlier snowmelt and increased 
evaporation and transpiration. Low precipitation and timing of water availability (associated 
with high temperatures but also with changes in soil moisture) can cause agricultural 
droughts. The risk of future agricultural droughts episodes will increase in the regions of 
robust soil moisture decrease (IPCC, 2013, p.1086). However, there is low confidence in the 
magnitude of future impacts (agriculture and meteorological droughts), even though 
substantial increases of meteorological drought are projected in the Mediterranean, Central 
America, Brazil, South Africa and Australia, while decreases are projected in high northern 
latitudes. 
 
Floods and droughts are not the only effects of the change of the rainfall pattern. The same 
motivations, which can lead to agricultural droughts, will probably affect the hydrology of 
several basins around the world. The California Climate Change Center in its report Climate 
change impacts on high-elevation hydropower generation in California’s Sierra Nevada: a case 
study in the upper American river (California Climate Change Center, 2006) studied the 
problems of hydropower generation connected with water availability. They run simulations 
for two locations under two different models for two greenhouse gas scenarios (A2 and B1 
which belong to the SRES scenarios and not to the RCPs), yielding a total of eight perturbation 
ratios. They carried out streamflow predictions for 2070-2099 compared with an unimpaired 
natural streamflow representing the period 1960-1990. The results are displayed in Figures 
3.19 and 3.20. 
The general trend that can be appreciated from these projections is a decline in spring and 
summer streamflows and an increase in streamflows in winter. This translates into an earlier 
timing of inflows. Each month was divided into equalized sets of wet, normal and dry days. 
Averages were taken of all wet, normal and dry January days, and so on, generating three 
series of monthly perturbation ratios. The results show that, in general, daily maximum 
streamflows increase more than medium and low streamflows (wet, normal and dry days). 
The percentage changes to annual streamflow for the whole system for all scenario, referred 
to the historical scenario, are: 
 
 71% for PCMB1_38 
 86% for PCMB1_39 
 62% for GFDLA2_38 
 86% for GFDLA2_39  
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Figure 3.19 Streamflow conditions (unimpaired inflow to Union Valley) under climate change scenarios 2070-2099. Note: 
cfs = monthly natural flow cubic feet per second. 1 acre foot = 43.560 cubic feet = 1233.48 m3. (California Climate Change 
Center, 2006, p.15) 
Figure 3.20 Streamflow conditions (unimpaired inflow to Ice House) under climate change scenarios 2070-2099. (California 
Climate Change Center, 2006, p.16) 
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The modification of precipitation pattern has also had a huge influence on the salinity of water 
elements, as oceans, watercourses and lakes. Regions with high salinity where evaporation 
dominates precipitation have become more saline since the 50s and regions of low salinity 
where precipitation dominates have become fresher.  
The Casamance estuary is a perfect example of the problem associated with this impact. In 
the report Salinity in the Casamance estuary. Occurrence and consequences (Blesgraaf et al., 
2006) the authors reported the reasons for which the Casamance estuary had become 
hypersaline and the principal one is the decrease of precipitations. They studied if there is the 
possibility to return to the original conditions, refreshing the estuary or, in other words, 
flushing it. They found that the most important parameter that influences the flushing of the 
estuary is the rainfall, since this is a dominant parameter with a large variance. More rainfall 
will result in more runoff. However, from the model output they could conclude that the 
estuary reacts quick on a change in rain and runoff intensity, but several years of heavy rain 
is not enough to flush the estuary completely, which results in a hypersaline estuary in the 
dry season.  
The WGI of IPCC in the AR5 communicated some long-term projections of global sea surface 
salinity (SSS). The CMIP5 climate model projections available suggest that high SSS 
subtropical regions that are dominated by net evaporation are typically getting more saline. 
Lower SSS regions at high latitudes are typically getting fresher. They also suggest a 
continuation of this trend in the Atlantic where subtropical surface water become more saline 
as the century progresses. At the same time the North Pacific is projected to become less saline. 
Figure 29 shows the projected sea surface salinity differences for 208-2100 for RCP8.5 relative 
to 1986-2005 from CMIP5 models.  
 
Figure 3.21 Projected sea surface salinity differences 2081-2100 for RCP8.5 relative to 1986-2005 from CMIP5 models. The 
number of CMIP5 models used is indicated in the upper right corner. Ocean salinity is generally defined as the salt 
concentration (e.g., Sodium and Chlorine) in sea water. It is measured in unit of PSU (Practical Salinity Unit), which is a 
unit based on the properties of sea water conductivity. 1 PSU = 1 g/kg. (IPCC, 2013, p.1094) 
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3.2.2 Expected impacts on energy resources  
All those sources that may be used to generate electricity or other kinds of energy are 
considered energy resources. These sources fall into two categories: renewable and non-
renewable resources. Wind, solar radiation, water, crops, oil, natural gas and coal are the 
sources we take in consideration in the investigation because they are all affected by climate 
change. In this section the focus is aimed at the energy endowment, to be more precise at the 
amount of primary energy available for every resource. 
 
As previously explained when we introduced the impacts on energy resources in Chapter 2, 
we aggregate the climatic consequences, which affect the energy endowment under a unique 
parameter: the climate change. An exception is done for hydropower endowment, which we 
consider affected by only the water system in our analysis, for highlighting the strong 
correlation between the water system and the energy system. 
 
3.2.2.1 Climate change’s impacts on energy resources   
Table 3.8 Projected climate change’s impacts on energy resources 
IMPACT PROJECTIONS REFERENCE 
WIND 
“Winners” and “losers”: regions where wind energy may benefit and 
regions where wind energy may be negatively impacted 
(Pryor and 
Barthelmie, 2010) 
Reference period: 1964 - 2000  
Northwest U.S. Wind speeds. Summertime: -5-10% (wind power 
resource: -40%). Wintertime: possible slightly increase 
(Sailor et al., 2008) 
Reference period: 1948 - 1978 
Continental U.S. Wind speeds. -1.0 to -3.2% in the next 50 years. -1.4 
to -4.5% over the next 100 years 
(Breslow and 
Sailor, 2002) 
Reference period: 1980 - 2000 
Baltic sea region. Wind power potential: +15% 
Ireland. Wind power potential. Wintertime: +4-8%. Summertime: 
decrease 
UK. Wind speeds. Summertime: -5% (-15% in Northern Ireland). 
Wintertime: increases 
Eastern Mediterranean. Wind speeds. Increases over land and 
decreases over sea. Noticeable increase over the Aegean sea 
(Mideksa and 
Kallbekken, 2010) 
BIOENERGY 
Brazil. Projections: 2005-2030. Reference period: 1980-2000 
Sugarcane. Planted area: +148%. Crop yield: +7% (from 77 to 82t/ha). 
Output: +161% 
Biodiesel. Shift of suitable growing zones for oilseed crops, from 
northeast to the south   
(de Lucena et al., 
2009b) 
WAVE AND 
TIDAL 
Relationship wind – wave energy 
+20% in mean wind speed raises mean wave heights around 44%, and 
raises available power levels by 133% 
-20% in mean wind speed lowers available power levels by 67% 
(Harrison and 
Wallace, 2005) 
FOSSIL FUELS 
The access will be affected by climate change 
Coal. Precipitation increase: coal quality decrease, coal availability 
increase (no seam fires) 
(Williamson et al., 
2009) 
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This part treats the expected impacts of climate change and its consequences to all energy 
resources, except for hydropower one. The resources we consider in this section are wind, 
bioenergy, wave, tidal, oil, natural gas and coal. The endowment of these will be altered in 
different way. This is due to fact that these sources belong to different typologies of energy, 
renewable and non-renewable. The amount of energy of a renewable resource is closely 
related to climate parameters: thus the endowment of these resources varies with changes of 
climate variables. On the other hand, the amount of energy of a non-renewable resource does 
not vary with weather and climate change: it is the access to them that could be influenced by 
changes in climate, and thus varies the final endowment of the non-renewable resource. 
 
Wind 
The availability and reliability of wind power depend on weather conditions. Wind mills and 
wind farms must be placed in those sites where the statistics of wind (maximum, minimum, 
mean and variance) are optimal for energy production. Only few sites have the appropriate 
characteristics for this purpose and climate change and its consequences may introduce the 
risk of reduce wind power generation diminishing the endowment of wind. It may also occur 
the opposite situation: an inappropriate area could become suitable owing to climate change. 
Researches consequently investigate future wind patterns not only on those regions that are 
now suitable for wind power generation, but also on all other regions, which could become 
good enough. They do not concentrate only on the statistics of wind (mean wind speed and 
gustiness), but also on other factors which influence the wind resource. They concentrate on 
air density for example, because it is fundamental in giving the value of energy density of 
wind. 
 
As for other energy resources, it does not exist a study where we can find comprehensive 
projections of wind pattern changes of all the world. This is due to fact that there was not so 
many research over this theme, but above all because it is quite difficult to elaborate global 
projections of wind changes. In literature we can find lots of precise studies which deal with 
specific regions or nations. Gathering together these studies permits to have a wider idea of 
global future changes in wind patterns and have an overview on how the studies are 
conducted: it could also permit to understand the general wind tendencies over the world. For 
example, we can deduce that wind statistics will change in different ways across regions, 
suggesting that it is necessary an accurate study for a specific region if we want to know in 
details future changes of wind pattern. 
Hereinafter there is an account of some investigation over the endowment of wind resource. 
 
Pryor and Barthelmie in Climate change impacts on wind energy: a review (Pryor and 
Barthelmie, 2010) mentioned some trends of wind energy density in the north and southeast 
of Europe, north and south America. They asserted that global climate change may change 
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the geographic distribution and the inter-and intra-annual variability of the wind resource, 
or alter other aspects of the external conditions for wind developments. As in other 
components of climate change there will be “winners” and “losers”: regions where wind 
energy developments may benefit from climate change and regions where the wind energy 
industry may be negatively impacted. From the research conducted to that period, it appeared 
unlikely that mean wind speeds and energy density will change by more than the current 
inter-annual variability, over most of Europe and North America during the present century. 
By the end of the 21st century there may be an increase in wintertime energy density in the 
north of Europe and a decline in the southeast but the uncertainty is very high. Then, 
suggested changes over South America may be of a larger magnitude, but also these estimates 
were subject to rather large uncertainty.   
 
Talking about South America, some researchers investigated the vulnerability of wind power 
to climate change in Brazil (The vulnerability of wind power to climate change in Brazil 
(Pereira de Lucena et al., 2010)). The focus of the study was to analyze some possible impacts 
of global climate change on the wind power potential of Brazil, by simulating wind conditions 
associated with the IPCC A2 and B2 scenario. Results indicated that the wind power potential 
in Brazil would not be jeopardized in the future due to possible new climate conditions. On 
the contrary, authors found that the average wind velocity would increase considerably in the 
coastal regions in general and in the north/northeast regions of the country in particular. The 
results based on the climate projections showed that the Brazilian wind power generation 
potential could have a threefold increase in the B2 scenario and a four-fold increase in the A2 
scenario for 2071-2100 as compared to the reference situation of 1961-1990. The wind 
potential was estimated using the projections of future wind velocities at 10 m height, which 
is below that of a typical commercial wind turbine. The relationship between height and wind 
velocity can be approximated by a logarithmic rule, in which roughness is one of the key 
parameters that depends on the vegetation cover. In Figures 3.22 and 3.23 are reproduced the 
new projected average wind velocities of A2 and B2 scenarios. 
 
In Climate change implications for wind power resources in the Northwest United States 
(Sailor et al., 2008) the authors investigated scenarios of climate change’s impacts on wind 
power generation potential in a five-state region within the Northwest United States (Idaho, 
Montana, Oregon, Washington and Wyoming). The scenarios suggested that summertime 
wind speeds in the Northwest may decrease by 5-10%, while wintertime wind speeds may 
decrease by relatively little, or possibly increase slightly. Thus under a warmed climate the 
wind power resource in the Northwest US may decrease by up to 40% in the spring and 
summer months, while in winter months the results were less consistent. 
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Figure 3.22 New projected average wind velocities in Brazil: Scenario A2. (Pereira de Lucena et al., 2010, p.907) 
 
Figure 3.23 New projected average wind velocities in Brazil: Scenario B2. (Pereira de Lucena et al., 2010, p.908) 
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Breslow and Sailor in Vulnerability of wind power resources to climate change in the 
continental United States (Breslow and Sailor, 2002) investigated the potential impact of 
climate change on wind speeds and hence on wind power across the continental US. They 
used the General Circulation Model output from the Canadian Climate Center and from the 
Hadley Center to provide a range of possible variations in a seasonal mean wind magnitude. 
The results from the Hadley model suggest minimal climate change impact on wind resources, 
while the results from the CCC model suggest reductions in mean wind speeds in the order to 
10-15%. However, the models were generally consistent in predicting that the US will see 
reduced wind speeds of 1.0 to 3.2% in the next 50 years, and 1.4 to 4.5% over the next 100 
years.  
 
Mideksa and Kallbekken in Impact of climate change on the electricity market: a review 
(Mideksa and Kallbekken, 2010) highlighted that whereas the research frontier has advanced 
significantly, there still remains a significant need for more research to better understand the 
effects of climate change on the electricity market. The authors focused on the areas they 
believed there were significant gaps: the electricity demand and the electricity supply. 
Discussing about electricity supply and specifically about wind power production, the 
researchers gave an account of some studies on the impact of climate change on the wind 
power potential which had been conducted for several regions: 
 
 Clausen et al., 2007, cited in Mideska and Kallbekken, 2010, p. 4: wind power potential 
could increase by up to 15% in the Baltic Sea region according to the IPCC SRES A2 
scenario; 
 Lynch et al., 2006, cited in Mideska and Kallbekken, 2010, p. 4: climate change has a 
seasonally different impact on the wind power potential of Ireland. There will be an 
overall increase in wind speeds in winter by about 4-8% while there will be a decrease 
during the summer months; 
 Cradden at al., 2006, cited in Mideska and Kallbekken, 2010, p. 4: UK’s wind power 
resource. Wind speeds are expected to decrease in summer by 5% in much of the UK 
and by about 15% around the South-Eastern part of the Northern Ireland. Then large 
part of the UK would experience increased wind speed during winter; 
 Bloom et al., 2008, cited in Mideska and Kallbekken, 2010, p. 4: for the Eastern 
Mediterranean they found that “wind speeds in 2071-2100 exhibits a general increase 
over land and a decrease over the sea, with the exception of a noticeable increase over 
the Aegean Sea”. 
 
Bioenergy 
Liquid biofuels are vulnerable to the effects of weather modifications on crops used as raw 
materials for the production. The changes in temperature, rainfall patterns, frequency of 
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precipitation and extreme events and level of carbon dioxide can alter the crop yield and 
agricultural distribution zones.  
 
Studies like Maize ethanol feedstock production and net energy value as affected by climate 
variability and crop management practices (Persson et al., 2009) analyze the connection 
between weather and climatic conditions and crop management practices to evaluate the 
future net energy value (i.e. the output energy after all non-renewable energy inputs have 
been accounted for) of the biofuels production. This indicator can be a sign for the long-term 
sustainability of bio-ethanol production because it accounts both crop management practices 
and climate variability. It gives an evaluation of future grain yield for a specific crop 
management, but it does not indicate the measure of the future production of crops for 
biofuels. We can say that it gives a qualitative information rather than quantitative.  
 
The magnitude of future biofuel endowment especially depends on the magnitude of future 
suitable areas for growing energy crops due to modification in climate. In this sense the 
authors of The vulnerability of renewable energy to climate change in Brazil (de Lucena et al., 
2009b) evaluated the effects of climate change on the geographic distribution of biofuels crop 
production. The analysis of the impact of the biofuels production in Brazil was made for both 
ethanol and biodiesel. The work presents an estimate of the impacts of GCC on the geographic 
distribution of sugarcane and oil seed crops (for bioethanol and biodiesel), considering only 
the changes in the temperature range by region. It did not consider other variables that can 
influence the productivity and adaptation of these crops in determined regions, such as 
atmospheric CO2 concentration and alterations in water regimes, as well as the incidence of 
crop pests and disease. Considering that authors did not deem many factors, the results 
presented may be too pessimistic for some crops, such as sugarcane and soybeans, and too 
optimistic for others. 
 
 Sugarcane. The area planted with sugarcane should rise by 148% over the 2005-2030 
period, reaching 13.9 million hectares and crop yield should increase by 7% from 77 
to 82t/ha. As a result, output will expand by 161%, reaching 1.14 billion tons in 2030. 
Since the crops is grown in all the country's regions, even if the cultivation becomes 
unfeasible in some of these regions due to GCC, other regions can take up the slack, 
especially the Midwest, by continuing to have a temperature range favorable to 
sugarcane (21-38°C), along with large expanses of available land. It is possible that 
there will be shifts in the geographic distribution, with some regions becoming 
climatically unfavorable to grow sugarcane, but others becoming more favorable. 
Even with these possible modifications in crop distribution, GCC will not significantly 
affect negatively the production of sugarcane ethanol in Brazil. 
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 Biodiesel. There are various species of oilseed plants which, grow in the country that 
have potential as raw material to produce biodiesel. The standouts are soybeans, 
whose oil represents 90% of Brazil’s vegetable oil output, sunflower seeds, for their 
oil yield, and castor beans, for the plant’s resistance to drought. 
According to the results, the northeast and Midwest regions should see a substantial 
increase in temperature, which can affect their capacity to produce soya. Soybean 
output can fall or even become unfeasible in these regions due to the great 
temperature variations. The temperature range for growing soya (8-34°C) in the 
south region is expected to improve, which can offset the negative effect of climate 
changes in the northeast and Midwest. 
The projections for soybeans production in the country are on the whole favorable, 
with estimates of growth of output around 3.5 million tons yearly. The greatest 
projected impacts will be in the mid-south and south. The forecast production 
increases are between 5% and 34%.  
The results indicate that the production of biodiesels in the country can be affected 
negatively by GCC, mainly in the northeast, with a shift of suitable growing zones for 
oilseed crops to the south region. However, not all the crops are adaptable to the 
edaphoclimatic1 conditions in that region, which can reduce the output of biodiesel in 
the country. 
 
Wave and tidal 
Ocean can provide a huge amount of energy through waves and tides. The technologies that 
exploit these kinds of energy resource are not so commonly used, not at the same extent as 
other renewable energy resources. 
Wave formation results from wind energy: climate change has an effect on wind, which in 
turn causes indirect impacts on waves. Wind climate effects and wave generation have a 
nonlinear relationship and show different long trends around the globe. In some regions there 
has been observed a positive impact on wave energy with an increasing trend in wave height. 
In other regions, there has been an opposite trend, with a negative impact on wave energy 
owning to a decrease in wave height. 
 
From the study Climate sensitivity of marine energy (Harrison and Wallace, 2005) we can 
deduce the relationship between wind and wave energy. In this report the authors put a focus 
on UK, studying here the projected changes of future wave endowment. Wind energy depends 
to wind speeds on a cubic relationship. A 10% change in wind speeds could alter energy yields 
by 13-25%, dependent on the site and season. As ocean waves are predominately the result of 
                                                    
1 Edaphoclimatic: related to edaphology and climate. Edaphology: the study of the influence of soil on living things, 
especially plants (“Edaphology,” n.d.) 
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wind action, changes in wind patterns will ultimately affect wave regimes. Like wind turbines, 
wave energy converters (WECs) are designed to capture energy from specific wave height, 
period and direction ranges. Thus there are potentially significant consequences of wave 
energy. Mean wave height period and wave power vary within the range of wind speed 
changes. Wave period varies in direct proportion with the wind speed, while wave height is 
more sensitive to increases in speed as might be expected from the square-relationship. A 
20% rise in wind speed raises mean wave heights around 44% (over a meter on average). A 
20% decrease in mean wind speed lowers available power levels by 67% while the opposite 
change raises them by 133%. 
 
Oil, natural gas and coal 
Oil, gas resources and coal will not be impacted by climate change, because they result from 
a process that takes millions of years and are geologically trapped. But climate change can 
affect our knowledge about these resources and the access to them. For example, climate 
change may facilitate access to several areas by diminishing the ice cover in the Arctic region. 
 
A specific mention should be done for coal. The study Climate-proofing energy systems 
(Williamson et al., 2009) talks about the meteorological parameters which could affect the 
fossil fuel endowment, focusing on coal. If average precipitation increases, coal quality could 
decrease due to higher moisture content of coal mines. But coal availability could increase if 
coal seam fires are extinguished. If average precipitation decreases, coal availability could 
decrease due to higher probability of coal seam fires. 
 
3.2.2.2 Impacts of water changes on energy resources 
Table 3.9 Projected impacts of water changes on energy resources 
IMPACT PROJECTIONS REFERENCE 
RUNOFF 
Projections: 2050. Reference period: 1900 - 1970 
    +10-40% in eastern equatorial Africa, La Plata basin, high-
latitude North America and Eurasia 
    -10-30% in southern Africa, southern Europe, the Middle East, 
mid-latitude western North America 
(Milly et al., 2005) 
From 44854 bcm (in 2010) to 52829 bcm (in 2100) (MIT, 2014) 
 
Water is an energy resource and, to be more accurate, water is a non-renewable energy 
resource. Analyzing the energy system, the water component must be placed logically in the 
category energy resource. As we have already said many times, water, as energy resource, is 
particular and important, because it has a strong correlation with all the components of an 
energy system, and for this reason we consider it as an independent entity. 
Water perturbs various units that constitute the energy system, included energy resources, 
even if it is itself an energy resource. But specifically, water system influences the endowment 
Future projections of climate change’s impacts on energy systems 
101 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
of water for hydropower generation. Hydropower plants depend on the hydrological cycle and 
the availability of water resource. Water is used for several purposes, not just for hydropower 
generation. Agriculture and refrigeration needs, for example, are necessities that must be 
taken in consideration when we would analyze the amount of water resource available for 
hydropower generation. 
 
The quantity of available water for all these aims is pondered using the runoff parameter. 
Runoff is that part of precipitation that does not evaporate and is not transpired, but flows 
over the ground surface and returns to bodies of water. Water needs for agriculture, 
refrigeration and hydropower generation are collected from water bodies: knowing the 
amount of water contained in water bodies could be really useful information. Thus several 
researches around the world, evaluate future impacts of climate change on runoff using a 
variety of hydrological model. 
 
The Working Group I of the IPCC in the first part of the AR5 (IPCC, 2013) as usual supplies 
projected changes for runoff for two different time scales. Global and basin-scale hydrological 
models obtain near term increase runoff with global warming in the Liard (Canada), Rio 
Grande (Brazil) and Xiangxi (China) basins, in northwestern Africa, southern Arabia and 
southeastern South America. They obtain a decrease for the Okavango (southwest Africa), 
northern Africa, western Australia, southern Europe and southwest USA (Figure 3.24). 
 
 
Figure 3.24 CMIP5 multi-model annual mean projected changes for the period 2016-2035 relative to 1986-2005 under 
RCP4.5 for total runoff (%). The number of CMIP5 models used is indicated in the upper right corner of the figure. (IPCC, 
2013, p.987) 
With regard to long term projections, in the AR4 21st century model-projected runoff 
consistently showed decreases in southern Europe, the Middle East and southwestern USA 
and increases in Southeast Asia, tropical East Africa and high northern latitudes. The same 
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general features appear in the CMIP5 ensemble of GCMs for all four RCPs shown in Figure 
3.25. The large decrease in runoff in southern Europe and southern Africa are consistent with 
changes in precipitation and warming induced evapotranspiration increases. The high 
northern latitude runoff increases are likely under RCP8.5 and consistent with the projected 
precipitation increases. Decreases in runoff are also likely in southern Europe the Middle East 
and southern Africa (Figure 3.25). 
 
The paper Effects of IPCC SRES emissions scenarios on river runoff: a global perspective 
(Arnell, 2003), even if it is outdated because it took in consideration the SRES scenarios and 
not the RCPs, gives us an important information about catchments. By the 2020s 
approximately a third of all catchments will have a substantial increase in runoff, a third will 
have a substantial decrease, and a third will show no substantial change. By the 2050s the 
number with no substantial changes will reduce to between 20 and 30%, and it will fall to 
between 10 and 30% by the 2080s. Figure 3.26 shows the degree of consistency in the 
estimated direction of change in average runoff. Areas with significant decrease in runoff 
include much of Europe, the Middle East, southern Africa, North America and most of South 
America. Areas with consistent increases in runoff include high latitude North America and 
Siberia, eastern Africa, parts of Saharan Africa and Australia, south and East Asia. 
Figure 3.25 Change in annual mean runoff relative to the reference period 1986–2005 projected for 2081–2100 from the 
CMIP5 ensemble. The number of CMIP5 models used is indicated in the upper right corner of each panel. (IPCC, 2013, 
p.1081) 
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Figure 3.26 Degree of consistency in the estimated direction of change in average annual runoff across eight simulations 
using the A2 emissions scenario by the 2020s, 2050s and 2080s. (Arnell, 2003, p.632) 
From these qualitative trends we can deduce that future changes in runoff are not univocal 
around the world: some regions will appreciate increases in water availability and some other 
decreases which depend on many factors.  
 
Other more specific information for other regions could be noticed in other documents. For 
example, in the article Global pattern of trends in streamflow and water availability in a 
changing climate (Milly et al., 2005) the authors reported specific trends and ranges for 
several regions around the world, explaining also the causes of such changes. They used an 
ensemble of 12 climate models to simulate observed regional patterns of 20th century changes 
in streamflow and project future changes in runoff. These models projected a 10-40% 
increases in runoff in eastern equatorial Africa, the La Plata basin and high-latitude North 
America and Eurasia and a 10-30% decreases in runoff in southern Africa, southern Europe 
the Middle East and mid-latitude western North America by the year 2050 (see Figure 3.27). 
The authors stressed that in general the areas of increased runoff will shrink over time, 
whereas areas of decreases runoff will grow. Initial increases of runoff in the 20th century are 
projected to reserve in the 21st century in eastern equatorial South America, southern Africa 
and the western central plains of North America.  
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Figure 3.27 Relative change in runoff in the twenty-ﬁrst century.  Ensemble (arithmetic) mean of relative change (%) in 
runoff for the period 2041–2060, computed as 100 times the difference between 2041–2060 runoff in the SRES A1B 
experiments and 1900–1970 runoff in the 20C3M experiments, divided by 1900–1970 runoff. (Milly et al., 2005, p.349) 
The article Assessing climate change impacts on global hydropower (Hamududu and 
Killingtveit, 2012) pointed mainly the attention on hydropower generation than hydropower 
endowment. Anyway, it supplied a projection of future runoff changes. Hamududu and 
Killingtveit used an ensemble of regional patterns of changes in runoff, computed from global 
circulation models (GCM) simulations with 12 different scenarios. They found that globally 
hydropower generation is predicted to change very little by the year 2050 for the hydropower 
system in operation today. Many regions will appreciate an increase in runoff and hydropower 
generation due to increasing precipitation, but also many others will recognize a decrease. 
The authors based their study on a runoff baseline data taken from the IPCC AR4. The changes 
reproduced in Figure 3.28 are expresses in terms of percentage variation from current runoff 
figures.  
 
 
Figure 3.28 Future (2050) runoff changes (%) based on 12 GCMs under A1B scenario. (Hamududu and Killingtveit, 2012, 
p.312) 
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Based on this evaluation, the authors concluded that even if individual countries and regions 
may experience significant impacts, climate change will not lead to significant changes in the 
global hydropower generation, at least for the existing hydropower system. 
 
Hamlet et al. produced the article Effects of projected climate change on energy supply and 
demand in the Pacific Northwest and Washington State (Hamlet et al., 2010) in which they 
evaluated potential changes in the seasonality and annual amount of hydropower production 
and changes in energy 
demand in a warming 
climate by linking 
simulated streamflow 
scenarios produced by a 
hydrological model. 
Changes in temperature 
and precipitation 
expected in the 21st 
century will have 
profound implications 
for the timing and 
volume of streamflow in 
the Pacific Northwest. 
Changes in streamflow 
then will have important 
implications for regional 
scale electrical energy 
supply. Hydropower 
production in the 
Columbia River basin is 
strongly correlated with 
modified streamflow in 
the Columbia River at 
The Dalles, Oregon. 
Figure 3.29 shows 
simulated monthly 
average mean flow at 
The Dalles, associated with 20th century climate and the three A1B and B1 scenarios. Warming 
will produce increased flow in winter, reduced and earlier peak flows, and systematically 
lower flows in summer. 
 
Figure 3.29 Simulated long-term  mean  modified  streamflow  for  the  Columbia  River  
at The  Dalles,  OR,  for  six  climate  change  scenarios. Top panels show results for 
the A1B scenario. Bottom panels show results for the B1 scenario. (Hamlet et al., 2010, 
p 173) 
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The projected increases of precipitations in cool season (October-March) and decreases in 
warm season in the scenarios, exacerbate the seasonal effects. On annual time scales, the 
effects of warming and increasing winter precipitation on streamflow are opposed. In the 
absence of warming, increases of precipitation in cool season would increase annual flow. In 
the streamflow scenarios, however, small reductions in annual flow at The Dalles (2-4% by 
mid-21st century) result from the combination of warmer temperatures (increased annual 
evaporation) and increased cool season precipitation. 
 
The vulnerability of renewable energy to climate change in Brazil (de Lucena et al., 2009b) 
analyzes, as the title indicates, the vulnerability of renewable energy production in Brazil, for 
the case of hydropower generation and liquid biofuels production, giving a set of long-term 
climate projections for the A2 and B2 IPCC emission scenarios. 
For the case of hydropower generation, the relevant climatic variable for the proposed 
analysis was the long-range outlook for the rainfall regime in the face of a possible new 
climate reality. The impacts of the GCC scenarios on the flow regime in the relevant Brazilian 
basins were assessed in two stages: the first consisted in estimating the future flows at each 
power plant feeding the national grid using unvaried time-series models. In the second stage, 
the impact of the alterations in the rainfall regime was incorporated into the projected flow 
series. As a general result, the flow projections for two GCC scenarios (A2 and B2) show a 
downward trend in the 2071-2100 period (see data in Table 3.10). In the B2 scenario the 
difference is greater than in the A2 scenario. The greater impact on flow occurs in the north 
and northeast regions of Brazil. In the Paranà Basin in the south-southeast of Brazil the 
impacts are not so significant. The power plants in the Paranà Basin show a seasonal positive 
variation in flow in the months when flow is increasing and negative in the months when it 
is falling. In the B2 scenario the negative impacts are even greater. If this were the case, the 
power plants would face an earlier dry period. The remaining basins all show an average 
negative impact on flow. 
 
Table 3.10 Results for hydropower (deviation from the reference projections) (de Lucena et al., 2009b, p.884) 
BASIN 
AVERAGE ANNUAL FLOW 
A2 (%) B2 (%) 
Paraná River -2.40 -8.20 
Grande 1.00 -3.40 
Paranaíba -5.90 -5.90 
Paranapanema -5.00 -5.70 
Parnaíba -10.10 -10.30 
São Francisco -23.40 -26.40 
Tocatins-Araguaia -14.70 -15.80 
Brazil (SIN) -8.60 -10.80 
Note. SIN: Sistema Interligado Nacional (Brazilian Interconnected electric power system) 
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The Mideksa and Kallbekken paper The impact of climate change on the electricity market: a 
review (Mideksa and Kallbekken, 2010) reviewed the research on climate change impact on 
electricity market through both electricity demand and supply. Talking about the hydropower 
supply, the authors reported the results of the study of Bye (Bye, 2008, cited in Mideksa and 
Kallbekken, 2010, p.4). Bye analyzed the effect of climate change on supply based on hydro 
and wind power in Northern Europe. He reported that river inflow and wind speed would 
increase by 11% and 1% respectively, between 2001 and 2040. This would raise the supply of 
power by 1.8% relative to 2001. 
 
In contrast to the studies mentioned until now, the report 2014 Energy and climate outlook 
(MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, 2014) of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology includes a global estimation of future total water supply, divided into 
runoff, withdrawal and evaporation. The total water supply in 2010 was 46398 billion cubic 
meters (bcm) while in 2100 it will be 54454 bcm. The total runoff will change from 44854 
bcm in 2010 to 52829 bcm in 2100 according to the projections. These estimations consider 
total runoff (generated from precipitation), groundwater recharge, withdrawals, return flows 
and water consumption (withdrawals that evaporate or not directly return to the basins).  
 
3.2.3 Expected impacts on energy demand 
The evaluation of climate change’s impacts on energy demand is fundamental for the 
management of the entire energy system. It is so important because it gives us an estimate of 
future energy consumption, which affects consequently the energy generation and the energy 
endowment. Once it was not considered so significant because an alteration of energy demand 
was reflected into a simple increase or decrease of energy supply. But now we acknowledge 
that, for example, a rise of surface air temperature in summer will lead to an increase in 
electricity consumption for space cooling, which needs an increment of electricity generation 
(affected by climate change) that requires more energy resources, which in turn are 
influenced by the changes in climate. Thus the relevant impacts of climate change into the 
energy system are not restricted to the resource and supply side. 
Besides space cooling there are other requirements which are altered by future climate 
changes. The amount of energy consumed in residential, commercial and industrial buildings 
for space heating is one of them. Others are the energy for water heating, commercial 
refrigeration, industrial process cooling and performance, agriculture and desalinization. 
Furthermore, water requirements are altered by climate change: the water demand in 
industry and agriculture will vary cause of temperature and water changes. 
 
This section of the assessment considers temperature rising and water changes as principal 
origins of impacts. Temperature increase will alter the energy consumption in buildings 
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(heating and cooling demand), in industry and in agriculture. In addition, temperature rise 
will change water use in industrial processes and water withdrawal in the agricultural sector. 
Changes in water properties, as temperature and availability, will then vary the final use of 
energy in almost all sectors, although we will concentrate only on the use of energy for water 
treatment.  
 
3.2.3.1 Impacts of temperature changes on energy demand 
Table 3.11 Projected impacts of temperature changes on energy demand 
IMPACT PROJECTIONS REFERENCE 
HEATING 
DEMAND 
+0.8% a year between 2000 and 2030, and after slowly decrease  
-34% worldwide by 2100 
(Isaac and van 
Vuuren, 2009) 
COOLING 
DEMAND 
From 1900 kWh (in 2000) to 4800 kWh (in 2100). +7% a year between 
2020 and 2030. Then +1% a year to the end of the century 
+70% greater than projected demand without climate change 
(Isaac and van 
Vuuren, 2009) 
INDUSTRY 
U.S. energy consumption per unit of industrial production: +0.0127% 
per increase in 1 HDD or +0.0032% per increase of 1 CDD 
Annual basis: -6.2% energy demand (a saving of 0.0422 EJ) 
(Wilbanks et al., 
2008) 
Use of water: +45% from 763 bcm (2010) to 1098 bcm (2100) (MIT, 2014) 
AGRICULTURE 
-10% from 1551 bcm (2010) to 1389 bcm (2100) (MIT, 2014) 
Water withdrawals (B2 scenario): from 2498 bcm (1995) to 2341 bcm 
(2025), to 2256 bcm (2055) and 2211 bcm (2075) 
(Alcamo et al., 
2007) 
 
As for other sectors of the energy system, there are not so many documents in literature which 
regard future impacts of climate change on energy demand on a global scale. The majority of 
existing studies focuses on the effects at local level, because generally climate impacts on 
energy use vary across regions. Nonetheless hereinafter some data and trends of heating and 
cooling demand, industry and agriculture use are reported. 
 
Heating and cooling demand in 
buildings 
The total energy demand for heating 
and cooling for buildings depends on 
outdoor temperature. A lot of empirical 
studies come to the same conclusion, 
that the energy demand depends on a 
temperature dependence pattern (TDP), 
which presents a U-shaped fashion (see 
Figure 3.30). This U-shaped TDP 
suggests that climate change may have 
ambiguous consequences for future 
Figure 3.30 Temperature Dependence Pattern based on a degree 
day approach. (Hekkenberg et al., 2009, p.1799) 
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energy demand at global level, as increasing outdoor temperatures could generally reduce 
heating demand and could increment cooling demand. 
The assessment of the impacts of temperature variations can be conducted using the concept 
of heating and cooling degree-days, even if energy consumption’s projections using degree 
day calculations can be fairly coarse. This method is appropriate only if the building use and 
the efficiency of the equipment remains constant. Furthermore, its application is limited 
because it considers only the effect of dry bulb temperature, which is extremely incorrect for 
cooling loads, because the load is dependent on both sensible and latent heats. 
 
The article Modelling global residential sector energy demand for heating and air conditioning 
in the context of climate change (Isaac and van Vuuren, 2009), is one of those few documents 
which consider globally the impacts of climate change into the energy sector. In this paper the 
authors attempted to describe residential heating and cooling demand in the context of 
climate change at global scale. They used relatively simple relationships to describe heating 
and cooling demand and explore the impacts of climate change on this simulated energy 
demand. 
The two effects of temperature increase on energy use in buildings are clear, as energy use 
for heating decreases and energy use for cooling increases. On the other hand, it is not so 
obvious whether the sum of energy use for heating and cooling will increase or decrease, even 
because worldwide reductions and increments of energy demand are not homogeneous. 
The authors used simply functions based on Heating and Cooling Degree Days (HDDs and 
CDDs) to estimate the energy demand of buildings. They as well used other parameters, like 
the Unit Energy Consumption (the average energy consumption per household using air 
condition), the penetration of air conditioners in households and the efficiency improvements 
to assess in the best way the future energy consumption in buildings. They used future 
scenarios which 
describe the regional 
demand and supply as 
a function of change 
in population, 
economic activity and 
energy efficiency. The 
results of their 
research on 
residential energy 
demand are easily 
visible in the diagram 
of Figure 3.31. 
 
Figure 3.31 Modeled global residential energy demand for heating and for air conditioning 
in a reference scenario. (Isaac and van Vuuren, 2009, p.513) 
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We could observe that global energy demand for heating will increase by 0.8% a year between 
2000 and 2030 due to increasing income and population and after it will decrease slowly due 
to level off of population growth and climate change. The regions with the highest heating 
energy demand are Western Europe, USA, Russia and China. In Europe final energy demand 
is projected to start decreasing in 2010 by 0.7% a year. In Russia demand is projected to start 
decreasing in 2020 by 0.6% a year. These declines will be the result of a stabilization or 
decline of the population, a decline of heating intensity and a warming climate. The projected 
trend is consistent with the fact that heating energy demand has been more-or-less constant 
over the past decades in Europe. In the USA and China, heating energy demand will increase 
throughout the century. The gradual 0.7% a year increase in demand in the USA will be driven 
by rising population and housing areas, while in China heating intensity is projected to go up 
too, compensating for the decrease in population predicted after 2030. Most of the growth in 
energy demand in China will occur before 2040, at a rate of 1.7% a year. The trends of these 
countries and for other are noticeable in the chart of Figure 3.32. The expected reduction in 
heating energy demand by 2100 worldwide is 34%. 
 
During the 21st century the penetration of air conditioning will increase extremely rapidly in 
most developing regions, driven by an increase in income levels and in numbers of CDDs. The 
UEC (Unit Energy Consumption) is the highest in the warmest regions with relatively high-
income levels (USA and Europe). It is expected that it will increase from 1900 kWh in 2000 
to 4800 kWh at the end of the century, due especially to climate change. In India and South 
East of Asia UEC is projected to increase to much higher levels, around 13000 kWh due to 
warm climate. As a result of the trends, electricity demand for air conditioning is projected to 
increase rapidly. Globally the rate of increase will be at its peak between 2020 and 2030 at 
7% per year, then it will be reduced to 1% a year by the end of the century. The result will be 
a cooling energy demand 40 times larger in 2100 than in 2000. The demand will be about 
Figure 3.33 Modeled regional residential energy demand 
for heating in the years 2000, 2050 and 2100 (reference 
scenario). (Isaac and van Vuuren, 2009, p.514) 
Figure 3.32 Modeled regional residential energy demand for 
air conditioning in the years 2000, 2050 and 2100 (reference 
scenario). (Isaac and van Vuuren, 2009, p.514) 
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70% greater than projected demand without climate change. The chart of Figure 3.33 
describes the trends for future cooling demand for specific countries or regions.  
 
Ruth and Lin in Regional energy demand and adaptation to climate change: methodology and 
application to the state of Maryland, USA (Ruth and Lin, 2006) explored the potential impacts 
of climate change on natural gas, electricity and heating oil use by the residential and 
commercial sectors in the state of Maryland, USA. The authors did not explore the impacts of 
climate change at global scale and neither at a country level: they concentrated on a single 
state, choosing Maryland because the state’s energy use infrastructure has evolved to deal 
both with high cooling demands during summer months and heating demands during winter. 
The results indicate that climate change will induce a comparably small signal on future 
energy demand for Maryland. However, there is the need to highlight that the paper 
specifically concentrated on the potential impacts of climate change on energy demand in the 
residential and commercial sectors of Maryland, but explored also demand changes in the 
broader context of economic and population changes. The projections they made are strongly 
influenced by the economic and populations parameters, but nevertheless they extrapolated 
the percentage change attributable to climate change from the overall projections. 
 
 
Figure 3.34 Electricity use per capita and percentage change attributable to climate change. (Future electricity price is 
assumed to be equal to the average historical price.) (Ruth and Lin, 2006, p.2828) 
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Figure 3.35 Natural gas use per capita and percentage change attributable to climate change. (Future natural gas price is 
assumed to be equal to the average historical price.) (Ruth and Lin, 2006, p.2830) 
 
Figure 3.36 Heating oil use per capita and percentage change attributable to climate change. (Future heating oil price is 
assumed to be equal to the average historical price.) (Ruth and Lin, 2006, p.2831) 
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Figure 3.37 Electricity use per employee and percentage change attributable to climate change. (Future electricity price is 
assumed to be equal to the average historical price.) (Ruth and Lin, 2006, p.2831) 
 
Figure 3.38 Natural gas use per employee and percentage change attributable to climate change. (Future natural gas 
price is assumed to be equal to the average historical price.) (Ruth and Lin, 2006, p.2832) 
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As said they investigated the potential impacts on electricity, natural gas and heating oil use 
by the residential and commercial sectors. They realized specific graphs to show projections 
of electricity, natural gas and heating oil use per capita, electricity and natural gas use per 
employee and their respective percentage changes attributable to climate change. These 
charts are illustrated from Figure 3.34 to Figure 3.38. 
 
The paper Impact of climate change heating and cooling energy use in building in the United 
States (Wang and Chen, 2014) quantified the impact of climate change in the energy 
consumption by heating and cooling systems in buildings in the US. This study used the 
HadCM3 Global Circulation Model (GCM) to generate weather data for future typical 
meteorological years, such a 2020, 2050 and 2080, for 15 cities in the U.S. on the basis of 
three CO2 scenarios. Two types of residential buildings and seven types of commercial 
building were simulated for each of the 15 cities. This study found that the impact of climate 
change varied greatly by geographical location and building type. However, there would 
generally be a net increase in source energy consumption by the 2080s, but it may decrease 
slightly in some locations. 
This study varies from others which use the degree day method with future weather data to 
determine the impact of climate change on building energy consumption. The degree day 
method can provide a quick estimate of the impact of climate change on buildings because it 
considers only the outdoor temperature as element of impact. It does not consider the solar 
radiation, the humidity and building characteristics such as thermal mass, which largely affect 
the energy demand of a building. For these reasons they used a sophisticated energy 
simulation program – EnergyPlus – for studying the impact of climate change on energy use 
in buildings, because this program has integrated modules for zone, system and natural 
ventilation calculations. They principally concluded that the majority of the cities located in 
warm and hot climate zones would experience a net increase in source energy for cooling and 
heating by the 2080s, while cities in cold climate zones would experience a net reduction on 
source energy use.  
 
The report Effects of climate change on energy production and use in the United States 
(Wilbanks et al., 2008) analyzed among other things the energy demand in residential and 
commercial buildings. The report summarized current knowledge about potential effects of 
climate change on energy demand in the United States without exploring the methods used 
in the various studies to elaborate the consumption projections. The authors mainly focused 
on the effects of climate change on energy consumption in buildings, emphasizing space 
heating and space cooling. They resumed some national and regional studies finding the 
effects of climate change on residential and commercial space heating and cooling.  
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Hereinafter the displayed data are deduced only from one document: A discrete-continuous 
choice model of climate change impacts on energy (Mansur et al., 2005). The impacts of climate 
change were calculated establishing an impact of 1°C increase in January temperatures in 
2050. The impact on the consumption of energy in residential heating was relatively modest. 
It predicted a 2.8% reduction of residential electricity consumption for electricity-only 
consumers, a 2% reduction of residential electricity consumption for gas consumers and a 
5.7% reduction of residential electricity consumption for fuel oil customers. Then Mansur et 
al. projected that a 1°C increase in January’s temperatures would produce a reduction in 
electricity consumption of about 3% for electricity for all-electric customers. In addition, the 
warmer temperatures would reduce natural gas consumption by 3% and fuel oil demand by 
a sizeable 12% per 1°C. As regards residential space cooling, the authors projected that when 
July’s temperatures were increased by 1°C, electricity-only customers increased their 
electricity consumption by 4%, natural gas customers increased their demand for electricity 
by 6% and fuel oil customers brought 15% more electricity. Finally, the projected changes on 
commercial space cooling when January’s temperatures were increased by 1°C show an 
increase of electricity consumption of 4.6% for electricity-only customers, a decrease of 2% 
for natural gas customers and an increase of 13.8% for oil customers. 
 
Industry demand 
It is not thought that industrial energy demand is particularly sensitive to climate change. 
Industrial facilities devote only about 6% of their energy use to space conditioning. This fact 
does not mean that industry is not sensitive to climate, or even that energy availability as 
influenced by climate or weather does not affect industry. 
Most of the energy used in industry is used for water heating: energy use would likely decline 
in industry if climate and water temperatures become warmer. Then, electrical outages, most 
of the times caused by extreme events, cause many interruptions every year which provoke 
huge economic damages. 
 
The report Effects of climate change on energy production and use in the United States 
(Wilbanks et al., 2008) cited the study of Considine, 2000, The impacts of weather variations 
on energy demand and carbon emissions, in which the author econometrically investigated 
industrial energy use U.S. data based on Heating Degree Days and Cooling Degree Days (in 
Fahrenheit) and calculated that U.S energy consumption per unit of industrial production 
would increase by 0.0127% per increase in 1 HDD or by 0.0032% per increase of 1 CDD. On 
an annual basis with a 1°C of temperature increase (1.8°F), there would be a maximum of 657 
fewer HDD per year and 657 more CDD (in Fahrenheit basis). This would translate into 6.2% 
less net energy demand in industry or a saving of 0.0422 EJ. 
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The Massachusetts Institute of Technology in its 2014 Energy and climate outlook (MIT Joint 
Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, 2014) paid a specific attention on the 
impacts of climate change on water resources and projecting future changes in water 
consumption in the domestic sphere, industry sector and agriculture. As regards the industrial 
use of water, they are expecting an increase of the use by almost 45% from 763 billion cubic 
meters (bcm) in 2010 to 1098 bcm in 2100 (see Figure 3.39). 
 
Figure 3.39 Current and future global withdrawal uses of water (in 2010 and 2100), in billion cubic meters. (MIT Joint 
Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, 2014, p.15) 
Agriculture demand 
As already reported, agriculture energy use falls into five main categories: equipment 
operations, irrigation pumping, embodied energy in fertilizers and chemicals, product 
transport, drying and processing. A warmer climate implies increases in the demand for water 
in irrigated agriculture, but also in the use of energy for pumping. However, no accurate 
estimates of these effects could be found in available literature. 
Projections of future water withdrawal in agriculture could be found in 2014 Energy and 
climate outlook (MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, 2014) and 
also in Future long-term changes in global water resources driven by socio-economic and 
climate changes (Alcamo et al., 2007). The MIT projected a future irrigation need of about 
1389 bcm in 2100 from 1551 bcm in 2010 (reduction of the 10%). Alcamo et al. instead 
reported the global projections of agriculture water withdrawal for A2 and B2 scenarios. 
Agriculture water withdrawals for A2 will change from 2498 bcm in 1995 to 2366 bcm in 
2025, 2282 bcm in 2055 and 2246 in 2075. As regards the B2 scenario, the withdrawal will 
vary from 2498 bcm in 1995 to 2341 bcm in 2025, 2256 bcm in 2055 and 2211 bcm in 2075. 
The two trends show a decrease of water withdrawal for agriculture, and they are comparable 
because they belong to the same order of magnitude.  
 
3.2.3.2 Impacts of water changes on energy demand 
Table 3.12 Projected impacts of water changes on energy demand 
IMPACT PROJECTIONS REFERENCE 
DOMESTIC USE +100% from 348 bcm (2010) to 698 bcm (2100) (MIT, 2014) 
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Water system is constituted by varied elements. The consequences of climate change could be 
notified in the water system and all its elements, as we have highlighted for oceans and 
cryosphere. But water system is formed also by freshwater resources, which we can locate on 
the surface (lakes, rivers and so on) and in the ground (aquifers). Surface and ground water 
convert themselves nearly entirely into runoff and the remaining part evaporates or is 
consumed. These processes occur because humans withdraw water resources from global 
water sources to meet some needs, as irrigation, industrial and domestic need. The water used 
for these needs is defined as withdrawal water. As we can read in 2014 Energy and climate 
outlook (MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, 2014), water resource 
experts estimated that only 10% of total water supply (as freshwater flow) is actually available 
for human withdrawal. The current total global water supply is estimated at 46398 bcm (see 
Figure 3.40), the withdrawal at 2662 bcm and the consumption at 1544 bcm: thus the use of 
water is about the 30% of the realistically available global supply.  
 
 
Figure 3.40 Current global water sources (2010), in billion cubic meters. (MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of 
Global Change, 2014, p.15) 
Comparing Figure 3.40 with Figure 3.41, which show the 2100 global water sources and use, 
the global freshwater supply is projected to increase by 17% from 46398 bcm to 54454 bcm 
as direct result of projected increased precipitation over land. On the demand side, total water 
withdrawals are expected to increase from the current levels of about 2700 bcm to 3200 bcm 
in 2100 (19% of increase). Looking at Figure 3.39 we can appreciate that domestic use of 
water is projected to double from 348 bcm to 698 bcm in 2100. Then we can also distinguish 
between consumption of water (the amount lost to evaporation or consumed and not returned 
to the basin) and withdrawals, which include consumption plus return flow. Withdrawals and 
consumption as a percentage of total annual flows can provide a misleading picture of the 
adequacy of water resources, because location and timing of flows is important. Similarly, the 
seasonality of precipitation often means the timing of flows does not match needs. 
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Figure 3.41 Future global water sources (2100), in billion cubic meters. (MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of 
Global Change, 2014, p.15) 
The water demand for domestic use, agriculture and industry will change in future due to 
climate change as we have seen. The supply of freshwater resources requires a cert amount 
of energy and if water system is projected to be modified by climate change, consequently also 
the energy demand will vary to supply freshwater. Thinking about domestic use, it will double 
in 2100 according to the MIT assessment. By 2100 MIT scenarios, despite abundant global 
supply, show increased water stress in parts of India, China, Pakistan, Turkey, North Africa, 
South Africa and U.S.  
To guarantee the necessary supply of freshwater in these regions will economically and 
energetically cost. Some regions around the world are already suffering this problem, like 
Canary Islands, the Indus River basin and California. For example, a desalination plant is 
under construction in Carlsbad, California, to provide about 7% of the San Diego region’s 
water (“Desalination Plant,” n.d.): in any case the plant entails high costs, environmental 
concerns and challenges of piping water inland as well as an increasing energy consumption.  
Some other areas, as the Indus River basin in India and Pakistan, may experience substantial 
shortages of surface water. In this region total withdrawal will exceed the amount of available 
surface water by 2100. That condition would imply an unsustainable situation and would need 
a fulfillment of water requirements by a transformation of current management practices in 
the region, including the water supply provided by groundwater extraction.  
 
Currently there are not available specific projections about this subject at global level and 
neither at regional scale. This problem is undeniable and the trends are well-rendered, but 
there is no specific literature about. 
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3.2.4 Expected impacts on energy supply 
We can say that the evaluation of climate change’s impacts on the energy supply system is the 
main task of the first part of this study and in general of the assessment of climate impacts on 
energy system.  
The energy supply system is that part of the energy system which converts primary energy 
into a form that can be used by consumers. In this analysis we take in consideration electricity 
as kind of energy used by consumers. We can not affirm that the energy supply system, 
formed by all the facilities that generate electricity, transmit and distribute it to the users, is 
the energy system’s portion most influenced by climate change. But it is undeniable that the 
impacts are huge and that the sector has a strategic importance in the complexity of the energy 
system. 
 
As already explain in the previous sections of the thesis, the description of the expected 
impacts on energy supply system is structured in a precise way. All the impacts should be 
attributed to climate change because climate change as a whole alters the energy supply and 
the related facilities. Nevertheless, we consider that the impacts are attributable to more 
sections which constitute the natural-energy system, as we can notice in Figure 2.1 at page xx 
and Figure 2.3 at page xx. The arrow corresponding to temperature indicates the analysis of 
the efficiency of supply facilities, whereas the arrow corresponding to water indicates the 
assessment of the refrigeration systems of the facilities. The climate change arrow then treats 
the mitigation projections. So the links between energy supply and other sections point out 
particular correlations between energy generation and natural environment. 
 
3.2.4.1 Impacts of temperature changes on energy supply 
Table 3.13 Projected impacts of temperature changes on energy supply’s efficiency 
IMPACT PROJECTIONS REFERENCE 
SOLAR POWER 
The increase of air temperature can modify the efficiency of 
photovoltaic cells and ultimately reduce the PV electric generation 
(Fidje and 
Martinsen, 2006) 
THERMAL 
PLANTS 
With +1°C: -0.8% nuclear power output. -0.6% coal/gas power output 
U.S.: -1% reduction in electricity generation means a drop in supply 
of 25 billion kWh 
(Mideksa and 
Kallbekken, 2010) 
TRANSMISSION 
California power grid. -7-8% transmission line capacity and -2-4% 
substation capacity due to +5°C (2100) 
(U.S. Department 
of Energy, 2013) 
 
In this section we analyze the impacts of temperature changes in the energy supply and 
precisely the alteration of the efficiency of the supply facilities due to the increase of air 
temperature. The raise of air temperature principally affects the efficiency of solar panels, the 
thermal power plants and the infrastructures used for the transmission and the distribution 
of power, and transfer of oil, gas and other fuels.  
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Solar panels 
Climate change can affect the performance of a solar cell in two main ways. Firstly, the current 
delivered by a solar cell is very dependent on the irradiance of the incoming sunlight. And 
secondly, solar cells are very sensitive to any changes in temperature. These changes can 
either be caused by alterations in the irradiance or in the amount of wind cooling the solar 
panel, but especially by alterations in the overall ambient temperature. The increase of air 
temperature can modify the efficiency of photovoltaic cells and ultimately reduce the PV 
electric generation. 
 
Thermal power plants 
Lots of different effects of global climate change may affect the electricity production in a 
thermal based power plant. The principally effects are the increase of temperature and the 
changes in water characteristics. Then the technologies that could be affected are coal, natural 
gas, nuclear, geothermal and biomass residues power plants. All these plants have in common 
the power cycle for the energy production: it could be the Rankine and the Brayton-Joule cycle. 
These infrastructures need a heating and a cooling system to generate electricity, and these 
structures are the most affected systems of the power cycle and consequently of the power 
plant. The average ambient conditions like temperature, pressure, humidity and water 
availability influence the cycles and thus the supply of energy. 
 
The ambient conditions which mostly affect the energy production are temperature and water 
availability. Following there will be some indications about the two types of power cycle and 
their impacts. Then there will be an account of the impacts, with trends and data, caused only 
by temperature changes and not water availability changes: this specific description will be 
exposed in the next paragraph which concerns the refrigeration impacts on power supply. 
 
 Brayton-Joule cycles. There are different types of Brayton-Joule cycles, like the open, 
combined and IGCC (Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle). The power output and 
the efficiency of the turbine may be affected by variations in ambient temperature and 
humidity. A rise in temperature raises the air specific volume, increasing the 
consumption of energy in the compressor and hence reducing the amount of net 
energy generated in the cycle. This modification induces a decrease in electricity 
generation or higher fuel consumption. Furthermore, the temperature and availability 
of water affect a portion of the Combined Cycle, and precisely the steam part. The next 
point, related to the Rankine cycle, displays better the theme. 
 Rankine cycle. Different power plants use this kind of power cycle to generate 
electricity, as coal, oil, nuclear, geothermal, biomass residues and IGCC. They all have 
in common the need of cooling, which could be affected by air temperature 
modifications and especially water alterations. A steam cycle requires lot of water: 
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each kWh of generated electricity requires around 100 liters of water, calculated by 
averaging all existing different cooling systems (Wilbanks et al., 2008, in Schaeffer et 
al., 2012, p. 6).  Projected changes in water availability make that power plants will 
increasingly compete with other water users like agriculture and public supply, 
especially in water-stressed areas. Alterations in quantity and quality of water suggest 
that closed-circuit cooling systems are less vulnerable than once-through systems. An 
increase in water temperature can affect the cooling efficiency of the generation cycle 
and increase water demand. 
 
All the climate change’s consequences, which could impact the thermal power supply, are 
quite small, but they could add up to a significant loss in power generation in a specific region 
that relies on thermal power plants. 
In the paper The impacts of climate change on the electricity market: a review (Mideksa and 
Kallbekken, 2010) the authors reported the results of two different studies (The impact of 
climate change on thermal power supply, 2009, Linnerud et al.; Effects of climate change on 
energy production and use in the United States, 2007, U.S. Climate Change Science Program 
and the Subcommittee on Global change Research) which analyzed the correlation between 
air temperature and power output. The first concluded that for a temperature increase of 1°C 
nuclear power output decreases by 0.8% and coal and gas power output decreases by 0.6%, 
due to thermal efficiency loss. The second reported, in the case of USA, that a 1% reduction 
in electricity generation due to increases temperatures would amount to a drop in supply of 
25 billion kWh. This data highlights that even if the efficiency loss is small in percentage terms, 
the overall effects of relatively small changes in efficiency could still be substantial, as the 
change applies to the major share of power production. 
 
Transmission, distribution and transfer 
The transmission and distribution of electricity through power lines are subject to climate 
variability and the efficiency of the transmission and distribution depends on various factors, 
including the temperature of surrounding environment. 
 
Mideksa and Kallbekken in their paper (Mideksa and Kallbekken, 2010) cited the study The 
future of European electricity: choices before 2020 (2008) of Eskeland et al., in which the 
authors report that there could be an electricity loss in transmission due to higher 
temperature and the resistance it induces on power lines. 
 
In the report U.S. energy sector vulnerabilities to climate change and extreme events (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2013) the authors gave an account of the impacts of temperature on 
the electric grid. They concluded that climate change projections like increasing air 
temperatures, more frequent and severe wildfires and increasing intensity of storm events, 
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could implicate a reduction in transmission efficiency and available transmission capacity, 
and an increased risk of physical damage. They reported the results of a study on the 
California power grid which projected that during the hot periods of August in 2100, under a 
higher emissions scenario, a 9°F (5°C) increase in air temperature could decrease 
transmission line capacity by 7–8%. The same study projected that 9°F (5°C) warming in 
2100 could cause substation capacity to fall by 2–4% (U.S. Department of Energy, 2013, p. 
12). 
 
3.2.4.2 Impacts of water changes on energy supply 
Table 3.14 Projected impacts of water changes on energy supply’s refrigeration 
IMPACT PROJECTIONS REFERENCE 
REFRIGERATION 
-0.45% power output due to +1°C 
(Mideksa and 
Kallbekken, 2010) 
Between 2010 and 2035: water withdrawals: +20%; water 
consumption: +85% 
(IEA, 2012) 
 
As for temperature, this part of the thesis does not analyze in general the energy supply 
alterations, due to water system changes to climate change, but it concentrates on a specific 
problem: the refrigeration of energy supply facilities.  
 
In the previous section we talked about the different kind of power cycles, used to generate 
electricity in the supply plants. We highlighted that the Rankine cycle relies very much on 
water and that an increase in water temperature can affect the cooling efficiency of the 
generation cycle and increase water demand. This sentence is supported by the results obtain 
by two different researches. 
In The impacts of climate change on the electricity market: a review (Mideksa and Kallbekken, 
2010) is reported the data of the research of Durmayaz and Sogut, 2006, Influence of cooling 
water temperature on the efficiency of a pressurized-water reactor nuclear-power plant. The 
authors investigated the impact of changes in cooling water temperature on the thermal 
efficiency of nuclear power plants using plant level data and an engineering model. Their 
result suggests that a 1°C increase in the temperature of the environment reduces power 
output by approximately 0.45% points. 
The water demand for thermoelectric generation then was investigated in chapter 17 Water 
for energy: is energy becoming a thirstier resource? of World energy outlook 2012 (IEA, 2012). 
In the New Policies Scenario (IEA scenario) withdrawals will increase by about 20% between 
2010 and 2035, but consumption will rise by a more dramatic 85%. These trends are driven 
by a shift towards higher efficiency power plants with more advanced cooling systems (that 
reduce withdrawals but increase consumption per unit of electricity produced).     
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3.2.4.3 Impacts of extreme events on energy supply 
Table 3.15 Projected impacts of extreme events on energy supply 
IMPACT PROJECTIONS REFERENCE 
HYDROPOWER 
Affected by flooding. Shutting down of the turbine operation or 
(rare) destruction of power plants and/or dams 
- 
WIND POWER 
Stressed by extreme wind speeds (25m/s): the strain on the turbine 
will be too high, and it could provoke serious damages  
- 
BIOFUELS 
Reduction of productivity of the crops by droughts, frosts, extreme 
temperatures and precipitations 
Destruction of biofuels’ production equipment by storms/cyclones  
- 
THERMAL 
PLANTS 
Inland reactors/plants. Subject to heat waves (reduction of power 
generation) and inland floods (damage of ancillary facilities) 
Coastal reactors/plants. Subject to the rise of sea level (inundation, 
erosion), instability of shorelines, storms, flooding   
(Kopytko and 
Perkins, 2011) 
FOSSIL FUELS 
Increase of production shutdowns to avoid life of environmental 
damage  
(Burkett, 2011) 
TRANSMISSION 
Disruption of infrastructure of the electricity grid by weather 
phenomena  and permafrost thawing 
- 
TRANSFER 
Interruption of barge transport of crude oil, petroleum products and 
coal due to decreased water levels (droughts) 
(U.S. Department 
of Energy, 2013) 
Note. (-) means that there is no a specific document which refers to 
The term extreme event is used to refer to all the weather and climate events, which manifest 
a greater severity than common weather and climate events. The episodes we are referring to 
are heat waves, heavy precipitation, cyclones, hurricanes and extreme sea level events. 
The severe episodes can have a debilitating impact on energy supply and more specifically 
they contribute to the reduction of energy generation and even the interruption. They affect 
all energy supply facilities, from the hydropower plants to the wind turbines, from biofuels 
productivity to thermal and nuclear plants, from oil and gas production to electricity grid and 
transfer of fuels. 
 
Normally the extreme event which affects hydropower generation is flooding. Hydropower 
plants are able to withstand flooding events by opening floodgates and shutting down turbine 
operation. But in rare cases hydropower plants and/or dams can be destroyed by flood events.  
 
Wind power generation could be stressed principally by two different events. Windmills can 
today only operate up to extreme wind speeds of around 25m/s. At higher wind speeds the 
strain on the turbine would be too high, which could provoke serious damages. In case of 
extreme winds presence, the electricity production will be shut down. The production could 
be also hampered by atmospheric icing: the efficiency gets lower when wind power is 
produced in icing conditions. Global warming facilitates the melting of ice, raising the 
performance of wind turbines in those areas characterized by icing problems. But extreme 
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precipitations associated with low temperatures could still cause ice formation in north 
latitudes, reducing the performance of wind turbines and even the interruption. 
 
Biofuels productivity could vary owing to modifications in climate, in atmospheric 
concentration of CO2 and presence of extreme events. Droughts and frosts, extreme 
temperatures and precipitations and hurricanes reduce the productivity of the crops and 
decrease biomass availability. Storms and cyclones could also destroy the equipment for 
biofuels production. 
 
The impacts caused by extreme events to thermal and nuclear power plants were largely 
studied by researchers to prevent possible significant damages to these facilities, which are 
essential for the supply of electricity to industries and population. Serious accidents to thermal 
and nuclear power plants should be avoided to not create disasters for the environment and 
population, because the fuels used and the processes are heavily pollutants. Kopytko and 
Perkins in Climate change, nuclear power, and the adaptation-mitigation dilemma (Kopytko 
and Perkins, 2011) concentrated on the adaptation-mitigation dilemma of the nuclear power 
plants, analyzing the safety and the interruption problems of these structures related to 
climate change. Most of the impact they analyzed could be referred to other types of power 
plants, like coal, oil, gas, solar and biomass plants: basically the analyzed impacts could be 
referred to all those plants which use a thermal cycle to generate electricity. The authors 
focused their attention on inland and coastal nuclear power plants, located respectively in 
France (where the 75% of electricity is generated by nuclear plants using 44 reactors) and in 
USA (104 reactors, 15 of which are located within 2 miles of the coast). The International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) created guidelines on adapting nuclear power plant design and 
operation to climate change. The authors studied the nuclear sites considering the major 
hazards elaborated by IAEA, which are the temperature of air and sea, the patterns, frequency 
and strength of winds, the characteristic of precipitation, the flow rates of rivers and rises and 
anomalies of sea levels. Inland reactors are subject to heat waves, which reduce the power 
generation and inland floods, which could damage ancillary facilities and put a risk on the 
stability of the plants. Coastal reactors instead are subject to the rise of sea level, which can 
inundate the reactor sites and increase erosion and instability of shorelines. These reactors 
are also exposed to intense storms combined with sea level rise, which can produce more 
severe episodes of flooding and wind damage. 
 
Oil and gas operation in low-lying coastal areas, onshore facilities and offshore facilities could 
be affected by climate change. The paper Global climate change implications for coastal and 
offshore oil and gas development (Burkett, 2011) indicated six key climate change drivers for 
coastal and offshore oil and gas development: sea level rise, storm intensity, wave regime, air 
and water temperature, precipitation patterns, changes in CO2 and ocean acidity. Oil and gas 
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supply from offshore and coastal low-lying facilities can be disrupted by extreme weather 
events, such as intense hurricanes, that could lead to production shutdown to avoid life or 
environmental damages. An expected increase in frequency, duration and intensity of such 
extreme events can have significant impacts on oil and gas supply. The supply may also be 
affected by structural damages caused by other extreme events, like flooding from sea level 
rise and storm surges, that may lead to erosion and other damages. Also oil refining may be 
affected by extreme events like lower water availability induced by climate change: oil refining 
is vulnerable to water availability because it is a large water consumption activity. The water 
demand in oil refineries can be impacted by higher temperatures, as most of water is used in 
cooling units. Then, the gas and oil transmission systems could be affected by factors as mud 
flows, floods, landslides and other extreme meteorological events. Storm surge and high 
winds historically have not had much impact on pipelines – either onshore transmission lines 
or offshore pipelines – because they are buried underground. However, offshore pipelines 
could be damaged by hurricanes.  
 
Extreme weather events could affect the delivery of electricity through disruption of 
infrastructure of the electricity grid. The weather phenomena could be extreme winds and ice 
load, lighting strikes, avalanches, landslides and flooding. In particular, excessive icing 
overhead lines can cause other outages, resulting in higher repair costs. Temperature 
extremes lead to electricity loss in transmission. Further, the permafrost thawing is 
considered a risk: much of the existing infrastructure erected in northern regions is located 
in areas of high hazard potential and could be affected by thaw subsidence. 
 
Even the transfer of energy fuels by train or by barge will suffer extreme events phenomena. 
In U.S. energy sector vulnerabilities to climate change and extreme events (U.S. Department 
of Energy, 2013) the authors illustrated that a decreased water levels in rivers and ports and 
increasing intensity and frequency of flooding, could cause interruptions and delays in barge 
and other fuel delivery transportation routes, resulting in delivery delays and increased costs.  
 
3.2.4.4 Impacts of energy resource changes on energy supply 
Table 3.16 Projected impacts of energy resource changes on energy supply 
IMPACT PROJECTIONS REFERENCE 
HYDROPOWER 
U.S. Colorado River: -40% hydropower production by the middle of 
21st century 
U.S. Central Valley: -10-12% hydropower production 
(Mideksa and 
Kallbekken, 2010) 
+0.08% of total generation, +2.46 TWh from current generation, 
reaching 2931 TWh (2050)  
(Hamududu and 
Killingtveit, 2012) 
WIND 
Offshore wind farms around the North Sea: +3-9% due to increases 
in wind speeds 
(Mideksa and 
Kallbekken, 2010) 
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IMPACT PROJECTIONS REFERENCE 
WIND 
Continental U.S.:-30-40% of wind power generation due to -10-15% 
mean wind speeds 
(Breslow and 
Sailor, 2002) 
BIOFUEL 
The magnitude of energy generating from biofuels depends on the 
quantity of energy resource produced 
- 
SOLAR 
Projections: 2071-2100. Reference period: 1980-2000 
-6% electricity output due to -2% solar radiation (2071-2100) 
(Fidje and 
Martinsen, 2006) 
Note. (-) means that there is no a specific document which refers to 
The supply of electricity from renewable resources strongly depends on the availability of the 
resources themselves. In the future the supply of energy from renewable energy will become 
increasingly essential due to the fact that non-renewable sources are using up and that the 
energy system is evolving to be renewable-dependent to meet the mitigation and 
environmental clean-up targets. For these reasons it is essential investigate on the changes in 
energy supply due to changes in energy resources. 
 
Differently from section 3.2.2, the focus of this part of the thesis is the assessment of the 
changes in energy production due to the changes of resource availability. While the outcomes 
of section 3.2.2 are the changes in the amount of energy resources, the conclusions of this part 
are the changes in the amount of energy produced. 
 
Hydropower generation 
The hydropower generation is one of the supply’s methods on which we have to base future 
energy production. The amount of electricity that can be generated from hydropower plants 
depends on the installed generation capacity and especially on the variation in water inflows 
to the plant's reservoirs. Natural climate variability already has great influence on the 
planning and operations of hydropower systems. Changing climate conditions may affect the 
operation of the existing hydropower system and even compromise the viability of new 
entrepreneurships. In fact, global climate change can add a significant amount of uncertainty 
to the already uncertain operation of hydropower systems. 
 
The California Climate Change Center in its paper Climate change impacts on high-elevation 
hydropower generation in California's Sierra Nevada: a case study in the upper American river 
(California Climate Change Center, 2006) reported as results that all scenarios show similar 
pattern of generation, with maximum generation during the summer months and minimum 
during spring and winter. In addition they added another interesting finding, that the change 
in timing of inflows will have a smaller than expected negative impact on hydropower 
generation in that system. 
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In The impact of climate change on the electricity market: a review (Mideksa and Kallbekken, 
2010) the authors reported several results of other investigations on hydropower generation 
supply. 
 
 Barnett et al., The effects of climate change on water resources in the West: 
introduction and overview, 2004. The hydropower production based on the Colorado 
River could decrease by as much as 40% by the middle of the 21st century.  
 Van Rheene et al., Evaluating potential climate change impacts on water resources 
systems operations: case studies of Portland, Oregon and Central Valley, California, 
2003. Hydropower in the Central Valley could decrease between 8% and 11% in Lake 
Shasta and between 10% and 12% for the Central Valley as a whole. 
 Bye, The electricity market and climate change – or vice versa, 2008. The author 
analyzed the effect of climate change on supply based on hydro and wind power in 
Northern Europe. He reported that the supply of power would raise by 1.8% in 2040 
relative to 2001. He pointed also up that climate change could affect hydropower 
production through dam safety. Most current dams are built without taking into 
account the possible impact of climate change and may have lower reservoir capacity 
to handle frequent extreme events associated with river flow and snow melt. About 
dams, if the changes take place slowly over time, the dam safety issue becomes 
relatively less important as new dams compatible with the new climate can be built 
while the old dams are taken out of use partly due to the redistribution of water flow 
and temperature and partly due to depreciation. 
 
Then in Assessing climate change impacts on global hydropower (Hamududu and Killingtveit, 
2012) the authors aimed to evaluate the changes in global hydropower generation resulting 
from predicted changes in climate. The study used an ensemble of simulations of regional 
patterns of changes in runoff, computed from global circulation models (GCM) simulations 
with 12 different models. The results indicated that there would be large variations of changes 
(increases/decreases) in hydropower generation across regions and even within regions. 
Globally hydropower generation is predicted to change very little by the year 2050 for the 
hydropower system in operation today. There are many regions where runoff and 
hydropower generation will increase due to increasing precipitation, but also many regions 
where there will be a decrease. Even if individual countries and regions may experience 
significant impacts, climate change will not lead to significant changes in the global 
hydropower generation, at least for the existing hydropower system. In Africa, there are some 
countries with increasing hydropower generation and others with decreasing hydropower 
generation. For Asia, positive trends owing to climate change have been projected for most 
countries. An exception will be the Middle East which has decreasing trends. The Americas 
will have a continental net increase with major producers having increases (south and north) 
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and only Central America having a reduced generation in the future. Southern, Eastern and 
Western Europe will have reductions while Northern part will have increases. As the large 
producers are in the Northern region, the continental changes will be positive in hydropower 
generation. Summing up, the global change in future hydropower generation due to climate 
change will show a slight increase over the current global hydropower generation of 2.46 
TWh, reaching 2931 TWh. The percentage change of total generation will be of 0.08%. 
 
The other factor which affects the hydropower generation is the Glacial Lake Outburst 
Flooding (GLOF). The impact of future GLOFs on hydropower will be proportional to the 
amount of water in the lake, slope of its path downstream and proximity of the hydropower 
plant. GLOF would cause both vertical and lateral erosion (Agrawala et al., 2003, p. 31). 
 
Wind generation 
The magnitude of electricity we can generate from wind power generation depends on the 
energy content of wind. An important property of the energy content is that it increases with 
wind speed to the third power. A wind speed of 3 m/s can produce 16 W/m2 of wind power 
whereas a wind speed of 12 m/s can produce 1305 W/m2 wind power. Thus, relatively small 
changes to the wind speed can have very large effects on wind power generation. Another 
important climatic parameter for the supply of energy is the frequency of extreme wind 
speeds. 
 
In the article The impact of climate change on the electricity market: a review (Mideksa and 
Kallbekken, 2010) the authors cited the 2006 study of Sood and Durance The influence of the 
North Atlantic Oscillation on the wind conditions over the North Sea which investigated the 
wind potential over the North Sea. The wind power from offshore wind farms is likely to 
increase by 3 to 9% around the North Sea due to increases in wind speed under a business as 
usual scenario. 
 
Breslow and Sailor in Vulnerability of wind power resources to climate change in the 
continental United states (Breslow and Sailor, 2002) calculated the wind power generation 
considering the results of wind speed changes of two climatic models, the Hadley and the CCC 
model. The Hadley model suggested minimal climate change impact, while the Canadian 
(CCC) suggested reductions in mean wind speeds on the order of 10-15%. Considering that 
wind power generation is a function of the cube of the wind speed, these decreases in wind 
speed correspond to potential reductions in wind power generation on the order of 30 to 40%.  
Anyway, there is not so much literature that treats the changes of energy supply from wind 
power generation. The researches concentrate more on the evaluation of the changes in wind 
patterns, because is simply to find the correlated changes in wind power generation. 
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Biofuel generation 
Vulnerability of liquid biofuels production can relate to impacts on crop yield caused by 
modifications in climate and the atmospheric concentration of CO2. These modifications 
include regional temperature, precipitation and frequency of extreme events, like droughts 
and frosts. Lower availability of water, caused by increase evapotranspiration due to rising 
temperatures and lower precipitation levels, can reduce crop productivity. High CO2 levels, 
up to a saturation limit, increase the photosynthetic rate, leading to higher productivity. This 
effect can be offset by an increase in temperature, since higher temperatures reduces 
photosynthetic activity. 
 
However, there is no literature about changes in energy supply of biofuels, because the 
magnitude of energy generating from biofuels depends on the quantity of energy resource 
produced. As for wind energy, the studies on the expected availability of future energy 
resource, give us future projections of energy supply caused by climate change. The available 
researches in literature do not analyze the impacts on biofuels production infrastructure, but 
only analyze the impacts on crop production for generating the biofuel energy resource.  
 
Solar power 
Solar energy generation is especially affected by increasing temperatures, which modify the 
efficiency of photovoltaic cells. Also a change in global radiation alters the electricity output 
of solar panels. Two researchers, Fidje and Martinsen, studied the effects on solar radiation 
modifications on solar panels in Effects of climate change on the utilization of solar cells in the 
Nordic region (Fidje and Martinsen, 2006). The authors experimented in Oslo how much a 
reduction in solar radiation could affect a PV generation. They verified that when the global 
solar radiation is reduced by 2%, the electricity output of solar cells would be reduced by 
about 6%. These results were calculated using the A2 and B2 IPCC scenarios for the period 
2071-2100. To know this information is fundamental, because these two scenarios represent 
a decrease in global solar radiation and an increase in temperature. Thus, the results are 
affected by solar radiation but also by temperature.   
 
3.2.4.5 Impacts of climate change mitigation on energy supply 
Table 3.17 Projected impacts of climate change mitigation on energy supply 
IMPACT PROJECTIONS REFERENCE 
MITIGATION 
-40-70% GHG emission in 2050 than 2010 to reach 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 
(+2°C relative to preindustrial level) 
-25-55% GHG emission in 2050 than 2010 to reach 500 ppm CO2eq by 2100 
-5-45% GHG emission in 2050 than 2010 to reach 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100 
To reach 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100: improvements in efficiency, 
tripling/quadrupling share of zero carbon energy supply by 2050 
(IPCC, 2015) 
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As already stated, this specific paragraph does not focus on those changing parameters which 
all together affect energy supply. The attention here is concentrated on the mitigation aspect 
in the impacts analysis. 
Adaptation and mitigation are two different used techniques to contrast climate change in the 
energy sector. The conventional view is that adaptation and mitigation are incompatible, but 
in the reality one does not exclude the other. These two methods can work together optimally 
and give benefits one to the other. 
The effects of mitigation strategies on the energy supply sector are very simple to note. 
Mitigation is a human intervention act to reduce the concentration of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere, reducing the generation of these or creating specific sinks where we can store 
them. The impacts of mitigation on the energy supply system are simple: to reduce the 
electricity generation using fossil fuel plants and to increase the production with no-CO2 
generation facilities. It is necessary implement a new energy supply system: the target is to 
convert the system from a fossil fuel base to a renewable energy base.  
Some objectives were set at global, regional or national level. The European Union approved 
in 2009 the so-called “20-20-20 Targets” in the Directive 2009/29/CE. The objectives were 
to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases of the 20% in 2020 relative to the 1990 level, to 
generate the 20% of the energy requirements with renewable sources and to increase the 
energy efficiency of a 20%. The European Council then approved on 24th October 2014 the 
EUCO 169/14 (European Council, 2014) in which it endorsed a binding EU target of an at least 
40% domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990. 
The Working Group III of the IPCC studied for the AR5 the future emissions from the energy 
supply sector, finding that are projected to almost double or even triple by 2050 to the level 
of 2010 unless energy intensity improvements can be significantly accelerated beyond 
historical development. Decarbonizing electricity generation is a key component of cost-
effective mitigation strategies in achieving low-stabilization levels. So the WGIII in Climate 
change 2014: mitigation of climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change et al., 
2015) highlighted that GHG emissions from energy supply can be reduced significantly by 
replacing current world average coal-fired power plants with modern, highly efficient natural 
gas combined-cycle power plants or combined heat and power plants, only as bridge 
technology. 
 
There are multiple scenarios with a range of technological and behavioral options, with 
different characteristics and implications for sustainable development, that are consistent 
with different levels of mitigation. For the AR5 about 900 mitigation scenarios have been 
collected in a database. This range spans atmospheric concentration levels in 2100 from 430 
ppm CO2eq to above 720 ppm CO2eq, which is comparable to the 210 forcing levels between 
RCP 2.6 and RCP 6.0. Mitigation scenarios in which it is likely that the temperature change 
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caused by anthropogenic GHG emissions can be kept to less than 2 °C relative to pre-industrial 
levels are characterized by atmospheric concentrations in 2100 of about 450 ppm CO2eq. 
Mitigation scenarios reaching concentration levels of about 500 ppm CO2eq by 2100 will limit 
the temperature change to less than 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels. Scenarios that exceed 
about 650 ppm CO2eq by 2100 are unlikely to limit temperature change to below 2°C relative 
to pre-industrial levels. Scenarios reaching atmospheric concentration levels of about 450 
ppm CO2eq by 2100 (consistent with a likely chance to keep temperature change below 2 °C 
relative to pre-industrial levels) include substantial cuts in anthropogenic GHG emissions by 
mid-century through large-scale changes in energy systems and potentially land use. 
Scenarios reaching these concentrations by 2100 are characterized by lower global GHG 
emissions in 2050 than in 2010, 40% to 70% lower globally, and emissions levels near zero 
GtCO2eq or below in 2100. In scenarios reaching about 500 ppm CO2eq by 2100, 2050 
emissions levels are 25% to 55% lower than in 2010 globally. In scenarios reaching about 550 
ppm CO2eq are from 5% above 2010 levels to 45% below 2010 levels globally. At the global 
level, scenarios reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq are also characterized by more rapid 
improvements in energy efficiency and a tripling to nearly a quadrupling of the share of zero- 
and low- carbon energy supply from renewables, nuclear energy and fossil energy with carbon 
dioxide capture and storage (CCS), or bioenergy with CCS (BECCS) by the year 2050. These 
scenarios describe a wide range of changes in land use, reflecting different assumptions about 
the scale of bioenergy production, afforestation, and reduced deforestation. All of these 
emissions, energy and land-use changes vary across regions. 
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Once having talked about the impacts of climate change on natural and energy systems, the 
purpose of this work is to recognize the vulnerabilities of energy systems due to climate 
change, in order to find the best way to adapt them. We can say that the investigation partially 
follows the title of the Working Group II contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
IPCC: Climate change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (IPCC, 2014). In Part A we 
firstly analyzed the impacts of climate change to energy system. In Part B we are going to 
assess the vulnerabilities of the system related to climate change. Finally, in Part C, we will 
investigate the possible measures to adapt the system to climate change. 
 
This section is essential for the adaptation analysis. It shows the components of energy 
systems which are vulnerable to climate change and require specific interventions to form a 
resilient and adapted energy system to the changes. The analysis will start defining the 
concept of vulnerability: this notion will be useful to evaluate the vulnerabilities of energy 
systems to climate change. The chapter will conclude focusing on metrics and their necessity. 
A set of parameters and indicators (metrics) to measure the vulnerability and resilience of an 
energy system has a remarkable importance, because it helps to identify policies, strategies 
and appropriate measures to reduce vulnerabilities, and realize an adapted energy system to 
climate change. 
 
4.1 Vulnerability definition  
Vulnerability is a central concept in climate change research. This crucial notion has a 
significant importance also in other contexts. A large number of research communities, such 
as those dealing with disaster management, public health, development and secure 
livelihoods, gives great relevance to vulnerability like climate impact and adaptation. For this 
specific reason – that vulnerability has a key role in many research contexts and not only in 
the energy one – the different research communities conceptualize its personal definition of 
vulnerability in very different ways. 
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It does not exist a unique definition of vulnerability of energy system to climate change: 
precisely, it does not exist at all.  In literature could be found the definition of vulnerability of 
a generic system to climate change, like the HELIO International one in Climate-proofing 
energy systems (Williamson et al., 2009, p.53): 
 
Vulnerability is the degree to which a system or unit (such as a human group or a 
place) is likely to experience harm due to exposure to risk, hazards, shocks or stresses. 
 
Füssel in its article Vulnerability in climate change research: a comprehensive conceptual 
framework (Füssel, 2005) notes the widespread disagreement about the appropriate 
definition of vulnerability, which frequently causes misunderstanding in interdisciplinary 
research on vulnerability and adaptation to climate change. His purpose is to attempt to 
ameliorate the confusion on vulnerability’s definition, by presenting a comprehensive and 
consistent conceptual framework of vulnerability. This framework should level out the 
terminology of vulnerability, to support interdisciplinary global change research.  
 
Of course, the IPCC drew up a definition of vulnerability related to climate change. Most 
researches refer to this specific definition: this thesis too will allude to it. However, to better 
understand the various facets of this precise definition, the conceptual framework of 
vulnerability, composed by Füssel in its above mentioned paper, will be reported. 
 
4.1.1 The IPCC definition of vulnerability 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, basing on the UNFCCC guidelines, defines 
vulnerability as: 
 
The degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse effects 
of climate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a 
function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate change variation to which a 
system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity (Parry and 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007, p. 883) 
Figure 4.1 Graphic definition of vulnerability (Dagma Schröter and ATEAM consortium, 2004) 
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This definition is set up on certain correlations between a system and climate change. The 
diagram of Figure 4.1 could sum up these correlations. 
 
Vulnerability, according to the IPCC definition, is an integrated measure of the expected 
magnitude of adverse effects to a system, caused by a given level of certain external stressors. 
Vulnerability includes an external dimension, which is represented by the exposure of a 
system to climate variations, as well as an internal dimension, which includes its sensitivity 
and its adaptive capacity to these stressors. At this point it is necessary to report the meanings 
of the key terms that form the IPCC definition of vulnerability, as done also by Füssel and 
Kleine in Climate change vulnerability assessments: an evolution of conceptual thinking 
(Füssel and Klein, 2006). 
 
Exposure:  The nature and degree to which a system is exposed to significant climatic 
variations. 
 
Sensitivity: The degree to which a system is affected, either adversely or beneficially, 
by climate variability or change. The effects may be direct (e.g. a change in crop yield 
in response to a change in the mean, range or variability of temperature) or indirect 
(e.g., damages caused by an increase in the frequency of coastal flooding due to sea 
level rise). 
 
Adaptive capacity: The ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including 
climate variability and extremes), to moderate potential damages, to take advantage 
of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences. 
 
The exposure of a system to climate stimuli depends on the level of global climate change and, 
due to the spatial heterogeneity of anthropogenic climate change, on the system’s location. 
The sensitivity of a system denotes the response relationship between its exposure to climate 
stimuli and the resulting impact. The adaptive capacity of a system or society describes its 
ability to modify its characteristics or behavior in order to cope better with changes in external 
conditions. In Resilience, vulnerability, and adaptive capacity: implications for system 
performance (Dalziell and McManus, 2004) the authors defined adaptive capacity as ‘the 
extent to which a system can modify its circumstances to move to a less vulnerable condition’. 
They clarified that adaptive capacity reflects the ability of the system to respond to changes in 
its external environment and to recover from damage to internal structures within the system, 
that affect its ability to achieve its purpose. 
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The ensemble of these systems’ aspects and climate change determines the definition of 
vulnerability. Vulnerability to climate change, as conceptualized by the IPCC, is a broader 
concept than potential impacts of climate change, as determined in climate impact 
assessment. Vulnerability assessments tend to include additional factors that increase their 
relevance for decision-makers. This is achieved by a more comprehensive representation of 
the main stressors affecting a system, including non-climatic stressors, and consideration of 
the socio-economic factors, that determine the differential potential of communities to adapt 
to changing conditions. We must also remember, according to Dalziell and McManus, that 
when we analyze vulnerability we must be aware that not everyone suffers the same way in 
response to the same event. 
 
Impacts of climate change and vulnerability have a particular correlation. The potential 
impacts of climate change on a particular system (together with its adaptive capacity) 
determine the vulnerability of that system to climate change. However, it does not suggest 
that impacts cause vulnerability. This is a crucial point of the vulnerability analysis, which 
always must be taken into account. 
 
The IPCC definition of vulnerability of a system to climate change is largely disputed by several 
researchers. Füssel in Vulnerability in climate change: a comprehensive conceptual framework 
(Füssel, 2005) presented a conceptual framework able to reconcile the large variety of 
vulnerability concepts found in literature, in order to resolve the misunderstanding between 
some scientists and the IPCC with its vulnerability definition. 
 
4.1.2 The conceptual framework of vulnerability 
Vulnerability describes a central concept in a variety of research contexts. It has its roots in 
geography and natural hazards, but is now used by various research communities. However, 
scientific communities conceptualize vulnerability in very different ways. 
The existence of competing conceptualizations and terminologies of vulnerability has become 
particularly problematic in the context of anthropogenic climate change. The cross-cutting 
nature of the global climate problem requires the intense collaboration of scientists from 
different research traditions, such as climate science, disaster management, risk assessment, 
development, economics and policy analysis. This collaboration must be based on a consistent 
terminology that facilitates researchers from different traditions to communicate clearly and 
transparently, despite differences in the conceptual models applied. 
 
The paper to which we refer, Vulnerability in climate change: a comprehensive conceptual 
framework (Füssel, 2005), assumes that there is no single correct or best conceptualization of 
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vulnerability: it suggests the need of a consistent framework and terminology for 
interdisciplinary global change research. The framework consists of three components. 
 
1. Terminology of vulnerable situations. It describes the context of a vulnerability 
assessment in terms of the vulnerable system, the hazard of concern, the valued 
attributes of that system that are threatened by its exposure to the hazard, a temporal 
reference. 
2. Classification scheme of vulnerability factors. The classification takes into account two 
independent dimensions: scale and disciplinary domain. 
3. Terminology of vulnerability concepts. This terminology describes any conceivable 
conceptualization of vulnerability based on the groups of vulnerability factors it 
includes. 
 
Situations 
Scanning the literature, we could note that all the frameworks of vulnerability specify four 
fundamental dimensions to describe the context of a vulnerable assessment. 
 
1. System. The system, region, population group and/or sector of concern. 
2. Hazard. The external stressor (or set of stressors) of concern. The United Nations in 
Living with risk: a global of disaster reduction initiatives (United Nations, 2004, cited 
in Füssel, 2005) defines a “hazard” as “a potentially damaging physical event, 
phenomenon or human activity that may cause the loss of life or injury, property 
damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation”. Hence, a 
hazard is understood as some external influence that may adversely affect a valued 
attribute of a system. 
3. Valued attribute. The valued attributes (or variables of concern) of the vulnerable 
system that are threatened by its exposure to the hazard. Complex hazards, such as 
anthropogenic climate change, may have a wide range of effects on a particular 
system or community. 
4. Temporal reference. The time period of interest. If the vulnerability of a system or its 
exposure to the hazard is expected to change significantly during the time period 
considered in an assessment, statements about vulnerability should specify a 
temporal reference, i.e., the point in time or period of time that they refer to. This is 
particularly relevant for vulnerability assessments, addressing anthropogenic climate 
change, which may have a time horizon of several decades or longer. 
 
These four attributes are universally applicable to a wide range of contexts and to different 
traditions of vulnerability research. We can condense the four dimensions in this phrase from 
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Vulnerability in climate change research: a comprehensive conceptual framework (Füssel, 
2005, p.6), to describe a vulnerable situation: 
 
Vulnerability of a system’s valued attribute(s) to a hazard (in temporal reference) 
 
An example of fully description of vulnerability based on this structure is “vulnerability of a 
particular ecosystem’s net primary production to wild-fires in 2050”. 
 
Factors 
A clear description of the vulnerable situation is an important first step for avoiding 
misunderstandings around vulnerability. However, there are different interpretations of the 
term vulnerability. 
Basing on the Füssel article (Füssel, 2005) we distinguish different vulnerability concepts by 
the vulnerability factors considered. The term vulnerability factor is used in a rather extensive 
sense. The meaning may be confused with the ones of risk factor. In this case, we can associate 
the word factor with feature/characteristic.  
 
In literature, various proposed frameworks are not comprehensive and they use terminologies 
that are incompatible with each other. Some authors distinguish an external and an internal 
side of vulnerability to environmental hazards, with different meanings associated to these 
two categories. Most use these terms to distinguish the external stressors that a system is 
exposed to, from the internal factors that determine the effects on the system. Others use 
them to distinguish external structural socioeconomic factors from internal agency-oriented 
factors. The United Nations distinguish four groups of vulnerability factors that are relevant 
in the context of disaster reduction: physical, economic, social and environmental. Several 
researchers then distinguish biophysical (or natural) vulnerability from social (or 
socioeconomic) vulnerability. 
Each of the terminologies cited above provides an important distinction of the factors that 
may be relevant for assessing the vulnerability of a system to a specific hazard. However, these 
terminologies are clearly incompatible with each other. According to (Füssel, 2005), the main 
reason for this confusion is the failure to distinguish between two largely independent 
dimensions of vulnerability factors: scale and disciplinary domain. 
 
1. Scale: internal vs. external. 
Internal vulnerability factors refer to characteristics of the vulnerable system or 
community itself. Vulnerability actors that can be controlled by the considered 
community are also considered internal. All other vulnerability factors are denoted as 
external. 
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2. Disciplinary domain: socioeconomic vs. biophysical. 
Socioeconomic vulnerability factors are those that relate to economic resources: the 
distribution of power, social institutions, cultural practices, and other characteristics 
of social groups typically investigated by the social sciences and the humanities. 
Biophysical vulnerability factors, in contrast, are related to system properties 
investigated by the physical sciences. 
 
Table 4.1 illustrates the independence of these dimensions by providing examples for the four 
categories of vulnerability factors, implicitly defined by them.  
 
Table 4.1 Classification of vulnerability factors according to scale and disciplinary domain (Füssel, 2005, p.9) 
  DOMAIN 
  SOCIOECONOMIC BIOPHYSICAL 
SC
A
LE
 INTERNAL 
RESPONSE CAPACITY 
e.g., household income, social networks, 
access to information 
SENSITIVITY 
e.g., topography, environmental 
conditions, current climate 
EXTERNAL 
EXTERNAL SOCIAL FACTORS 
e.g., national policies,  international aid, 
economic globalization 
EXPOSURE 
e.g., severe storms, earthquakes, 
sea-level change 
 
The classification scheme for vulnerability factors presented in Table 4.1 constitutes the 
minimal structure for describing the multitude of vulnerability concepts from the literature.  
 
Concepts 
Different interpretations of vulnerability can be distinguished, depending on which of the four 
groups of factors the vulnerability is included. 
 
Vulnerability definitions which involve only one group of factors are denoted by adding the 
scale and the domain as qualifiers (or attribute: e.g. internal socioeconomic vulnerability). All 
relevant vulnerability definitions that include factors from two groups, combine factors from 
either the same scale or the same domain. The qualifier cross-scale is used for combinations 
of internal and external factors and integrated for combination of socioeconomic and 
biophysical factors. These attributes allow to uniquely denoting vulnerability definitions 
combining two groups of factors (e.g. cross-scale socioeconomic vulnerability) or all four 
groups (cross-scale integrated vulnerability). 
 
The described terminology of vulnerability concepts has one limitation: it is indifferent with 
respect to time. The response capacity of a community to climate change involves its coping 
capacity (i.e. its ability to cope with short-term weather variations) as well as its adaptive 
capacity (i.e. its ability to adapt to long-term climate change), which may be determined by 
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different factors. Discussions about vulnerability concepts that do not refer to a particular 
vulnerable situation, may thus have to specify explicitly the temporal reference of the 
vulnerability concepts in addition to their domain and scale. Therefore, we can use the terms 
current, future and long-term for this purpose, depending on weather the vulnerability 
concept refers to the present, to the future, or to the present and the future, respectively. 
 
The combination of the terminology of vulnerable situations and the terminology of 
vulnerability concepts presented here, represents a comprehensive conceptual framework of 
vulnerability, spanned by the following six dimensions: 
 
1. Temporal reference: current vs. future vs. long-term 
2. Scale. Internal vs. external vs. cross-scale   
3. Disciplinary domain. Socioeconomic vs. biophysical vs. integrated 
4. Vulnerable system 
5. Valued attribute 
6. Hazard 
 
The conceptual framework of vulnerability here presented can be applied in various ways. 
First, it allows communicating clearly which interpretation of vulnerability is used in a specific 
assessment. Second, it facilitates the debate on how and why different vulnerability concepts 
differ from each other. Third, it provides a framework for reviewing existing terminologies of 
vulnerability. 
 
4.1.3 Approaches to vulnerability research 
The conceptual structure of vulnerability could be applied in several approaches to 
vulnerability research. We will focus on the classical ones.  
There are three major frameworks for vulnerability research. The four groups of vulnerability 
factors previously distinguished are typically included in the respective conceptualization of 
vulnerability. 
 
Risk-hazard framework 
The risk-hazard framework is applied to assess the risks to certain valued elements (exposure 
units) that arise from their exposure to specific hazards. 
The framework distinguishes two factors that determine the risk to a particular system: the 
hazard, which is a potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that 
is characterized by its location, intensity, frequency and probability, and the vulnerability, 
which denotes the relationship between the severity of hazard and the degree of damage 
caused. The risk-hazard approach is the most widely approach applied in technical literature 
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on disasters. It generally assumes that hazard events are rare and that the hazard is known 
and stationary. Applying the previous terminology, this vulnerability concept is characterized 
as internal biophysical vulnerability. The terms sensitivity and susceptibility are also used to 
denote this concept. 
 
Social constructivist framework 
The social constructivist framework is applied to analyze who is most vulnerable, and why. 
According to this framework, vulnerability denotes the socioeconomic response capacity of 
individuals and groups to a variety of stressors.  
The social constructivist framework, which is rooted primarily in political economy, prevails 
in poverty and development literature. Its vulnerability definition refers exclusively to people 
and it is based on an explanatory model of socioeconomic vulnerability to a range of stresses 
and consequences. This vulnerability concept is characterized as internal social vulnerability 
or cross-scale social vulnerability. The terms response capacity and resilience are also used to 
denote this concept. 
 
Hazard-of-place framework 
The two traditions (risk-hazard and social constructivist) have been combined in various 
integrated frameworks: the most notably of them is the hazard-of-place framework. 
Integrated definitions of vulnerability are widely used in the context of global change and 
climate change, referring to regions, communities or other social units. 
 
4.1.4 Vulnerability to climate change and the debated vulnerability definition by 
the IPCC 
Anthropogenic climate change differs substantially from other concerns where vulnerability 
assessments have been applied, with important implications for the design of vulnerability 
assessments and the definition of key concepts. 
 
Two main interpretations of vulnerability in climate change research have developed in 
response to the varied information needs of policymakers concerned to global climate change. 
To limit the adverse impacts of anthropogenic climate change, two fundamental options are 
considered: mitigation and adaptation. The two response options rely on information about 
the vulnerability of key systems to climate change. However, their specific information needs 
differ significantly, for instance, with regard to the relevant time horizon and the importance 
of distinguishing the impacts of anthropogenic climate change from those of natural climate 
variability. 
The three main traditions of vulnerability research (risk-hazard, social constructivist and 
hazard-of-place) vary in their ability to provide information for the two response options 
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(mitigation and adaptation). In principle, the risk-hazard framework can provide important 
information for mitigation policy but it needs to be substantially extended to reflect the 
specific characteristics of the hazard global climate change. The social constructivist 
framework can provide important information for the design of adaptation policies, in 
particular in developing countries. However, it also needs to be adapted to account for the 
unique challenges associated with long-term climate change. 
 
Using the risk-hazard framework as starting point, we could develop a consistent definition 
of future (or long-term) vulnerability to global climate change, which we could then link to 
the contended vulnerability definition of the IPCC. 
The risk-hazard framework has been widely applied in risk assessments to estimate the 
expected damages caused by different kinds of hazards, including climatic hazard. Standard 
applications of disaster risk assessment (DRA) are primarily concerned with short-term 
natural hazards, assuming known hazards and present vulnerability. Key characteristics of 
the climate change problem, in contrast, are: the long-term asset, that is global but not 
uniform, the involvement of multiple climatic hazards, the different effects on a system, the 
association with large uncertainties about future hazard levels and the attribution to human 
action. In summary, the hazard and risk events considered in DRA are limited in time and 
space, whereas the global climate change is not. 
Thus, the conceptualization of long-term vulnerability to global climate change in opposition 
to Disaster Risk Assessment is discussed below. 
 
1. Climate change is continuous 
DRA is concerned with discrete hazard events, which are the cause of risk to a system. 
Climate change in contrast is a continuous process that may either increase or 
decrease baseline risk level. 
2. Climate change is a long-term process attributable to human action 
DRA sees climatic hazards as stationary and exogenous to the assessment, and 
assumes vulnerability to be constant. The long time scales of climate change, in 
contrast, require a dynamic assessment framework that accounts for uncertainty in 
future hazard levels and changes in all groups of vulnerability factors over time.  
3. Climate change is complex, global and spatially heterogeneous and uncertain 
DRA assumes that the exposure of a vulnerable system to a hazard can be 
characterized by the description of the hazard at the spatial scale of the hazard. In 
vulnerability assessments to global climate change, however, the large deviation 
between the scales of the (global) hazard and the (regional) exposure units does not 
permit the implicit equation of hazard with exposure to the hazard. Two identical 
systems at different locations are likely to experience different exposures for the same 
magnitude of the hazard global climate change (e.g., expressed in terms of global 
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temperature change). Furthermore, the same amount of regional climate change (e.g., 
a given change in precipitation) may have very different impacts depending on the 
baseline climate.  
4. Climate change may have multiple effects on a system 
DRA typically uses a single metric to describe the risk attributed to a specific hazard. 
Climate change, in contrast, typically has multiple incommensurable effects on 
societies and other vulnerable systems. For that reason, comprehensive 
characterizations of the vulnerability of a system to climate change generally require 
the use of multiple metrics. 
 
The risks of future climate change to a system are determined by its future exposure to 
climatic hazards at the regional scale and by its future sensitivity to these hazards. Future 
exposure to regional climate hazards is determined by the future hazard level as well as by a 
regional exposure factor that describes the manifestation of climate change at the regional 
level. Future sensitivity to climate change depends on the current sensitivity of the vulnerable 
system as well as its adaptive capacity over time. 
In summary, future risk is determined by future hazard level and three other factors: the 
regional exposure factor, current sensitivity and adaptive capacity. The three latter factors are 
exactly those considered in the vulnerability definition of IPCC. Hence, the IPCC definition of 
vulnerability consistently describes the future (or long-term) vulnerability of any natural or 
social system to global climate change.  
 
4.1.5 Different views about vulnerability 
As already said, vulnerability is not a straightforward concept and there is no consensus to its 
precise meaning. Some definitions of vulnerability are contradictory and the term is used to 
mean different things by different authors. There are many different definitions of 
vulnerability. Previously we chose one of them (the IPCC one) as the most suitable to describe 
the concept of vulnerability to climate change, delineating a conceptual framework to support 
it. 
 
As reported by the Tyndall Centre in its New indicators of vulnerability and adaptive capacity 
(Adger et al., 2004), it is essential to stress that we can only talk meaningfully about the 
vulnerability of a specified system or exposure unit to a specified hazard or range of hazards. 
A system or exposure unit may be a region, population groups, community, ecosystem, 
country, economic sector, household, business or individual. The term hazard is used here to 
refer specifically to a physical manifestation of climatic variability or change, such as: drought, 
flood, storm, episode of heavy rainfall, a long-term change in the mean value of a climatic 
variable, a potential future shift in a climatic regime and so on. Climate hazards may be 
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defined in terms of absolute values or departures from the mean of variables as rainfall, 
temperature, wind speed, or water level, perhaps combined with factors such as speed, 
duration and spatial extent. Hazards are also referred to climate events. Crucially, hazards 
described here are purely physically defined. 
However, we can say that the definitions of vulnerability in the climate change related 
literature tend to fall into two categories or views: 
 
 In terms of the amount of (potential) damage caused to a system by a particular 
climate-related event or hazard; 
 As a state that exist within a system before it encounters hazard events. 
 
Focusing on this second point, the view of vulnerability as a state (i.e. as a variable describing 
the internal state of a system prior to the occurrence of a hazard event) has arisen from studies 
of the structural factors that make human societies and communities susceptible to damage 
from external hazards. In this formulation, vulnerability is something that exists within 
systems independently of external hazards. 
 
We could give an example to explain better the concept. Imagine we have a box, which 
normally is filled to the half. This situation represents the normal operation of a system, which 
is not affected by climate change. The box presents also a little hole on one side in the upper 
half. This peculiarity exemplifies a vulnerability of the system. If we completely fill the box a 
leak occurs. The largest amount of water stands for a climate change, whereas the leak of 
water symbolizes the change of operation which the system undergoes. Without the 
appearance of a climate change event, we could not observe an alteration in the operation of 
the system, but the vulnerability would still be present. 
 
In a subsequent section of the thesis we will display the vulnerabilities of the energy system 
related to climate change and not to any change in population, community, ecosystem, 
country, economy, household, business and individual. We will only focus on the 
vulnerabilities related to climate change, trying to incorporate all the vulnerabilities of the 
system, those ones that will appear or not in future due to climate change and. 
 
4.1.6 The need of a metric for vulnerabilities 
As we know the argument “climate change” holds a particular importance in the international 
concern. Mitigation and adaptation are considered the best approaches to deal with climate 
change. To be aware of the effectiveness of mitigation and adaptation measurements, the best 
approach is to evaluate the outcomes of the measurements. While a common metric in terms 
of “tons of CO2 equivalent reduced” has traditionally been used in the mitigation context, there 
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are no commonly accepted parameters and indicators to compare adaptation needs and the 
effectiveness of adaptation measurements. This lack could be explained by the fact that 
identification of adaptation measures is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, parameters and 
indicators (a metric) for energy system need to be developed and tested to assess whether 
proposed measures for adaptation are appropriate. Thus, the first step is to find the 
vulnerabilities of the system and elaborate a set of indicators to ponder them. 
 
In order to understand better how to trigger and sustain positive synergies, the HELIO 
International developed a straightforward methodology and a set of indicators to assess the 
vulnerability and resilience of national level energy systems to climate change. Then by 
applying the indicators to energy systems, HELIO aimed to help identify policies and measures 
that can best facilitate and support adaptation activities. This procedure was descripted in the 
report Climate-proofing energy system (Williamson et al., 2009), which we use as base for 
the delineation of the metric for vulnerability. 
 
4.2 The assessment of vulnerabilities  
Climate vulnerability assessment normally is based on the vulnerability structure defined by 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), recalled by the 
IPCC and described in the first part of this chapter. The assessment describes vulnerability as 
the combination of three parameters: exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity (see also 
Figure 4.1). This method was used by several researchers and groups, like the World Bank in 
Climate impacts on energy system. Key issues for energy sector adaptation (Ebinger and 
World Bank, 2011) and ENDESA in its La gestión del cambio climático: informe de adaptación 
(Endesa, 2013). In the ENDESA’s report it is clearly emphasized that there is the need of two 
types of data for assessing vulnerability: technical (type of technology and process) and 
climatic (current and future projections of climate change). The climate impacts, which are 
likely to affect the facilities (exposure), and the potential effects and consequences of the 
impacts (sensitivity) with the adaptive capacity, are the pillars of this kind of analysis. 
 
The various documents, which we have considered, focus on different aspect of the energy 
system. For example, the ENDESA’s report analyzed ENDESA’s power plants (fossil fuels, 
nuclear, hydroelectric and wind) and distribution infrastructure. The World Bank took in 
consideration the entire energy system, concentrating on the supply of energy and the 
resource endowment. Paskal in its The vulnerability of energy infrastructure to environmental 
change (Paskal, 2009) tried to identify some of the most susceptible nodes in the global energy 
infrastructure. The U.S. Global Change Research Program in Climate change impacts in the 
United States: U.S. national climate assessment (U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2014) 
covered several topics including the energy supply and use. Kopytko and Perkins in Climate 
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change, nuclear power, and the adaptation–mitigation dilemma (Kopytko and Perkins, 2011) 
aimed attention at nuclear power plants. Beyond these papers, we also gave a huge 
importance to all those documents examined to assess the impacts of climate change on the 
energy system, because that know-how gives us the basis to detect systems vulnerabilities. 
Differently from the impact’s section, the eye of this assessment will be the system and 
especially the supply side of it. The analysis of vulnerabilities will be taken from the point of 
view of the infrastructures and not from the point of view of climate change. 
 
The following assessment of energy system’s vulnerabilities will focus especially on the supply 
part of the system. Climate change is altering and will alter the entire energy system, from 
energy endowment to energy supply through energy demand. Nonetheless, not all the 
elements of the energy system show susceptibility to climate change. The electricity 
generation from renewable or non-renewable resource is affected by vulnerabilities, as the 
fossil fuel extraction, production, refining, and the transmission, distribution and transfer of 
energy. Differently, we can say that the other missing parts which constitute the energy 
system (the energy endowment and the energy demand), are simply vulnerable to specific 
climatic aspects. In the assessment, we will hint at these vulnerabilities. 
 
Therefore, vulnerability assessment will cover the energy supply side of the system and the 
vulnerabilities correlated to the other parts. Table 4.2 summarizes the vulnerabilities 
discussed in the following sections. 
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Table 4.2 Energy sector vulnerabilities to climate change 
ENERGY SECTOR VULNERABILITY CORRELATED VULNERABILITY 
HYDROPOWER 
Water resource availability Quantity of runoff and seasonal high and low flows 
Temperature 
Precipitation 
Evaporation 
Extreme events 
Reservoir storage 
Dependency: glacier – precipitation - runoff 
Infrastructure safety 
Floods 
Droughts 
Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF) 
WIND POWER 
Large dependence on variations in wind patterns 
Impossibility to make adequate predictions of wind 
characteristics 
Wind characteristics and patterns 
Carbon dioxide emissions 
Rise of temperatures  
Changes in vegetation 
Air density 
Impossibility of storage  
Infrastructure safety 
Hurricanes 
Sea level rise (offshore) 
Icing 
SOLAR POWER Photovoltaic cell temperature 
Irradiance 
Wind cooling 
Ambient temperature 
BIOMASS AND 
BIOFUELS 
Biomass resource availability 
Temperature 
Precipitation 
Atmospheric concentration of CO2 
Extreme events: droughts, frosts, hurricanes 
Use in thermal plants and biofuel production 
Rise of temperatures 
Complexity in maintaining a constant temperature 
Water availability 
Water properties  
WAVE AND TIDAL 
ENERGY 
Availability of wind  
Large dependence on variations in wind patterns  
Wind characteristics and patterns 
Carbon dioxide emissions 
Rise of temperatures  
Changes in vegetation 
Air density 
Infrastructure safety Sea level rise 
THERMOELECTRIC 
POWER PLANTS 
THERMAL CYCLE EFFICIENCY 
  Increase of ambient air temperature 
  Increase in water temperatures 
Location of water intake, location of outlet, fluid 
velocities, turbulence, pressure changes  
COOLING SYSTEM 
  Water availability 
  Water characteristics 
  Type (once-through/recirculating) 
  Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
Once-through cooling system: streamflow condition 
Recirculating cooling system: water consumption 
Location of the cooling water intake 
INFRASTRUCTURES 
  Safety 
  Site of building 
  Safety function of safety-related structure 
Climate change and extreme events 
Air and sea temperatures, Wind, Precipitation,  
Flow rate of rivers, Sea level, Storms 
FOSSIL FUEL 
Infrastructure safety 
Sea level rise, Storm intensity, Wave regime,  
Air and water temperature, Precipitation pattern,  
CO2 concentrations, Ocean acidity,  
Permafrost thawing 
Efficiency of equipment 
Rise of temperatures 
Water availability 
ENERGY TRANSFER 
Efficiency of transmission lines and transformers Rise of temperatures  
Extreme events, in particular icing and lightning 
Permafrost thawing 
Infrastructure safety 
Pipelines Climate phenomena 
Soil structure 
Erosion 
Subsidence 
Pumping stations and valves 
Means of transport 
Floods 
Water levels 
Droughts 
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4.2.1 Hydropower 
The amount of electricity that can be generated from hydropower plants depends on two 
factors. The first one is the installed generation capacity. The second and most important is 
the amount of available water. Natural climate variability has great influence on the planning 
and operation of hydropower systems. It is essential to know the “pace” of the water resource. 
Most systems are designed taking into account historical records (daily and seasonal 
fluctuations of water resource) to determine the amount and variability of produced energy. 
They consider the variation in water inflows trough the seasons, correlated to plant’s 
reservoirs and plant’s generation capacity. 
 
In this section we will discuss about the vulnerabilities of hydroelectric generation, focusing 
during the analysis on three particular main vulnerabilities of the supply hydropower system. 
Changing climate conditions can affect the operation of existing hydropower systems. 
Hydropower generation strongly depends on water resource availability: this is the first main 
vulnerability of the system. Global climate change will add significant amount of uncertainty 
to the already uncertain design and operation. This uncertainty turns into vulnerability and 
will affect the generation, hence we already have to take it into account and treat it to protect 
the future generation. 
 
As already mentioned and characterized, the changing climate is altering the streams of water 
basins. River flows are variable throughout the year, especially across seasons. Reservoir 
storage capacity compensates for daily, seasonal and even annual variations in water inflow, 
enabling the match of electricity generation to variable power demand. Though, climate 
change, which is modifying the hydrological cycle, puts to the test the existing reservoir 
storage. The findings about river levels and precipitation patterns, until recently, were 
considered constant. As the climate change, what were constants are now becoming variables. 
This causes problems for water storage. Thus, we could say that this is the second main 
vulnerability of hydropower system.  
In the study Climate change impacts on high-elevation hydropower generation in California's 
Sierra Nevada: a case study in the upper American river (California Climate Change Center, 
2006), for example, the authors reported that California’s hydrology would experience an 
earlier timing of streamflows. If we stand in the case of having low storage capacity, or 
otherwise inappropriate to changes, higher inflows in wintertime could lead to greater 
spillage and less overall energy generation. 
 
The paper The vulnerability of energy infrastructure to environmental change (Paskal, 2009) 
aims to identify some of the most susceptible nodes in the global energy infrastructure. It 
focuses also on hydropower generation, distinguishing clearly the vulnerabilities of two 
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different kinds of hydropower power plants, the primarily glacier-dependent and the 
primarily precipitation-dependent. 
Glacier-dependent hydro plants are those hydroelectric installations that depend primarily on 
glacial thaw, such as some in the Himalayas, Alps and Andes. In this kind of plants, the 
vulnerabilities arise in the reservoirs. At the beginning there is a vulnerability correlated to 
the size of the reservoirs because water flows may be too big and they cannot fit into 
reservoirs. Then, once the flows reach a minimal extent, hydroelectric production declines 
and production vulnerability will grow. 
Precipitation-dependent hydro plants are those installations that depend primarily on 
predictable seasonal precipitation. They will find increasingly difficult to anticipate flow. 
Dams often supply three purposes: flood control, irrigation and power generation. 
Hydropower plants rely on predictable rain patterns. If precipitations are inadequate, there 
will be a loss in generation. The situation can be equally problematic when there is too much 
water for the design of the installation. If the reservoir fills up in the rainy season and then, 
owing to changing precipitation patterns, the rain keeps falling into what should be the dry 
season, the reservoir can back up and impart problems to the upstream zone. If in order to 
prevent any damage upstream a higher quantity of water is added to the already swollen river, 
the downstream zones could be flooded and furthermore a certain amount of stored energy 
would be wasted. 
Moreover, there are small systems, which exhibit small run-of-river plants. These plants offer 
little operational flexibility and, for this reason, these small systems present a great 
vulnerability. Natural river flow can be highly variable, across seasons and years, and climate 
change can emphasize this aspect. Reservoir storage capacity can compensate these variations 
in water flow because it acts as energy storage and copes with climate changes. In some 
regions snowmelts is part of the hydrological cycle. Snowpack acts as natural reservoir during 
winter. Climate change will increase river flow in spring and reduce it in summer if the built 
reservoirs are not designed to manage earlier increased flows: the result could be a waste of 
energy through spillovers. 
 
The third main vulnerability is related to the safety of hydropower infrastructures. Extreme 
events like flooding, droughts and Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF) could lead to physical 
damage and changes in operations to the hydropower plants and dams. Siltation and erosions 
follow these events. As written in Climate change impacts on high-elevation hydropower 
generation in California's Sierra Nevada: a case study in the upper American river (California 
Climate Change Center, 2006), most current dams are built without taking into account the 
possible impact of climate change and may have lower reservoir capacity to handle frequent 
extreme events associated with river flow and snowmelt. About dams, if the changes take 
place slowly over time, the dam safety issue becomes relatively less important as new dams 
compatible with the new climate can be built. 
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We could have another vulnerability in those energy systems, where hydro generation is 
complemented by other power sources. If the electric system is based fundamentally on 
hydropower, future changes in water availability could lead to an erratic electricity production 
an even to power shortages. The risk of power shortages must be minimized. These systems 
present a high degree of susceptibility that must be reduced to keep constantly online the 
entire energy system. The measure of impact could be assessed in terms of firm power. 
 
Other vulnerabilities of the hydropower system could be associated to the hydropower 
endowment. The water availability is the main one and it depends on the changing climate. 
The quantity of runoff and the seasonal high and low flows are vulnerable to the increasing 
temperatures, precipitation, evaporation and extreme events. 
 
4.2.2 Wind power 
The energy produced from wind turbines strongly depends on wind characteristics: wind 
speed, frequency distribution, average value, directional changes and density.  
Climate change will largely affect the characteristics of wind increasing the uncertainty on 
energy output. Therefore, the main vulnerability of wind power supply is the massive 
dependence on natural and climate variations in wind patterns. 
 
Another huge weakness, which can be associated to the previous vulnerability, is that wind 
energy cannot be stored. If we think about hydropower generation, water can be stored and 
the production can be regularized. This is not possible for wind. We can think to gather the 
electric energy produced by windmills but we cannot store the wind resource to generate 
electricity in future, as we can do with water. 
 
There could be a solution to deal with the above-mentioned problems. The remedy should be 
to have perfectly knowledge of future statistics of wind, to try to match the power demand 
fluctuations with wind resource or to generally plan energy production. To achieve this target, 
we would need precise prediction of wind patterns. Nonetheless, it is quite difficult to 
elaborate global and regional projections of wind changes. Downscaled climate projections 
have serious limitations when reproducing wind speeds, frequency distribution and 
directional wind changes. It is much easier to obtain future prediction of temperature changes 
from climate projections. Thus, another susceptibility is the impossibility to make adequate 
predictions of wind characteristics. 
 
In the wind power generation sector there is also a vulnerability correlated to the structure of 
the facilities. Extreme events like hurricanes could heavily stress wind turbines. Windmills 
can today only operate up to extreme wind speeds of around 25 m/s. At higher wind speeds 
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the strain on the turbine would be too high, which could provoke serious damages to the 
structures. Offshore turbines are also vulnerable to sea level rise. 
Atmospheric icing could hamper production. Global warming facilitates in general the melting 
of ice. Nevertheless, extreme precipitation associated with low temperatures in north 
latitudes, for example, could cause ice formation, reducing the performance of wind turbines 
and even the interruption of the production. 
 
Examining the wind system in its entirety we could observe some vulnerabilities associated 
with the wind power supply and endowment. Firstly, the generation of electricity is possible 
only with a specific wind speed. Wind speed must belong to a specific range, which depends 
on the state of technological progress. Natural variability and climate change cause alterations 
in the geographical distribution and frequency of wind. Production is consequently vulnerable 
to the variability of wind speeds. 
Wind patterns change due to the contribution of carbon dioxide emissions, from fossil fuel 
consumption to global warming: emissions are projected to have dramatic impacts on global 
climate. Consequences of climate change like the rise of temperatures lead to an alteration of 
wind field characteristics. Changes in vegetation could modify the roughness of soil and 
consequently the available wind, increasing the uncertainty. Also air temperature affects the 
generation, because an increase of it leads to a decrease of air density with a commensurate 
decline in energy density. All these transformation, related to climate change, influences the 
wind resource, making vulnerable the wind power sector. 
 
4.2.3 Solar power 
The photovoltaic cell is the main component of a solar panel, that one which generates 
electricity. 
PV cells are influenced by a factor: they are very sensitive to any changes in temperature. 
These changes can either be caused by changes in the irradiance or in the amount of wind 
cooling the solar panel, but especially by changes in the overall ambient temperature. 
Therefore, solar panels display a vulnerability related to air temperature.  
Climate change will rise the temperature of the air and it will also change the composition of 
the atmosphere, altering the water content and the cloudiness, modifying the atmospheric 
transmissivity and the amount of the incoming radiation. Therefore, we can state that there 
is the presence of a vulnerability, but this time related to the endowment of the resource and 
not to the energy production. 
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4.2.4 Biomass and biofuels 
Biomass could be used as an energy resource, as we know. It can be used either directly via 
combustion to produce heat, or indirectly after converting it to various forms of biofuel. These 
two sort of usage present different and common kind of vulnerabilities. 
 
Biomasses used in thermal plants and in liquid biofuel production, show a common 
vulnerability related to the availability of the biomass resource. The final energy generation 
is vulnerable to the amount of biomass at our disposal. The quantity depends on various 
parameters related to climate change, like: temperature increase, water availability, 
atmospheric concentration of CO2, extreme precipitation and presence of other extreme 
events like droughts, frosts and hurricanes. Differently from hydroelectric power, the 
vulnerabilities of the biomass supply system are not related only on the resource availability 
(crops for biomass and water for hydropower) but also on the agents which affect the biomass 
production. Humans influence the achieving of raw materials for biomass system (humans 
cultivate crops using various techniques, water and fertilizers), whereas they have no 
influence in the availability of water, the “fuel” of the hydropower sector. For this reason, in 
the biomass sector we additionally must consider as vulnerability the climate events which 
affect the crop yield, that is the “fuel” of the biomass sector. 
 
The use of biomass in thermal plants and in liquid biofuel production then presents some 
different vulnerabilities, related respectively to the changes in air temperature and water 
availability. 
The increase of temperatures induces a specific vulnerability in thermal plants. High 
temperatures reduce thermal generation efficiency, reducing the generated energy and 
increasing uncertainty. Therefore, thermal plants, which use biomass as fuel, are vulnerable 
to high air temperatures. The reduction of generation efficiency and consequently of 
generated energy could be also caused by water availability. Lower water quantities can 
reduce the efficiency of the cooling system and consequently the efficiency of the entire plant. 
We could talk further about the plants’ problems related to temperatures and water 
availability, but we leave it to a following section in which we will focus specifically on thermal 
plants and their relative vulnerabilities. 
Also biofuel production is vulnerable to climate change. Higher temperatures affect the 
efficiency of some procedures, like the availability of water. Some processes need high 
temperatures, so climate change helps the achieve of them. However, normally these 
processes need a constant temperature, which is hard to keep with high and changing 
temperatures. Finally, water is crucial for biofuel production. The availability and its 
properties are very important for it, because the necessary amount and the parameters must 
be in a very close range which is easy to modify. 
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4.2.5 Wave and tidal energy 
Waves are created through the presence of wind. Consequently, climate change impacts on 
wind energy have direct impacts on wave formation. Therefore, we can say that all the 
vulnerabilities of the wind system could show up in the energy supply of the wave system. 
Generally, a supply system is vulnerable to the availability of the fuel resource, that are waves 
and tides in this case. In particular, wind forms waves: for this reason, we can say that the 
wave system shows a vulnerability to the availability of winds. 
Like wind turbines, wave energy converters (WECs) are designed to capture energy from 
specific wave height, period and direction. Therefore, WECs are vulnerable not only to the 
availability of wind but also to the characteristics of it, which influence the characteristics of 
waves. 
Because wave energy infrastructures are located in seas and oceans, wave energy converters 
are also vulnerable to sea level rise. 
In literature, there are no references about climate change effects on tidal energy. It is possible 
that sea level rise could alter the tidal basins ffecting the tidal range but there is no certainty. 
However, we could assume that tidal energy displays a vulnerability to sea level rise. 
 
4.2.6 Thermoelectric power plants 
When we talk about thermoelectric power plants we refer to all those plants which use vapor 
and/or gas to generate electricity. These power plants use coal, natural gas, oil, nuclear fuel, 
geothermal energy, solar energy or biomass as fuel, to produce vapor or gas to generate then 
electricity. Therefore, the power cycles used in these plants are the Rankine cycle or the 
Brayton-Joule cycle. 
Thermoelectric power plants present vulnerabilities in the efficiency of the power cycle and 
the cooling system, in the facilities and in all the correlated infrastructures. These structures 
are vulnerable to the changing temperature of air and water, to the availability of water and 
to extreme events.  
Following, we will characterize in details these vulnerabilities using information from some 
reports and studies like Climate impacts on energy system (Ebinger and World Bank, 2011), 
The vulnerability of energy infrastructure to environmental change (Paskal, 2009), La gestión 
del cambio climático. Informe de adaptación (Endesa, 2013), Climate change, nuclear power, 
and the adaptation–mitigation dilemma (Kopytko and Perkins, 2011), U.S. energy sector 
vulnerabilities to climate change and extreme weather (U.S. Department of Energy, 2013) and 
all the others used to describe the impacts of climate change in the energy system. 
 
Thermal cycle efficiency 
Thermal cycle efficiency of thermoelectric plants is affected principally by increases in 
ambient air and water temperatures. 
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The increase in ambient air temperatures and cooling water temperatures will increase steam 
condensate temperatures and turbine backpressure, reducing power generation efficiency 
(U.S. Department of Energy, 2013, p.10). The plants based on Rankine cycle are so vulnerable 
to increase temperatures. 
Increasing water temperatures pose other risks to thermoelectric power plants and could 
reduce available generation capacity. For example, increasing water temperatures put power 
plants at a risk of exceeding thermal discharge limits, established to protect aquatic 
ecosystems. Several other factors influence the vulnerability to higher water temperatures of 
these power plants. These factors include the location of the water intake, the location of the 
outlet, the fluid velocities of the inlet and outlet, turbulence and pressure changes and natural 
temperature distributions. For example (U.S. Department of Energy, 2013, p.11), Unit 2 at the 
Millstone Nuclear Power Station was shut down in August 2012 after temperatures in Long 
Island Sound exceeded the maximum temperature at which the nuclear power plant is 
permitted to extract cooling water. However, Unit 3, which pulls water from deeper and cooler 
waters in the ground, continued to operate. 
 
Cooling system 
Thermoelectric facilities use water resources for cooling necessities: hence they are vulnerable 
to water characteristics. 
The water use intensity and the impact of decreasing water availability depends on the type 
of power plant, cooling system employed, geographic location of the plant and source of 
cooling water. For example, water withdrawals per unit of power produced are far lower for 
closed cycle circuits than once-through systems, but the water consumption is higher. 
 
Once-through cooling systems are particularly vulnerable to low streamflow conditions, due 
to the large volumes of water withdrawn. In contrast, recirculating cooling systems reuse 
cooling water multiple times than immediately discharging it back to the water source. In 
recirculating systems that use cooling towers, some of the water evaporates while the rest is 
reused and sent back to the condenser in the power plant. Recirculating cooling systems, like 
once-through systems, continually withdraw water. Even if they withdraw notably smaller 
quantities of water from the source, they can be affected by low flow conditions. Water lost 
through evaporation in the cooling towers must be replaced, resulting in appreciably higher 
water consumption than for once-through systems. Thus, less water is consumed by once-
through cooling systems, but greater amounts of water are withdrawn, resulting in a greater 
potential for entrapment and intrusion of aquatic organisms. Increasing water temperatures 
put power plants at risk of exceeding thermal discharge limits established to protect aquatic 
ecosystems, resulting in a greater sensitivity to low water conditions. 
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Another vulnerability associated to the decreasing water availability can be perceived in the 
placement or location of the cooling water intake structures for the thermoelectric power 
plant. Cooling-water intake heights will influence the degree to which intake structures are 
exposed above water levels. During times of drought, river, lake or reservoir water levels may 
fall near or below the level of the water intakes, used for getting water for cooling, resulting 
in power production at some power plants being stopped or reduced. 
 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies are not cooling technologies, but we talk 
about them in this section because, as cooling systems, require a high water consumption. 
Withdrawal and consumption rates are estimated to be approximately two times higher for 
coal and natural gas facilities that include carbon CCS, than for those without CCS. Therefore, 
the plants which use CCS technologies could be more vulnerable to decreasing water 
availability. 
 
Infrastructures 
Normally thermoelectric power plants are placed in regions where there is a large availability 
of water, to meet the large amount of water for cooling for thermoelectric plants. As a result, 
they are generally situated in areas that are susceptible to environmental change. Numerous 
power plants line the coasts and many others are situated inland, near rivers or lakes in low-
lying areas or flood plains. All these infrastructures are vulnerable to events correlated to 
water. 
Increasing intensity of storm events, sea level rise and storm surge pose a risk to coastal 
thermoelectric facilities. Specific vulnerabilities to hurricanes and flooding vary from site to 
site. Increasing intensity and frequency of flooding set a risk to inland thermoelectric facilities. 
The intake structures, buildings and other infrastructure at thermoelectric generation 
facilities that draw cooling water from rivers, are vulnerable to flooding and in some cases to 
storm surge. They are also dependent on increasingly valuable and variable freshwater 
supplies. 
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) elaborated the major hazards for nuclear 
sites, which can in addition be considered for a generic thermoelectric plant. The hazards are 
temperature of air and sea, patterns, frequency and strength of winds, characteristic of 
precipitation, flow rates of rivers and rises and anomalies of sea levels. Inland reactors are 
subject to heat waves, which reduce the power generation, but also to inland floods, which 
could damage ancillary facilities and put a risk to the stability of the plants. Coastal reactors 
instead are subject to the rise of the sea level, which can inundate the reactor sites and increase 
erosion and instability of shorelines. While intense storms combined with sea level rise can 
produce more severe episodes of flooding and wind damage. Kopytko and Perkins in Climate 
change, nuclear power, and the adaptation–mitigation dilemma (Kopytko and Perkins, 2011) 
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studied the operation of US nuclear power plants during hurricane season. They found that 
there is a need to design non-safety structures and equipment to withstand the extreme 
events, or assure that their failure would not disable the safety function of safety-related 
structures, systems and components, because the structures and equipment are extremely 
vulnerable to climate change and extreme events. 
 
New commissioned plants in many countries, like in United Kingdom, already present a 
vulnerability in the facilities correlated to the site of building. Communities do not easily 
accept a nuclear power station or thermoelectric plant in their region. Thus, in many cases 
the proposal is to locate the new plants on the same site as the old ones. In UK the government 
has given assurances that builders would have to “confirm that they can protect the site 
against flood-risk throughout the lifetime of the site, including the potential effects of climate 
change”. It is however difficult to estimate both the lifetime of the site and the potential effects 
of climate change. Right from the outset, the new plants present the same vulnerabilities as 
older plants. 
 
4.2.7 Fossil fuel extraction, production and refining 
Oil, natural gas and coal onshore and offshore facilities exhibit various vulnerabilities related 
to climate change. We can divide these vulnerabilities in two main groups: those ones related 
to the structure and the maintenance of the infrastructures and those ones related to the 
efficiency of the processes. 
 
The fossil fuel extraction, the production and the refining are affected by climate change and 
its consequences in several ways. We can simply state that all these phenomena form lots of 
vulnerabilities to this huge sector, which are different from each other, according to the type 
of impact and the affected structure. 
The paper Global climate change implications for coastal and offshore oil and gas development 
(Burkett, 2011) indicated six key climate change drivers for coastal and offshore oil and gas 
development: sea level rise, storm intensity, wave regime, air and water temperature, 
precipitation patterns, changes in CO2 and ocean acidity. Hurricanes, for example, can disrupt 
oil and gas supply and other extreme events, like flooding from sea level rise and storm surges, 
may cause damages like erosion. All these offshore and low-lying coastal facilities (the oil and 
gas production and refining) are vulnerable to these climatic events and we must take into 
account them for adapting the whole system. 
The Burkett’s paper and the Paskal’s one (Paskal, 2009) stress that warming atmospheric 
temperatures can have various effects on the resource development in the Arctic. Decreasing 
ice cover may require design changes to counter effects of increased wave action and storm 
surges like erosion. However, the biggest problem may be the thawing of the permafrost. 
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Thawing permafrost has the potential to affect severely infrastructure in cold climates. This 
is a huge vulnerability for the extraction sector. With environmental change, infrastructure 
problems in cold climates are likely to become more common. We should invest in permafrost 
and cold climate engineering research to find ways to rebuild Arctic and other cold climate 
infrastructure in a manner that will be viable over the long term. In addition, the maintenance 
of the infrastructure is vulnerable to temperature increase.  
 
With regard to the efficiency of refining equipment, climate change may induce a lower water 
availability which could strongly affect the operation of the facilities. Oil refining is a large 
water consumption activity. Water demand can be impacted by higher temperatures, as most 
of refinery’s water demand is used in cooling units. Also oil and gas production are vulnerable 
to decreasing water availability, because the required water for enhanced oil recovery from 
oilfields and hydraulic fracturing are huge. 
 
4.2.8 Transmission, distribution and transfer of energy 
Weather and climate situations can affect the transmission and distribution of power and the 
transfer of oil, gas and other fuels. This is especially true in the case of transmission lines and 
pipelines that can extend thousands of kilometers. Even land-based transfers of energy (by 
road or rail) and water based transfers (by boat or barge) are similarly exposed. In this section 
we will concentrate on the vulnerabilities of these energy transportation systems, 
differentiating the vulnerabilities related to electricity grid to the others related to fuel 
transfer. 
 
The transmission and distribution of electricity through power lines are subject to climate 
variability: the efficiency of the transmission and distribution depends on various factors, 
including the temperature of surrounding environment. As reported in U.S. energy sector 
vulnerabilities to climate change and extreme weather (U.S. Department of Energy, 2013), 
increasing temperatures are expected to raise transmission losses, decrease current carrying 
capacity and increase stresses on the distribution system. The efficiency of the lines is reduced 
by higher temperatures, while another effect of the increasing temperatures – the thermal 
expansion – could produce a significant increase in sag, which could cause several problems. 
Transmission lines suffer from high temperatures as the electric power transformers. 
Transformers could even fail causing interruptions of the electric power supply. 
The increasing temperatures alongside drought periods could exacerbate the risk of wildfire, 
which poses a risk to electricity transmission, causing physical damage to transmission line 
poles and especially to wooden ones.  
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Other weather phenomena like extreme winds and ice load, lighting strikes, avalanches, 
landslides and flooding could impact the delivery of electricity though disruption of 
infrastructure. In particular, excessive icing on overhead lines can cause outages. 
In addition, the permafrost thawing, caused by global warming, is considered a risk: much of 
the existing infrastructures erected in northern regions are located in areas of high hazard 
potential and could be affected by thaw subsidence. 
Summing up, transmission lines and, in general, the whole electricity grid, are highly 
vulnerable to increased temperatures, droughts, flooding, extreme winds, icing and 
permafrost thawing.  
 
As regards fuel transfer, first of all we have to say that we must analyze separately the transfer 
of fuel through pipelines and the transfer through means of transport, because these two kind 
of transportations present different vulnerabilities. 
Referring to The vulnerability of energy infrastructure to environmental change (Paskal, 
2009), oil and gas pipelines could be damaged by several events like flooding, storms, 
hurricanes and other extreme events. Even if most pipelines are buried and thus seemingly 
insulated from the effects of severe weather, there are exposed nodes, such as pumping 
stations and valves, that are vulnerable to climate phenomena. In addition, it is uncertain how 
changes in water tables, soil structure, erosion and subsidence might affect pipelines. Existing 
pipelines may need to be reassessed, especially if they are built on thawing permafrost. 
 
Crude oil, petroleum products like gasoline, coal and corn-based ethanol (blended with 
gasoline) are transported by rail, boats, barges, trucks and tankers. All these means of 
transport could be disturbed by climate change: for this reason they could display some 
vulnerabilities. The most impacted transports are supposed to be the rail and barge systems. 
Heavy rainfall events will increase flood risk: increased frequency and intensity of flooding 
events will affect water levels in rivers and ports impeding barge travel: also, it could wash 
out rail lines, considering that in many regions they follow riverbeds. Besides, reductions in 
river levels, caused principally by droughts, could impede barge transport of crude oil, 
petroleum products and coal, resulting in delivery delays and increased costs. Therefore, the 
transport of fuel is vulnerable to flooding and droughts. 
 
4.3 Indicators of energy sector vulnerability 
When considering the state of a system, its development and the need to adjust decisions, 
policies and actions, measurement is the key. 
Since climate variables can affect energy segments differently, mapping vulnerabilities 
according to these variables and analyzing the impacts on the whole energy system can offer 
a good measure of climate resilience. Historic information can also provide a basis on which 
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infer the effects of future climate variability according to current patterns of variability. This 
is especially relevant for the case of extreme events. Such indicators can help in vulnerability 
assessment, by weighing the importance of specific energy segments in the whole energy 
system and by providing information about what climate variables are most likely to influence 
an entire energy system. However, creating a single metric for evaluating the resilience of a 
system to climate is challenging. 
 
In the World Band study Climate impacts on energy systems (Ebinger and World Bank, 2011) 
the authors indicated that few indicators can be used to assess the resilience of a system based 
on a comparison of current and future climate. Resilience in resource endowments is related 
to losses (or gains) in potential production, whereas resilience of energy supply depends also 
on the efficiency of energy production and conversion. In the first case, comparing total 
available primary energy in current climate against scenarios of climate change provides a 
general measure of losses or gains. Then, analyze specific energy segments like hydropower, 
wind power or oil reserves, would also be important, especially when energy systems have 
limited diversity. 
In addition, the authors displayed other indicators to measure the vulnerabilities of a system 
and its resilience. For example, the level of diversification of energy production provides an 
important measure of resilience. Systems that heavily rely on a single energy source can be 
more exposed to climate impacts; the variety of a system, on the other hand, does not allow 
the use of a single indicator as good measure of resilience. 
Many indicators, based on information about energy systems, can be used to assess the extent 
to which those systems are vulnerable to climate change. In terms of energy, the fuel shares 
in total primary and final energy supply, as well as total electricity production and installed 
capacity, can be useful as indicators. Then, since renewable energy is more vulnerable to 
alterations in climate, the share of renewable sources in total energy supply and electricity 
generation/installed capacity is also relevant in assessing climate resilience. For energy 
supply, variations on overall system efficiency (measured, for example, by the ratio of total 
final energy to primary energy consumption) induced by climate change, can indicate how 
energy conversion and transfer can be impacted by climate change, although this measure 
can show aggregate impacts on energy supply. In addition, there is the need to integrate the 
understanding of the system’s supply vulnerability with some measures of specific energy 
sources. Projected climate change impacts on the renewable electricity generation capacity 
factor1 are a good measure for sources, such as hydropower and wind power generation. 
Impacts on thermal electricity generation, on the other hand, are better described in terms of 
                                                   
1 The net capacity factor of a power plant is the ratio of its actual output over a period of time, to its potential output if 
it were possible for it to operate at full nameplate capacity.  
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conversion efficiency or capacity variations. Climate impacts on liquid biofuel production can 
be assessed through variations in agricultural and conversion productivity. 
Variations in energy intensity of a consuming sector can portray a picture of vulnerability 
from the demand side. The biggest challenge here is to conduct a strict ceteris paribus analysis 
in climate change assessments that are carried out for the long term. The level of information 
and knowledge about energy relations should be considered as an indicator of resilience, 
considering that it allows to better understand and act earlier to adapt to climate change 
impacts. 
 
Two recent studies, Use of indicators to improve communication on energy systems 
vulnerability, resilience and adaptation to climate change (Michaelowa et al., 2010) and 
Climate-proofing energy systems (Williamson et al., 2009) looked at metrics for the 
vulnerability and resilience of energy systems. They presented a set of indicators to determine 
the level of vulnerability of a particular energy system, the capacity to implement energy 
adaptation projects and how successful proposed implementation measures will be in 
increasing energy system resilience. In the following section we will focus on their works on 
indicators of the level of vulnerability. 
 
4.3.1 HELIO indicators of vulnerability 
The above-mentioned papers aim to contribute to the development of parameters and 
indicators for energy systems. Based on its experience in applying indicators, HELIO has 
developed two sets of indicators to respectively measure: 
 
1. The vulnerability of energy systems 
2. The effectiveness of adaptation efforts in the energy sector 
 
The second set of indicators is useful for the evaluation of adaptation measures. Hence, these 
parameters will not be examined in this chapter. 
 
HELIO’s philosophy is that the underlying metric – the actual measurement or statistic used 
– must be generally available for most, if not all, countries. Data collection and vector 
calculation must be do-able and if calculation is required to derive an indicator it must be 
simple to do. 
Overall the indicators themselves must: 
 
 Be clearly definable, simple to understand, and easily communicated to citizens and 
decision-makers alike; 
 Be relevant to actual or anticipated policies; 
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 Reflect an important aspect of the social, economic, environmental, technological or 
governance elements of the energy system; 
 Measure something of obvious value to observers and decision-makers; 
 Have robustness, durability and long-term relevance. 
Prior to display the set of indicators for energy systems’ vulnerabilities to climate change, 
HELIO in Climate-proofing energy systems (Williamson et al., 2009) introduces the country-
level vulnerabilities. When vulnerabilities are discussed at national level, the discussion is 
traditionally done around issues of energy supply security and how to improve it. There is 
little policy formation around the broader context of reducing energy system vulnerability and 
improving resilience through ecodevelopment strategies, e.g. addressing environmental, 
social, economic technical and governance issues. 
In order to make effective proposed polices and measures, first of all it is necessary to quantify 
the overall vulnerability state of the country. HELIO’s first set of indicators measures the 
overall vulnerability of a country. 
Table 4.3 Country-level vulnerabilities (Williamson et al., 2009, p. 18) 
SECTOR INDICATOR 
Environmental 
Change in rainfall patterns 
Variation in temperature 
Economic 
Proportion of households acquiring access to electricity in the last two decades 
Level of increased energy autonomy 
Technical 
Change in the amount of energy supplied by renewables 
Level of diversity of renewable energy sources and technologies 
Social 
Change in prevalence of diseases 
Change in employment 
Civic (Governance) 
Land reform improvement 
Change in public participation in planning process 
 
Finally, the two papers get to define the indicators of vulnerability and resilience. 
The principal vulnerability indicators are listed in Table 4.4. The indicators cover all major 
energy systems. They were picked from the HELIO paper and the Michaelowa et al. one. 
 
Table 4.4 Summary table of vulnerability indicators. Created by author collecting data from (Williamson et al., 2009, p. 
31-32) and (Michaelowa et al., 2010, p. 12-15) 
SECTOR INDICATOR DESCRIPTION 
HYDROPOWER 
VH1 
Expected precipitation change over next 20-50 years (%) and/or 
probability of floods in each watershed 
VH2 
Projected flood frequency over the next 50 years (number of 
floods that have a greater intensity than a flood with a 100 year 
recurrence cycle) 
WIND POWER 
VW1 Number of wind turbines at less than 1 m above sea level 
VW2 
Projected change of average wind speed over the next 20 years, 
based on regional climate models (%) 
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SECTOR INDICATOR DESCRIPTION 
VW3 
Projected share of average annual wind speeds over 25 m/s over 
the next 20 years (at this wind speed most wind turbines have to 
be switched off) 
SOLAR POWER 
VS1 Capacity of solar installations already in place (m2) 
VS2 
Expected temperature (°C) increase in the next 20 years relevant 
for PV capacity 
BIOMASS AND 
BIOFUEL 
VB1 
Proportion of biomass used for energy purposes (%) in total 
biomass production 
VB2 Expected precipitation change over next 20-50 years (%) 
VB3 
Probability of temperature increase beyond biological heat 
tolerance of relevant crop over the next 20 years (%). 20 years is 
the estimated average lifetime of biomass power plants. 
VB4 
Projected drought frequency over the next 20 years (number of 
droughts that would result in a reduction of crop yields by more 
than 20%) 
VB5 
Projected flood frequency over the next 20 years (number of 
floods that would result in a reduction of crop yields by more 
than 20%) 
VB6 
Number of biomass power plants located at less than 1 m above 
sea level and situated in an area that has a 100 year flood cycle 
THERMAL POWER 
PLANTS 
VP1 
Number of thermal (coal, oil and gas) power plants located at less 
than 1 m above sea level and within the area that would be 
flooded by a flood with a current recurrence period of 100 years 
VP2 
Number of nuclear power plants located at less than 1 m above 
sea or river level and within the area that would be flooded by a 
flood with a current recurrence period of 100 years 
VP4 
Expected temperature increase of cooling water for thermal 
(including nuclear) power plants over the next 30 years (°C) 
FUEL FROM MINED 
RESOURCE 
VF1 
Share of offshore oil and gas installations likely to be hit by a 
storm of more than 70 m/s gusts over the next 20 years (%). The 
lifetime of such installations is not well known, but should be 
shorter than that of power plants. At a wind speed of 70 m/s 
destruction of plants is likely 
VF2 
Share/number of refineries likely to be hit by a storm of more 
than 70 m/s gusts within the next 20 years (%) 
VF3 
Number of coal mines plants located at less than 1 m above sea 
level and situated in an area than has a 100 year flood cycle 
TRANSMISSION AND 
TRANSFER 
VT1 
Length of in-country, above-ground transmission and 
distribution lines (km) 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESILIENCE OF ENERGY SYSTEMS 
TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Basically, this thesis is divided into three main parts, as already stated many times. The first 
one examined climate change and the impacts of it to energy system. The second one checked 
the vulnerabilities of the energy system to climate change. The third, i.e. this specific part, is 
the main one and it gives the name to the entire thesis. This particular section investigates 
the adaptation issue and specifically the possible measures which we could put into practice 
to adapt the energy system – and especially the supply side – to climate change. 
 
The main topic of the third part of the thesis, as we said, is the description of the 
improvements we have to implement to the supply energy system to adapt it from climate 
change. Nonetheless, the adaptation of energy system to climate change does not only consist 
in energy generation improvements. Several more aspects must be considered for 
implementing a proper adjustment of energy system. The objective of Part C is to discuss 
emerging practices and tools for managing climate impact, integrating climate considerations 
and operational practice into planning processes in an environment of uncertainty. 
 
These topics will be explored in two sections. In the first one we will describe the objectives 
of the adaptation issue and the characteristic of adaptation policies. The second one instead 
will delineate the adaptation practices we should introduce to make the energy system 
resilient to climate change. 
The structure of this section of the thesis is principally based on the World Bank study Climate 
impacts on energy systems (Ebinger and World Bank, 2011). Some ideas derive from another 
key study realized by the IPCC Working Group II: Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, 
and vulnerability (IPCC, 2014). Several concepts then are supported by other researches 
carried out by other investigation teams like the UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP), 
THE United Nations Environment Programme – World Conservation Monitoring Centre 
(UNEP-WCMC) and the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR).  
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5.1 Implementation of climate resilience 
The energy sector is at risk from climate change and it is also at risk from current climate 
variability. Risks handled today, while perhaps are not enough to fully address climate change, 
will help to address risks into the future. Adaptation measures to climate change and climate 
variability will surely increase the resilience of energy systems. Thus, to increase the 
resilience, climate change’s adaptation needs to be integrated into energy planning and 
decision-making processes at all relevant levels. 
 
Remembering the definition of adaptation (The process of adjustment to actual or expected 
climate and its effects. Adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial 
opportunities. (IPCC, 2014, p.40)), the targets of the analysis are to reduce the damage from 
climate change and make resilient the energy system. To reach these objectives it is necessary 
put into practice some deeds and strategies, which will be delineated in the following sections. 
 
Adaptation to climate change is transitioning from a phase of awareness to the construction 
of actual strategies and plans in societies (IPCC, 2014, p.871). The combined efforts of a broad 
range of international organizations, scientific reports and media coverage, have raised 
awareness of the importance of adaptation to climate change, fostering a growing number of 
adaptation responses in developed and developing countries. The awareness of the need of 
adaptation has reached a considerable level: on the other hand, the knowledge about 
adaptation is still generally scarce, especially in the management of climate risk. Energy risk 
needs to be assessed and managed from a base of information that is far from perfect. The 
uncertainties in hydro-meteorology, climate perspective, in short-term and long term 
predictions will affect the development. Therefore, it is necessary a methodology to improve 
adaptation in all its dimensions. 
 
In regards, there are probably two basic approaches to guide decisions and actions in risk 
management and adaptation development (even if we would say that one is not an adaptation 
approach). Either methods should not use single-scenario assessment of risk. There is nothing 
incorrect in strict scientific terms in the results produced using single-scenario assessment of 
risk, but it should always keep in mind that single-realization approaches do not reveal the 
true extent of the uncertainties involved. Considering that, the two approaches are the do 
nothing and the proactive. The do nothing approach – which is not an adaptation approach – 
permits complacency, or more appropriately, lack of awareness. The planning goes along 
traditional lines, taking climate risks into account as they become clear and managing any 
issues retroactively. The proactive approach on the other hand makes mainstream the risk 
management. This approach essentially takes into account in advance the risk correlated with 
climate change in climate strategies, embracing the idea of adaptation. 
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The following sections explore the desirable outcomes of adaptation decisions and strategies, 
the main gaps and options to integrate climate risk considerations into energy systems. They 
recognize the various levels at which integration needs to take place and the multitude of 
stakeholders involved. 
This description will be divided into three parts, underlining the most important 
characteristics we should take in consideration. 
 
5.1.1 Awareness versus knowledge 
Climate change is expected to have a wide range of direct and indirect effects on energy 
production and consumption patterns. Though, the research and policy-oriented literature 
are still generally scarce on energy-related climate risk and impacts, not less for management 
which is emerging. Detailed data on possible climate effects are needed to take decisions about 
short-term adaptive management and longer-term planning, related, for example, to 
technological change. It is also important to raise awareness and concern at project, policy 
and planning level about climate impacts on energy services, as at the wider implications for 
development. The literature supports identification of key issues and potential options, but 
the knowledge base is relatively limited for making generalized conclusions on the integration 
of adaptation options in planning and decision-making. There is a minority of academic 
literature that provides information on the implementation of adaptation plans, in contrast 
with the large amount of literature that discusses concepts, strategies and plans of adaptation 
(IPCC, 2014, p.877). 
 
However, the growing literature on the subject illustrates increasing scientific awareness. An 
example of this is the study Raising awareness of climate change. A handbook for government 
focal points (United Nations Environment Programme, 2006). In this handbook the authors 
implemented a checklist for raising awareness. They set a list of steps for planning and 
organizing a climate change communications strategy, drawn on the wide range of 
experiences that organizations and government have had in conducting outreach.  
 
5.1.2 Uncertainty in the decision-making 
Responding to climate change involves an iterative risk management process that 
includes both mitigation and adaptation, taking into account actual and avoided 
climate change damages, co-benefits, sustainability, equity and attitudes to risk. 
(Pachauri and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2008). 
 
Risk is often represented as the probability of occurrence of hazardous events or trends 
multiplied by the magnitude of the consequences if these events occur. Therefore, high 
risk can result not only from high probability outcomes but also from low probability 
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outcomes with very severe consequences. This makes it important to assess the full 
range of possible outcomes, from low probability tail outcomes to very likely outcomes 
(Pachauri and Meyer, 2015). 
 
A risk-based approach to climate change adaptation can support informed decisions to avoid 
maladaptation and minimize the risks of over- and under-adaptation. This section describes 
risk management approaches that are being used to identify adaptive responses and increase 
the climate resilience of energy systems. It highlights areas where efforts should be 
strengthened or knowledge gaps exist.  
 
Climate risk management 
Risk assessment and management are already important aspects of energy decision making. 
Energy providers are get used to policy changes, shifting global market conditions, changes 
in financial variables and climate variability. Energy users cope with price fluctuations as well 
as near term shortages in energy availability, caused by extreme weather events and damages 
to energy distribution infrastructure.  
Climate considerations are evident especially in planning and investment strategies for 
renewable resources that depend directly upon climate parameters. Currently, the use of 
present-day or historical weather and seasonal climate data and information is part of 
everyday risk management for many utilities and regulators across the world (Audinet et al., 
2014). However, the integration of forward-looking information on climate change in 
decision-making (“climate change adaptation”) remains limited. Long term changes in climate 
and short-term increases in climate variability (as we have seen) are increasingly impacting 
generation, transmission and distribution of electricity, forcing industry to consider new ways 
to manage the associated risk. 
 
The UK Climate Impact Programme (UKCIP) developed a risk-based framework (see Figure 
5.1) for adaptation decision making in the technical report Climate adaptation: risk, 
uncertainty and decision-making (Willows et al., 2003). 
The decision-making framework is composed by eight stages: 
 
1. Identify problems and objectives; 
2. Establish decision-making criteria; 
3. Assess risk; 
4. Identify options; 
5. Appraise options; 
6. Make decision; 
7. Implement decision; 
8. Monitor, evaluate and review. 
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Figure 5.1 A generic framework to support good decision-making in the face of climate change risk (IPCC, 2014, p.851, 
based on (Willows et al., 2003, p.7))  
The iterative risk management process shows a cyclical nature and uses uncertain long-term 
impacts to develop short-term adaptation priorities and options. This is useful for two main 
reasons: 
 
1. It provides the short-term policy or project analysis and advice that decision makers 
need; 
2. New information and data can be incorporated continuously as they become available 
to alleviate constraints on decision-making posed by uncertainty. Decision-making 
criteria can be revised when new information on costs and feasibility becomes 
available. 
 
For each stage of the framework there are key issue that decision-maker should consider and 
questions that should be answered. Stages 1 and 2, for example, define the nature of the 
decision problem, the decision-maker’s objectives and criteria that help differentiate between 
options. At stage 3 climate change risks associated with the decision are formally identified 
and assessed, alongside other non-climate risks. Climate change scenarios are an important 
tool to give information in this stage. At stage 4 the decision-maker should aim to identify 
options that are robust to climate change and provide the greatest likelihood of meeting the 
objectives and criteria defined in stage 2. In particular, the decision-maker should try to find 
“no regret” and “low regret” options. These options are appraised against the criteria in stage 
5, to determine the preferred or best option. Stage 6 then demands that the decision-maker 
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forms a judgement, that all issues revealed during the decision-making process have been 
addressed. 
 
The Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) in its document Climate 
vulnerability assessments (ESMAP, 2009) presented a similar framework for decision-
making, to support adaptation of energy infrastructure vulnerable to climate change (Figure 
5.2). It created the framework basing it on experience and published guidance from United 
Kingdom (UKCIP) and Australia. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Decision-making framework for adapting vulnerable energy infrastructure to climate change (ESMAP, 2009, 
p.2) 
A deeper analysis of the various frameworks for adaptation decision-making reveals that 
climate risk management requires an interdisciplinary effort, where the tools and knowledge 
of scientists, energy analysts, economists, policy makers, planners and citizens are combined. 
Collectively the frameworks highlight at least four features that are relevant for the energy 
sector: practically, flexibility, compatibility and stakeholder engagement. 
In this sense, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) produced the 
Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: building the resilience of nations and communities 
to disaster (HFA), a plan to explain, describe and detail the work that is required from all 
different sectors and actors to reduce disaster losses. It was developed and agreed with the 
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help of many partners, which were needed to reduce risk disaster – governments, 
international agencies, disaster experts and many others – bringing them into a common 
system of coordination. In the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: building the resilience 
of nations and communities to disaster. Mid-term review 2010-2011 (United Nations Office for 
Disaster Risk Reduction, 2011) the authors highlighted the significant progress that has been 
made over the past years in disaster risk reduction: they also accentuated the fact that the 
adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action in 2005 has played a decisive role in promoting 
this progress across international, regional and national agendas.  
 
Dealing with uncertainty 
The energy-system impact relationship is highly complex and uncertain. Uncertainty about 
the exact nature of climate change impacts at the local and regional level (for example in terms 
of precipitation and storminess) makes difficult to improve and fine-tune adaptation 
measures. 
Uncertainty exists where there is a lack of knowledge concerning outcomes. It may result from 
an imprecise knowledge of the risk. However, even when there is a precise knowledge of 
frequency and magnitude of events there is uncertainty, because outcomes are essentially 
unknown (Willows et al., 2003, p. 43). 
 
Uncertainty could arise for a lot of reasons: for the estimation of the future growth in 
greenhouse gas emissions and their concentration in atmosphere, for the estimation of the 
extent of warming, when regional climatic responses are taken into account, when we 
consider impacts on various humans and natural systems; etc. Planners and decision makers 
need local, specific and detailed information about aforementioned cases: however, all those 
points raise uncertainty. 
We could sum up the various types of uncertainty in six categories: “real-world” uncertainty, 
data uncertainty, knowledge uncertainty, model uncertainty, outcome uncertainty and 
decision uncertainty. The various uncertainties and their typology could be identified using a 
risk-based framework, as the UKCIP one showed in the previous section, or using some 
specific multidisciplinary tools for planning, as suggested by the IPCC in the AR5 (IPCC, 2014, 
p.883). Some of these tools could be monitoring, modeling or spatially integrated systems 
with the techniques of GIS. Other ones could be communication tools, like brochures, 
bulletins, posters, magazines, policy briefs, videos TV, radio broadcasts, Internet and many 
more. Finally, some more tools could be early warning systems. 
 
Furthermore, climate-sensitive decisions deal with uncertainty: it is useful to know in what 
way these decisions could be influenced by uncertainty. Some decisions are based on a 
recognized need to manage current climate variability and extremes and/or to address 
adaptation in anticipation of longer-term climate change. In this case, awareness and 
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knowledge on climate variability are high. For some other decisions, climate variability and 
change may be one of many uncertainties that influence the outcome of a decision. In this 
case, raising awareness among planners and decision makers may be an important first step, 
to ensure that attention is paid to the potential impacts of climate change. 
 
We could observe then that an inherent risk hits the adaptation decisions and measures: the 
risk of committing an error in the adaptation. We could distinguish three types of adaptation 
errors: 
 
 Under-adaptation. Too little emphasis is placed on climate risks. It may result from a 
failure by decision makers to consider or identify climate change or specific climate 
variables. 
 Over-adaptation. Climate change or related variables are overemphasized: in practice, 
practices turn out that are not to be significant or too little weight has been given to 
non-climate factors compared to climate factors. 
 Maladaptation. Actions taken (unintentionally) that constrain the options or ability of 
other decision makers now or in the future to manage the impacts of climate change.  
 
Proper integration of climate risks in decision-making processes will minimize the risk of 
over-, under- and maladaptation.  
 
Timing and uncertainty 
The long-term nature of climate change makes timing an important part of adaptation 
decisions. The lifetime of a decision is an important consideration when determining whether 
climate adaptation is needed. 
Timing decisions depend on the relative costs and benefits of taking action at different points 
in time. In particular, decision makers will compare the present value of adaptation now with 
the present value of adaptation at a later stage. Thus, as described in the document Economic 
aspects of adaptation to climate change: costs, benefits and policy instruments (Agrawala et 
al., 2008), the timing decision depends on three factors. The first is the difference in 
adaptation costs over time. The effect of discounting would normally favor a delay in 
adaptation measures, so would the prospect of potentially cheaper and more effective 
adaptation techniques that might be available in the future. The second factor is the short-
term benefits of adaptation. Early adaptation will be justified if it has immediate benefits, for 
example by mitigating the effects of climate variability. The measures that provide short-term 
adaptation benefits can be characterized as no- or low-regret options. The third component 
has to do with the long-term effects of early adaptation. Early adaptation is justified if it can 
guarantee lasting benefits. 
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Furthermore, it is useful make a comment on the relation between time, uncertainty and the 
long-lived infrastructure. Many supply, transmission and distribution investments are large 
and long-lived. Early adaptation action for long-lived infrastructure investments will 
generally be less costly and more effective than retroactive maintenance and repairs or 
expensive retrofitting. Furthermore, substantial investments in energy infrastructure are 
ongoing or under way in most regions around the world and are expected to continue.  
 
5.1.3 Mainstreaming climate risk management into energy planning 
There is a tall wall between our scientists and our decision makers. Scientists do their 
research and lob their information over the wall, hoping that somebody on the other 
side will catch it in receptive hands and act on it. However, what is on the other side 
of the wall is a big pile of papers and information that the decision makers pay no 
attention to (Jonathan Foley, 2010, cited in Ebinger and World Bank, 2011, p.93). 
 
This section discusses options to fill knowledge, information, awareness and capacity gaps for 
climate risk management in the energy sector. It highlights the role of governments and 
institutions at the local, national and international levels. 
 
Scientific knowledge 
Climate risk management presents a knowledge gap: the lack of capacity to model and project 
climate impacts at local and regional scales is perhaps the most prominent. Government 
institutions and international research communities have the important task of filling this 
gap. 
Some considerations should be taken into account when prioritizing risk research. 
 
 How far can the risk be reduced through further research and in what time frame? 
 How deep are the uncertainties? Do they arise from data needs, a modeling problem, 
or do we basically not have a scientific understanding of the risk phenomena? 
 How do the uncertainties interact with the profile of the risk? 
 
To balance these aspects, we may consider some principles: 
 
 Knowledge needs of various decision makers and stakeholders; 
 The cost-effectiveness and likelihood of risk reduction give large uncertainties; 
 Investments in decisions with short-term payoffs versus high-risk/high-gain longer-
term research. 
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Guidance for decision makers 
Governments, local, regional and national institutions and stakeholders are decisions-makers: 
they are not the scientists who investigate on climate change, adaptation and risk 
management. Most of the times, the information obtained by scientists are not 
comprehensible by decision-makers, which consequently pay no attention to. We need a lot 
of effort to translate scientific data and knowledge into information relevant to decision 
making on adaptation. 
 
The correlation between decision-makers and researchers could be summed up by the 
following outline (see Figure 5.3). As written in the previous paragraph, decision-makers and 
the research communities have the important task to fill the knowledge task with their skills. 
Decision-makers should support the scientific community whereas scientists should provide 
understandable data to decision makers to implement correct adaptation strategies. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 The decision-makers/scientists connection. Created by author 
Scientists should provide particular comprehensible information to support the capacity of 
decision makers at various levels. This knowledge should be shown using maps, guidelines 
and plans to facilitate the decision-makers. 
 
The WGII in Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Part A: global and 
sectoral aspects (IPCC, 2014) highlighted how limitations of current institutional 
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arrangements within decision-makers restrict the mainstream of climate adaptation. They 
continued declaring that expanding research on institutional arrangements in at least three 
key areas can help improve the implementation of adaptation plans in both developed and 
developing countries. These areas are the multilevel institutional coordination between 
different political and administrative levels, the institutional rigidity and the coordination 
between formal governmental and administrative agencies and social and private 
stakeholders. 
The UNEP then in Raising awareness of climate change. A handbook for government focal 
points (United Nations Environment Programme, 2006) asserted that a communication 
program for decision-makers for addressing climate change could be successful as first step 
of adaptation planning. The group developed some steps for planning and organizing a 
climate change communications strategy. These steps are: 
 
1. Set the goals 
2. Assess and strengthen the resources 
3. Identify the target audiences 
4. Approach potential partners 
5. Sharpen the messages 
6. Deliver the message to the target audiences 
7. Evaluate and monitor the results. 
 
Economic assessment 
Estimations of the impacts of climate on societies and economies are an effective way (maybe 
the only way) of catching the attention of central decision makers at international, national 
and local levels. At present, energy-focused estimates of macro-economic impacts, the 
economic value of damages and the benefits and costs of adaptation policies are limited. 
Economic assessment need to be expanded at all levels, including detailed assessment of costs 
and benefits of adaptation for site-specific investments and national/sector policies.  
 
Integrated development 
An effective adaptive response requires that energy systems are considered in the context of 
development. Adaptation and mitigation policies and actions contribute to this development. 
Energy sector mitigation and adaptation policies and actions may overlap. Energy 
diversification, demand-side management and energy efficiency are adaptation as well as 
mitigation actions. However, some other policies may cause an obstruction between 
mitigation and adaptation. For example, mitigation policies that hinge on larger share of 
renewable energy sources are very likely to affect risk management practices, influence 
technology research and development and affect energy choices. Changing climate 
parameters may increase energy demand and consumption (for example, for cooling and 
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heating) and extreme mitigation policies may not permit to meet the new energy conditions. 
If mitigation policies fail to integrate climate impacts on renewable energy source, this could 
impose severe risks of maladaptation.  
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CHAPTER 6 
THE EMERGING ADAPTATION PRACTICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the evaluation of adaptation measures and the formulation of adaptation policies to reduce 
the damage from climate change, it is essential identifying the vulnerabilities of the energy 
system to the consequences of climate change. Then, in the global climate change context, 
adaptation requires a combination of elements that include the availability of economic and 
natural resources and access to technology, information, infrastructure and institutions. 
Adaptation measures can be formulated and can be taken in three different ways. They can 
be a response to climate change alone or they can be part of a broader set of initiatives. Finally 
they can be an addition to baseline investments for the purpose of increasing resiliency. 
There are similarities between adaptation, in the climate change context, and measures taken 
by individuals, firms or governments to deal with natural climate variability and variability 
generated by global climate change. Therefore, dissociating climate change adaptation from 
energy policy can be complicated, especially when there are many no-regret actions. 
Energy systems already take account of some climate risks in their operation and planning. 
Adaptation measures can further reduce system vulnerability to environmental change, by 
building capacity, improving information for decision making and integrating climate risks 
into management and operational decisions. 
 
6.1 Adaptation measures to climate change 
This section explores the concept of adaptation and its various attributes in the context of the 
energy sector. It expands the categories of adaptation measures in the energy sector, which 
are fundamentally two: the adaptive capacity and the adaption actions. Between the 
descriptions of the two measure’s categories there will be a clarification of the characteristics 
that an adaptation action must have. 
 
6.1.1 The adaptive capacity 
We must understand that adapting to climate change need to be an ongoing process. A critical 
step in ensuring energy system’s resilience is to build adaptive capacity. Building adaptive 
capacity is crucial for effective selection and implementation of adaptation options. 
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Quoting Climate change 2014: synthesis report (IPCC, 2015, p.118) “Adaptive capacity is the 
ability of systems, institutions, humans and other organisms to adjust to potential damage, to 
take advantage of opportunities or to respond to consequences.” Specifically, adaptive capacity 
is the ability or potential of a system to respond successfully to climate variability and change. 
 
The implementation of adaptive capacity needs fundamentally two conditions: improvement 
of knowledge and increase awareness accessing to information such research, data collecting 
and monitoring. The second is to provide a supportive framework for action to develop 
governance, partnerships and institutions.  
 
Improve knowledge system 
Generating data and knowledge is a necessary condition for effective action.  
Firstly, it has been observed that there is the need to expand on the research side the 
knowledge of climate change’s impacts on energy production and use. There are some general 
needs, like: provide high-resolution models for local and small regional impact evaluation; 
research the technologies and practices to save cooling energy and reduce electrical peak load 
demand; research how the changing regional patterns of energy use impact regional energy 
supply, institutions and consumers; better understand the effect of changing climate 
conditions on renewable and fossil-based energy development. Then, there are some other 
needs related to technology area. Some of these are: better understand space cooling efficiency 
potential; improve information on the interaction between water demand and use; improve 
understanding of climate change’s impacts and local variability on wind and solar energy 
production; develop strategies and improve the technological potential of energy supply 
systems; understand the role of regional interconnections and distributed generation in 
improving the resilience of electricity supply systems; understand the impact of severe 
weather events on the sub-sea pipeline systems. 
Data collection and monitoring are also important elements of a capacity-building strategy. It 
is very often stated that “you cannot manage what you cannot measure”. Climate adaptation 
measures in the energy sector are critically dependent on reliable and timely weather and 
hydro-meteorological observations combined with forecast models and assessment tools 
specific for the energy sector. 
Finally, awareness must be increased. Risk management practices are professionally handled 
in most cases. But, for a variety of reasons, adaptation needs are unlikely to be included among 
risks and vulnerabilities.  
 
Supportive framework for action 
Successful adaptation involves collaboration across a multitude of interested partners and 
decision makers: international, national and local government, the private sector, 
nongovernmental organizations, community groups and others. 
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National and transnational governments can provide a clear policy framework to guide 
effective adaptation in the medium and long term. Local public institutions (local 
governments), civil society institutions (producer organizations) and private institutions 
(private businesses) have an important operational role because adaptation action is 
inevitably, mainly locally. At the business level, energy companies list physical risks as a 
concern. 
 
The WGII of the IPCC strengthened this thesis asserting that planning and implementation of 
adaption follow formal institutions associated with regulations, policies and standards created 
and enforced by government actors. They also added that the planning and implementation 
require the participation of informal institutions through interactions among stakeholders, 
according to cultural, social and political conditions in societies. 
Institutional dimensions may both enable and limit adaptation planning and implementation. 
Currently institutional arrangements restrict the mainstreaming of climate adaptation 
through some institutional barriers, which in general are seen as dynamic and context-
dependent across sectoral, spatial and temporal scales. This means that how a particular 
institutional barrier operates to either strengthen or limit the planning and implementation 
of adaptation, can vary both between and within countries, depending on case study locations. 
Hereinafter we illustrate five of the most commonly emphasized barriers or enablers of 
institutional change. 
 
1. The importance of multilevel institutional coordination between different political and 
administrative levels in society is increasingly cited as challenging in both developing 
and developed countries. Several studies report that climate adaptation is inhibited by 
levels and actors, without being conscious of the roles and responsibilities. There are 
few national requirements or guidelines to help local governments approach climate 
adaptation. In addition, climate change does not possess clear institutional 
characteristics as a municipal professional area. Further, the literature shows that the 
lack of clear national agendas and incentives may burden local governments 
differently, based on their different capacities.  
2. Literature shows that key actors, advocates and champions are decisive for initiating, 
mainstreaming and sustaining momentum for climate adaptation planning and 
implementation in different national settings. Key actors can be particularly important 
in the absence of strong national level policies and strategies. 
3. The horizontal interplay between actors and policies operating at similar 
administrative levels is seen as key in institutionalizing climate adaptation. Local 
governments and administrations consist of different professional silos with their own 
internal norms, values and priorities. The institutional rigidity of existing 
administrative and political sectors creates unfortunate compartmentalization. 
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Climate adaptation is seen as the isolated task of a singular sector that may hinder 
mainstreaming and horizontal coordination across sectors and departments. 
4. The need to acknowledge political dimensions in planning and implementation is 
highlighted in several studies, both in developing and developed countries. Politicians 
have not recognized climate adaptation as being politically crucial enough to elevate 
on the policy agenda. Subsequently, they identify a tendency to prioritize other 
political concerns (often more short-term tangible issues). 
5. Improved coordination between formal governmental and administrative and private 
stakeholder is highlighted in the literature. Private sector involvement is often seen as 
a way to increase the efficiency of climate adaptation. 
 
6.1.2 Diversification of adaptation actions  
The primary objective of adaptation in energy system could be interpreted as guaranteeing 
the supply of energy and balancing production and consumption throughout time and space.  
The process of adapting to climate change is complex and consists of a multitude of behavioral, 
structural and technological adjustments. In this section we differentiate adaptation actions, 
basing them on a set of attributes illustrated in Climate impacts on energy systems (Ebinger 
and World Bank, 2011). 
 
 Timing of action 
Adaptation measures may be proactive or reactive. A proactive approach in energy 
systems aims to reduce exposure to future risks. A reactive approach instead aims to 
alleviate impacts on installed technologies or supply systems. An example could be re-
inforce existing energy infrastructure with more robust control solutions that can 
better respond to extreme-weather-related service interruption. 
 Temporal scope 
Adaptation measures can be short term or long term. The distinction between short-
run and long-run adaptation has to do with the pace and flexibility of adaptation 
measures.  
 Ability to face associated uncertainties and/or to address other social 
environmental or economic benefits 
o No-regrets. Adaptation measures whose socioeconomic benefits exceed their 
costs; 
o Low-regrets. Adaptation measures for which the associated costs are relatively 
low and for which the benefits under projected future climate change may be 
relative large; 
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o Win-win. Adaptation measures that minimize social risk and/or exploit 
potential opportunities, but also have other social, environmental or economic 
benefits. 
 Location 
Adaptation measures can be localized or systemic. Impacts from climate change are 
frequently local, but there are also cases where the impacts are systemic, such as when 
climate impacts affect resource endowments.  
 Nature of agents involved in the decision making 
Adaptation measures can be private or public. Note that this distinction can also be 
referred to autonomous or “market-driven” versus planned or “policy-driven” 
adaptation. Most of the energy infrastructure in developed countries is privately 
owned. However, since these economies depend significantly on reliable supplies of 
energy, governments have to ensure that this energy infrastructure is resilient to 
climate change. 
 
6.1.3 The adaptation actions 
We could easily say that this section is the core of the entire thesis. In this section we will 
delineate the responses, measures and actions we should implement to adapt energy systems 
to climate change scenarios. 
The focal point of this portion is the description of all those adaptation measures we should 
put into practice to reduce the vulnerabilities of energy systems. As already said, the thesis is 
divided into three main parts: description of the impacts of climate change on energy systems, 
identification of the vulnerabilities of the system to climate change and finally characterization 
of adaptation measures to reduce the vulnerabilities. This is the last part and here we make 
clear the entire purpose of the thesis.  
Nonetheless, this part of the thesis does not only be formed by the actions we should 
undertake against the vulnerabilities of the supply side of the energy system described in 
Chapter 4, but it presents also other actions regarding the demand side of the energy system 
and the management of adaptation. We begin talking about the demand side of the system, 
then about the supply side and finally about the adaptation management. But first, we explain 
the subdivision – that we did – of the adaptation responses. 
 
Adaptation responses to system’s vulnerabilities can be classified as technological, behavioral 
or structural, according to Climate impacts on energy systems: key issues for energy sector 
adaptation (Ebinger and World Bank, 2011). Adaptation measures could be also divided into 
engineering and non-engineering options as stated by Climate risk and adaptation in the 
electric power sector (Asian Development Bank, 2012). The terms technological and 
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behavioral and the terms engineering and non-engineering essentially have the same 
meaning.  
  
Technological or engineering responses concern the new or adapted technologies to reduce 
the vulnerability of energy assets or strengthen their resilience to the consequences of global 
warming. Some responses include physical protection devices and better design of assets in 
the planning stage through improved design standards. In some circumstances the response 
could be relocate or retrofit extremely vulnerable existing infrastructure, decentralize 
generation systems or develop new technologies like smart grids to accommodate renewable 
sources with intermittent generation in existing grids. 
Behavioral or non-engineering responses instead refer to the reconsideration of the location 
of investments. It may be cost-effective to implement some specific actions, like put in place 
more robust operational and maintenance procedures, improve and better coordinate land 
use planning, improve energy security through policies and enforceable regulations. Others 
could be to decentralize local planning and generation, integrate climate change and disaster 
management planning, improve forecasting of demand changes and supply-demand balance 
with climate change, integrate power sector planning into other sectors’ planning and 
improve localized models used to predict storms and flood hazards. 
 
The technological and behavioral, or engineering and non-engineering adaptation measures 
in the energy sector intended to minimize negative impacts due to long-term changes in 
meteorological variables and extreme events. Substantially, these responses are those 
measures which counteract the vulnerabilities of energy system to climate change. 
The structural responses cited by Ebinger and World Bank include all actions which require 
sector wide changes, including the deployment of sector wide incentives. One example is the 
adoption of policy frameworks to facilitate the internationalization of adaptation concerns in 
energy systems, either through the set-up of economic or fiscal incentives. 
 
Table 6.1 summarizes the measures we will discuss hereinafter. The terms we will use to 
divide the various adaptation measures will be engineering and non-engineering. Most of the 
adaptation measures have been identified in four reports: Climate risk and adaptation in the 
electric power sector (Asian Development Bank, 2012), Climate impacts on energy systems: 
key issues for energy sector adaptation (Ebinger and World Bank, 2011), Use of indicators to 
improve communication on energy systems vulnerability, resilience and adaptation to climate 
change (Michaelowa et al., 2010) and Climate-proofing energy systems (Williamson et al., 
2009). Those information or adaptation practices not identified in the aforementioned 
documents will be punctually specified.
  
 
Table 6.1 Adaptation measures for energy demand and energy supply systems to climate change 
VULNERABLE ELEMENTS 
ADAPTATION MEASURES 
ENGINEERING MEASURES NON-ENGINEERING MEASURES 
D
EM
A
N
D
 
ELECTRICITY END USE 
 Increase generation (MWh) and capacity (MW) 
 Improve the energy efficiency of energy supply 
 Improve end-use efficiency for buildings, facilities and energy-intensive appliances 
and machinery 
 Reduce the need of cooling, increase cooling efficiency and decrease internal heat 
gains 
 Implement energy storage technologies as further option to shift electricity 
consumption away from peak hours 
 Require minimum energy performance standards for new commercial buildings  
 Require a wide range of electricity-using appliances with labelling and certification  
 Require and enforce energy performance standards 
 Develop legislation and access to finance for energy service companies 
 Set minimum standards for industrial electrical motors; 
 Consider subsidized programs for mass replacement of incandescent lights, and 
replacing old inefficient refrigerators with never efficient models 
 Adopt the ISO global energy management standard 
 Consider the possible use of solar photovoltaic rooftop panels to reduce summer 
building cooling loads 
SU
P
P
LY
 
HYDROPOWER 
 Design more robust dams for heavier flooding and extreme events 
 Increase dam height to accommodate increase river flow extremes 
 Construct or augment water storage reservoirs 
 Restore and better manage upstream land 
 Construct small dams in the upper basins if flow is expected to increase 
 Adapt or expand installed capacity to accommodate increase in flow regime 
 Modify canals or tunnels to better handle changes in water flows 
 Modify spillway capacities and install controllable spillway gates 
 Modify the number and type of turbines that are better suited for expected water 
flow rates and more resilient to performance reductions and turbine lifetime 
 Design regional integration through transmission connections 
 Siting plants in locations non-threatened by Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF) risks 
 Promote the development of smaller plants to respond to GLOF risk 
 Analysis to estimate likely range of projected climate variations over hydro lifetime 
 Identify cost-effective designs (new plants) and modifications (existing plants) to deal 
with specific risks identified for the site 
 Adapt and implement in plant operation to account for changes in river flow patterns 
 Relocate based inflow on changes in flow regime 
 Optimize reservoir management and improve energy output by adapting to changes 
in rainfall or river flow patterns 
 Operational complementarities with other sources (for example natural gas) 
 Develop improved hydrological forecasting techniques and adaptive management 
operating rules 
 Develop basin-wide management strategies that take into account the full range of 
downstream environmental and human water uses 
WIND POWER 
 Construct turbines that can operate at higher wind speeds and gusts 
 Design a foundation which support the turbine where there are changes in 
permafrost conditions 
 Design offshore turbines to withstand expected increases in wind-sea wave forces 
 Use taller towers to capture the stronger winds at higher altitudes 
 Consider the development and commercialization of vertical axis wind turbines 
 Consider the effects of extreme low and high temperatures in turbine  
 Implement passive and active methods to reduce icing. Passive method: design 
blades with reduced ice accumulation. Active method: blade heating 
 Integrate increased amounts of wind energy into the grid 
 Choose sites for new infrastructures, or relocate existing turbines in sites that take 
into account expected changes in wind speeds during the lifetime of the turbines, as 
well as sea level rise and changes in river flooding 
 Siting procedure to take into account expected changes in wind speeds and sea –level 
rise during the lifetime of the turbines 
 Ensure the presence of rapid emergency repair teams 
 Develop insurance schemes for long-term wind power yields and damages 
 Develop meteorology-based weather/climate forecasting 
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SU
P
P
LY
 
SOLAR POWER 
 Assure structures are strong enough to withstand higher winds 
 Specify stronger mounting structure, and cabling and components that can deal with 
high moisture content and flooding 
 Specify heat-resistant PV cells and module components designed to withstand short 
peaks of very high temperature 
 Use designs that improve passive airflow beneath photovoltaic mounting structures 
 Where snowfalls are heavy or likely to increase, assure free space so that snow can 
slide off the panel 
 Where solar energy is likely to become more diffuse, with changes in cloud cover, 
rough surfaced photovoltaic modules are more efficient 
 Where clouds are likely to pass over modules more quickly, consider micro-inverters 
for each panel to improve stability and increase power output 
 Consider distributed systems which can improve grid stability 
 For any tracking solar system for CSP, the motors and their mounting must be 
especially robust wherever stronger winds are expected 
 Avoid tracking systems where cyclones are expected to increase in strength (CSP) 
 Consider forced air and liquid coolant systems where temperature will increase (CSP) 
 Where water shortages are expected consider air cooling (CSP) 
 Use evacuated tube collectors for thermal heating because they do not suffer from 
ambient temperature problems 
 Use engineer evacuated tube collectors with higher resistance to hailstorms 
 Use evacuated tube collectors than flat plate collector when there is more diffuse 
than direct insolation 
 Develop meteorology-based weather/climate forecasting 
 Where possible, site solar photovoltaic, CSP and thermal systems where expected 
change in cloud cover are relatively low 
 Choose locations with lower probability of dust, grit and snow of practical 
 For locations where temperature increases or significant heat waves are expected, 
choose modules with more heat-resistant photovoltaic cells and module materials 
designed to withstand short peaks of very high temperature 
 For distributed solar systems, make available mobile repair teams to ensure 
functioning of systems after damage from extreme events 
BIOMASS AND BIOFUELS 
 Expand irrigation systems or improve the efficiency of existing irrigation to counteract 
drought impact if sufficient water is available from sources outside drought-hit area 
 Use unconventional sources if there is no availability of conventional water resources 
 Protect against floods by building dykes and improving drainage 
 Expansion of rainwater harvesting, water storage and conservation techniques, water 
reuse and desalination 
 Improve water harvesting and use 
 Improve soil and nutrient management 
 Increase the robustness of biomass power plants 
 Use of salt-tolerant pants (halophytes) – including varieties of sugarcane, millet and 
corn that grow in brackish water on saline land 
 Adjust crop management and rotation schemes 
 Adjust planting and harvesting dates 
 Introduce soil moisture conservation practices to improve soil fertility  
 Relocate crops in areas with lower risk of flooding and storms 
 Implement early warning systems for seasonal rainfall and temperature anomalies 
 Support emergency harvesting of biomass in case of an imminent extreme event 
 Provide crop insurance schemes 
 Control pests and diseases because climate change appears to be altering them 
 Improve ecosystem management 
 Implement efficient harvesting and early transformation of agriculture produce to 
reduce post-harvest losses and preserve crop quantity and quality 
WAVE AND TIDAL ENERGY 
 Devices need to be engineered to withstand extreme waves by being massive 
 For sea wave floating systems, consider designing for 50-year freak waves 
 For sea wave anchorage systems, design them to be oriented in the wave direction 
rather than across the wave front to reduce vulnerability to severe stresses 
 Consider protection mechanism against storm 
 Raise level of barrage basin walls for tidal systems 
 For OTEC, construct larger pipes to increase volume of water to the surface 
 Design deep-sea pipes to withstand greater stresses 
 Consider onshore or nearshore systems to produce electricity, because they are less 
vulnerable to storm damage, although the power available is less than further out at 
sea 
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THERMOELECTRIC POWER 
PLANTS 
 Develop and implement higher structural standards for new or renovated buildings 
 Build concrete-sides buildings instead of metal because they are more resistant to 
wind and corrosion 
 Raise level of structures 
 Develop flood control where floods are likely to increase. Implement embankments, 
dams, dykes, reservoirs, polders, ponds, relocated flood defense, barriers and higher 
channel capacity 
 Construct improved coastal defenses (seawalls and bulkheads) 
 Improve drainage and reroute water pipes 
 Protect fuel storage including stockpiles 
 Change the cooling system from a once-through to a closed-circuit 
 Redesign cooling facilities: recover water from condense and heat exchangers, reduce 
evaporative losses, increase secondary or wastewater usage, construct dry cooling 
towers 
 Increase volume of water treatment works and develop new water sources 
 Install additional cooling towers and modify cooling water inlets at coastal locations  
 If cooling water is unavailable with climate change, air-cooled systems could be used 
 Use dry or hybrid cooling systems with lower water requirements 
 Develop more efficient pumps and heat exchangers 
 Choose better locations (less exposed places) to build new thermal plants 
 Concentrate investment in locations where temperatures are likely to be cooler 
 Decentralize generation 
 Invest in more cooling capacity and in different cooling technologies 
 Invest in more spare production capacity and more network capacity 
 Require more stringent safety investments 
 Develop and implement higher structural standards for new or renovated buildings 
 Incorporate gradual sea level rise, increased storms events and associated tidal 
surges into design criteria 
 Formulate long-term strategies to respond to climate-related disruption 
 Restore/afforest/reforest land 
FOSSIL FUEL EXTRACTION, 
PRODUCTION AND 
REFINING 
 Build or enlarge reservoirs of water to reduce flooding risk in new and existing mining 
developments 
 Reassess flood-prone areas and elevating buildings or vulnerable components 
 Build flood-proofing buildings 
 Power plants and pumps should preferably be sited where there is an adequate 
supply of cooling water 
 Consider air cooling as an alternative to water cooling 
 Build or improve dykes, berms and spillways onshore 
 Build or enlarge reservoirs of water to reduce water shortages 
 Develop or reroute water source 
 Improve the robustness of designs, particularly offshore installation that are 
vulnerable to storms 
 Site future mines in areas that have a limited exposure to flooding or drought risk 
 Adopt techniques that slow, steer and block water flows 
 Carry out flood hazard assessments 
 Improve models used to predict storms 
TRANSMISSION, 
DISTRIBUTION AND 
TRANSFER OF ENERGY 
 Reinforce existing T&D structures and build underground distribution systems 
 Where stronger winds are expected, strengthen distribution poles with guy wires 
 Where lightning strikes may increase, include lightning protection 
 Specify more effective cooling for substations and transformers 
 Design improved flood protection measures for the infrastructure 
 Build a resilient high-capacity transmission system 
 Use smart transformers which control the flow of electricity to stabilize existing aging 
power grids 
 Develop and use smart grids 
 Design more flexibility into T&D networks, allowing increased rerouting during times 
of disruption 
 Reduce pressure on the grid through distributed, decentralized energy generation 
 Take care to maintain grid stability 
 Require higher design standards for distribution poles and towers 
 Invest resources into building a resilient, high-capacity transmission system 
 Improve system management through investing in smart grids 
 Forbid the construction of power lines near dikes and ban permanent trees next to 
existing dykes 
 Specify Information and Communication Technology (ICT) components that are 
certified as resilient to higher temperatures and humidity, and design improved 
redundancy into ICT systems, including wireless transmission better able to handle 
high temperatures 
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6.1.3.1 Demand side adaptation measures 
Before dealing with the main topic of the section – the characterization of the specific 
adaptation measures against the vulnerabilities listed in Chapter 4 – we will discuss those 
general adaptation measures associated with electricity end use demand. 
For electricity end use, the adaptation measures, necessary to cope with increased energy 
demand with temperature rises, could be engineering and non-engineering. These adaptation 
measures, as many others we will display, have to take into account different more problems 
related to climate change, as mitigation. The implementation of certain measures must be 
pondered on many aspects and not only on adaptation targets. This consideration could be 
already applied in the engineering measures. 
 
Engineering measures 
 Increase generation (MWh) and capacity (MW) to meet increased demand (business 
as usual approach); 
 Improve the energy efficiency of energy supply (generation, transmission, distribution 
system improvements); 
 Improve end-use efficiency for buildings, facilities and energy-intensive appliances 
and machinery. Reduce the need of cooling, increase cooling efficiency and decrease 
internal heat gains; 
 Implement energy storage technologies as further option to shift electricity 
consumption away from peak hours. The main storage technologies are electrical 
energy storage (capacitors) mechanical energy storage (compressed air energy), 
chemical energy storage (batteries) and thermal energy storage (sensible heat systems 
such as steam accumulators). 
 
The increase of generation and capacity should be intensely pondered. The level of 
diversification of an energy system has a profound influence on its resilience to climate 
impacts. Having alternatives means to reduce the vulnerability of the sector as a whole to a 
specific set of climate impacts. Relying on a single source of energy can make an energy system 
vulnerable in the case of an adverse impact from climate change. Broadening the range of 
power plant types and fuels in the generation mix and using a mix of centralized and 
decentralized supply patterns will help to increase the flexibility of the system and its 
resilience to more variable climatic conditions. 
 
Non-engineering measures 
There is a large range of technical and policy demand-side energy efficiency measures 
available, that can reduce energy demand and the need for investing in new capacity. Many 
may require new regulations and their enforcement to have a discernible impact; they also 
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may be more effective if power utilities are required to take a proactive role in demand-side 
management. Policy measures include the following: 
 Require minimum energy performance standards for new commercial buildings and 
a wide range of electricity-using appliances with labelling and certification programs; 
 Require and enforce energy performance standards; 
 Develop legislation and access to finance for energy service companies, with 
remuneration based on energy actually saved through an investment, reducing the 
risks of undertaking energy efficiency initiatives and measures; 
 Set minimum standards for industrial electrical motors; 
 Consider subsidized programs for mass replacement of incandescent lights with more 
efficient compact fluorescent lights or light-emitting diodes (LEDs) and replacing old 
inefficient refrigerators with never efficient models; 
 Adopt the International Organization for Standardization global energy management 
standard; 
 Consider evaporative cooling, which may be effective even in temperature climates as 
temperatures rise and summers become hotter and drier; 
 Consider the possible use of solar photovoltaic rooftop panels to reduce summer 
building cooling loads. 
Then, the report Adaptation of California's electricity sector to climate change (Vine, 2008) 
shows the portfolio of adaptation strategies for California’s electricity sector, including 
mitigation, adaptation, technological development and research, in which California’s utilities 
have always had a fundamental role. These strategies are: 
 Reducing peak demand increases 
The electricity system can respond to increase in peak demand in two primary ways: 
by reducing the magnitude of increased peak demand through energy efficiency 
programs and by increasing the resiliency of the energy production system to respond 
to these peaks.  
California’s state and local government institutions and utility companies have 
extensive programs to promote the use of high efficiency machinery, as high efficiency 
air conditioners. In addition, alternative technological solutions to air conditioners are 
being studied. For example, in some areas of California where air conditioners are 
used for only few hours in the summer, households do no need to use an air 
conditioner if the house is designed and built with energy efficiency principles in mind 
(e.g., thermal mass, use of natural cooling, well-insulated, evaporative coolers, etc.). 
Public information programs can also play a large part in mitigating the effects of 
energy demand increases. And moreover, California’s utilities have been the leaders 
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nationally in promoting energy efficiency. As reported in Vine (2008), since 1975 the 
energy savings from the utilities’ energy efficiency programs and from the state’s 
building and appliance standards have supplanted the need for a minimum of 24 new 
large-scale (500 MW) power plants. 
 Improving the generation system’s ability to respond to peak demands 
The adaptability of the energy system will be enhanced if future installations can be 
designed with built-in flexibility to accommodate the span of potential climate 
impacts. Energy sources in the future may be integrated increasingly with buildings 
(e.g., zero energy new homes). 
 Enacting mitigation policies that enhance adaptation potential 
California has been a leader in implementing energy legislation and policy that affect 
how the public and private sector will manage climate change. California is expected 
to continue this leadership role. Local governments in California have also been 
national leaders in preparing for climate change by implementing policies that 
primarily have a mitigation focus but will also provide adaptation benefits.   
 Increase research, demonstration and development (RD&D) to support energy 
sector response 
While existing technologies are available for California to use as part of its adaptation 
response, there is a need to develop a portfolio of robust energy efficiency technologies 
as part of a major RD&D effort. 
 
6.1.3.2 Supply side adaptation measures 
This part of the section describes the specific adaptation measures related to the 
vulnerabilities of the supply side of the system and the vulnerabilities correlated to the other 
parts of the energy system. The description will start from electricity generation through 
renewable and non-renewable resources: then it will get to fossil fuel extraction, production 
and refining and transmission, distribution and transfer of energy.  
 
Hydropower 
Hydropower plants have a long-term lifetime, of about 50 or 100 years: for this reason, is 
fundamental assess all the changes in climate that might affect the output and the operation 
of the generation plants. 
Carrying out an initial analysis based on recent climate change models can improve 
confidence and reduce costs that may be unnecessary for the proposed hydropower 
development. Similar studies might identify cost-effective modifications of the existing 
infrastructure (not design changes) for adapting the system to climate change. These analyses 
are useful not only for the infrastructure safety, but especially for system operation. 
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Anyway, hydropower plants are normally robust and an increase in the strength or frequency 
of extreme events like storms or cyclones only marginally increase the risk of destruction 
(Asian Development Bank, 2012, p. 22). Many more problems arise in the operation and 
management of the entire system due to changes in hydropower endowment. So both 
engineering and non-engineering measures are essential for adapting the hydropower 
generation system to climate change in general. Specifically, non-engineering measures can 
be integrated into existing or future developments and typically require the involvement of 
numerous stakeholders within the river basin. 
 
Engineering measures 
 Design more robust dams and infrastructure for heavier flooding and extreme events; 
 Increase dam height and enlarge floodgates to accommodate increase river flow 
extremes (also for glacier melting) and variability; 
 Construct or augment water storage reservoirs and change reservoir management; 
 Restore and better manage upstream land including afforestation to reduce floods, 
erosion, silting and mudslides; 
 Construct small dams in the upper basins if flow is expected to increase; 
 Adapt or expand installed capacity to accommodate increase in flow regime; 
 Modify canals or tunnels to better handle changes in water flows; 
 Modify spillway capacities and install controllable spillway gates to flush silted 
reservoirs 
 Modify the number and type of turbines that are better suited for expected water flow 
rates. Make the turbines more resilient to performance reductions and lifetime due to 
higher suspended sediment loads; 
 Regional integration through transmission connections. As reported in Amazon and 
the expansion of hydropower in Brazil: Vulnerability, impacts and possibilities for 
adaptation to global climate change (Soito and Freitas, 2011) the hydraulic operation 
of reservoir systems is always directed towards energy optimization and meet the 
multiple uses of water. From the perspective of energy optimization, the existence of 
reservoir accumulation provides important energy exchange between regions of the 
country, made through the Brazilian transmission network. Figure 6.1 shows the 
energy exchanges between regions in Brazil; 
 Siting plants in locations non-threatened by Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF) risks. 
This adaptation measure is typical of those regions in the world where there are 
hydropower plants which are glacier-dependent. In the document Development and 
climate change in Nepal: focus on water resources and hydropower (Agrawala et al., 
2003) it is recommended to move proposed hydropower plants to alternative locations 
to reduce vulnerability of GLOF risk. This risk is relevant to the construction of both 
small-scale hydropower plants and large-scale ones: the former because they are often 
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located in close proximity to potential sites, the latter because of the danger of damage 
and much faster rates of siltation than design can cope with. 
Another adaptation response to GLOF risks is to promote the development of smaller 
plants, which would spread the risk of a catastrophic flooding event and avoid damage 
to a huge plant with significant sunk cost. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Energy exchange between regions in Brazil (Soito and Freitas, 2011, p.3174) 
 
Non-engineering measures 
 Analysis to estimate likely range of projected climate variations over hydro lifetime; 
 Identify cost-effective designs (new plants) and modifications (existing plants) to deal 
with specific risks identified for the site; 
 Adapt and implement in plant operation to account for changes in river flow patterns; 
 Relocate based inflow on changes in flow regime; 
 Allow for increased flows from glacier melting if they are likely to persist over the 
technical lifetime of the system’s increased capacity; 
 Optimize reservoir management and improve energy output by adapting to changes 
in rainfall or river flow patterns; 
 Operational complementarities with other sources (for example natural gas); 
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 Develop improved hydrological forecasting techniques and adaptive management 
operating rules; 
 Develop basin-wide management strategies that take into account the full range of 
downstream environmental and human water uses. 
 
Wind power 
Wind turbines are often design to deal with a wide range of conditions. Nevertheless, where 
wind speeds are expected to increase, design can be adapted to capture more energy and 
produce more electricity. As well as trying to make infrastructures invulnerable against 
climate change, adjustments in the operation of the infrastructure help increase the resilience 
of the entire system. Thus, we can display both engineering and non-engineering adaptation 
measures of the wind sector. 
 
Engineering measures 
 Construct turbines that can operate at, and physically withstand, higher wind speeds, 
higher wind gusts and direction changes; 
 At higher latitudes, changes in permafrost conditions have a great impact in the 
designing of the foundation of wind turbines. Design a foundation which support all 
the weight, plus the system frequencies and variable forces exerted by the rotating 
turbine (Pryor and Barthelmie, 2010); 
 Design offshore turbine designs to withstand expected increases in wind-sea wave 
forces; 
 Use taller towers to capture the stronger winds at higher altitudes; 
 Consider the development and commercialization of vertical axis wind turbines, which 
are less sensitive to rapid changes in wind direction. They could potentially yield an 
order of magnitude increase in wind farm energy output per unit of land area, as 
vertical axis systems can be place close together without significant turbine wake 
effects; 
 Insure against impact of storms on long-term power yields and damage; 
 Consider the effects of extreme low and high temperatures in turbine (and blade) 
selection and operation, as these can alter physical properties of materials (e.g., rubber 
seals may become brittle at low temperatures; hydraulic systems and lubricant needs 
may change); 
 Implement passive and active methods to reduce icing. A passive method is the blade 
design to reduce ice accumulation; an active method is blade heating (Pryor and 
Barthelmie, 2010); 
 Integrate increased amounts of wind energy into the grid, as well as improve grid 
stability. 
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Non-engineering measures 
 Choose sites for new infrastructures or relocate existing turbines in sites that take into 
account expected changes in wind speeds during the lifetime of the turbines, as well 
as sea level rise and changes in river flooding; 
 Siting procedure to take into account expected changes in wind speeds during the 
lifetime of the turbines and to account for anticipated sea-level rise changes in river 
flooding; 
 Ensure the presence of rapid emergency repair teams to repair damaged turbines 
quickly; 
 Develop insurance schemes for long-term wind power yields and damage from 
storms; 
 Develop meteorology-based weather/climate forecasting. 
 
Solar power 
Solar energy can be exploited in three different types of production systems: in a solar 
photovoltaic system (PV), in a Concentrating Solar Power system (CSP) and in a thermal 
system. All three technologies are likely to be affected principally by the same climate impacts: 
temperature increases, increased cloud cover and increased extreme events. 
Following, there will be an account of the engineering and non-engineering options for the 
photovoltaic systems, the CSP systems and the thermal systems. Specific adaptation options 
for PV, CSP and thermal systems will be marked to distinguish them from the adaptation 
measures which could be applied to the three production systems. 
 
Engineering measures  
 Assure that structures are strong enough to withstand higher winds (although roof-
mounted structures cannot be more robust than the building on which they are 
located); 
 Specify stronger mounting structure; 
 Specify cabling and components that can deal with high moisture content and 
flooding; 
 Specify heat-resistant PV cells and module components designed to withstand short 
peaks of very high temperature (PV); 
 Use designs that improve passive airflow beneath photovoltaic mounting structures, 
reducing panel temperature and increasing power output (PV); 
 Select appropriate tilt panel angle to clean dust; 
 Select module surface favorable to self-cleaning; 
 In dry areas, consider panel washing system to remove dust and grit; 
 Where snowfalls are heavy or likely to increase, assure free space so that snow can 
slide off the panel; 
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 Where solar energy is likely to become more diffuse, with changes in cloud cover, 
rough surfaced photovoltaic modules are more efficient and output can be improved 
under overcast conditions by selecting an appropriate tilt angle; 
 Where clouds are likely to pass over modules more quickly, consider micro-inverters 
for each panel (in place of small numbers of large centralized inverters) to improve 
stability and increase power output (PV); 
 Consider distributed systems (rather than feeding power into a single part of the grid), 
which can improve grid stability (although mobile repair teams may be needed to 
repair damage from extreme events); 
 For any tracking solar system for CSP, the motors and their mounting must be 
especially robust wherever stronger winds and particularly more intense storms and 
gusts, are expected (CSP); 
 Avoid tracking systems where cyclones are expected to increase in strength (CSP); 
 Where temperatures are likely to increase, it may be interesting  to consider forced air 
and liquid coolant systems (Patt et al., 2010), (CSP); 
 Where water shortages are expected consider air cooling (CSP); 
 Use evacuated tube collectors for thermal heating because they do not suffer from 
ambient temperature problems as much since their inner tube is insulated by a 
vacuum (Patt et al., 2010), (Thermal); 
 Use engineer evacuated tube collectors with higher resistance to hailstorms (Patt et 
al., 2010), (Thermal); 
 Use evacuated tube collectors than flat plate collector when there is more diffuse than 
direct insolation (it occurs when there is cloudy weather). (Patt et al., 2010), 
(Thermal). 
 
Non-engineering measures 
 Develop meteorology-based weather/climate forecasting; 
 Where possible, site solar photovoltaic, CSP and thermal systems where expected 
change in cloud cover are relatively low, although this is difficult to accurately predict; 
 Choose locations with lower probability of dust, grit and snow; 
 For locations where temperature increases or significant heat waves are expected, 
choose modules with more heat-resistant photovoltaic cells and module materials 
designed to withstand short peaks of very high temperature; 
 For distributed solar systems, make available mobile repair teams to ensure 
functioning of systems after damage from extreme events. 
 
Biomass and biofuels 
Adaptation measures for bioenergy systems are similar to those of other high-intensity 
agriculture. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), for example, has carried out 
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numerous studies on improving climate change resilience in agriculture, as Climate-Smart 
Agriculture: Policies, Practices and Financing for Food Security, Adaptation and Mitigation 
(Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2010). These are equally 
applicable to bioenergy and mixed energy/food production systems. 
Following, we will differentiate, as usual, the engineering and the non-engineering measures 
to adapt the system. Moreover, we will list some FAO’s options taken from Climate risk and 
adaptation in the electric power sector (Asian Development Bank, 2012) and some other 
results from the study The vulnerability of renewable energy to climate change in Brazil (de 
Lucena et al., 2009). 
 
Engineering measures 
 Expand irrigation systems or improve the efficiency of existing irrigation to counteract 
drought impact if sufficient water is available from sources outside drought-hit area; 
 Use unconventional sources such as desalinated seawater or fossil water resources if 
there is no availability of conventional water resources; 
 Protect against floods by building dykes and improving drainage; 
 Expansion of rainwater harvesting, water storage and conservation techniques, water 
reuse and desalination; 
 Improve water harvesting and use; 
 Improve soil and nutrient management; 
 Increase the robustness of biomass power plants. 
 
Non-engineering measures 
 Use of salt-tolerant pants (halophytes) – including varieties of sugarcane, millet and 
corn that grow in brackish water on saline land – or robust crops with high biological 
heat tolerance and water stress tolerance than current crops; 
 Adjust crop management and rotation schemes; 
 Adjust planting and harvesting dates; 
 Introduce soil moisture conservation practices as the use of trees and shrubs in 
agricultural systems to improve soil fertility and moisture though increasing soil 
organic matter; 
 Relocate crops in areas with lower risk of flooding and storms; 
 Implement early warning systems for seasonal rainfall and temperature anomalies; 
 Support emergency harvesting of biomass in case of an imminent extreme event; 
 Provide crop insurance schemes. 
 
As mentioned above, now we give an account of the FAO’s and de Lucena’s results about the 
measures to improve agricultural systems. 
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FAO advocates the merging of adaptation, mitigation and even prevention actions to produce 
an overall strategy of resilient adaptation for agricultural systems. The conclusions are equally 
valid for biomass and biofuel energy. 
 Improve water harvesting and retention and water-use efficiency for increasing 
production and address increasing irregularity of rainfall patterns; 
 Control pests and diseases because climate change appears to be altering the 
distribution, incidence and intensity of animal and plants pests and diseases; 
 Improve ecosystem management and biodiversity to provide a number of ecosystem 
services which can lead to more resilient, productive and sustainable systems; 
 Use genetic resources to determine tolerance to shocks such as temperature extremes, 
drought, flooding, pests and diseases. It also regulates the length of the growing 
season or production cycle and response to inputs as fertilizer, water and feed; 
 Implement efficient harvesting and early transformation of agricultural produce to 
reduce post-harvest losses and preserve crop quantity and quality. 
 
Finally in The vulnerability of renewable energy to climate change in Brazil (de Lucena et al., 
2009) the authors studied the impacts of global climate change on the geographic distribution 
of sugarcane and oilseed crops in Brazil. For sugarcane, they found that cultivation will 
become unfeasible in some regions because of GCC, but other regions could take up the slack 
by continuing to have a temperature range favorable to sugarcane. Therefore, they suggested 
shifting geographical distribution. The same considerations could be made for the various 
species of oilseed pants grown in the country. 
 
Wave and tidal energy 
Energy from the ocean – sea wave, tidal and the extremely complex and unproven ocean 
thermal energy conversion (OTEC) – is primarily exploratory in nature and not yet 
commercialized. Energy from tidal flows can be considered commercial, but is a niche 
hydropower technology with limited practical application. However, there is considerable 
development of sea wave technologies (in UK), some of which can be considered near 
commercial and tidal energy is under construction in Asia. 
Adaptation measures to improve the resilience of sea wave, tidal and OTEC systems to climate 
change can be divided, as usual, into engineering and non-engineering options. Some actions 
are taken from the document The potential of wave energy (Hayward and Osman, 2011). 
 
Engineering measures 
 Devices need to be engineered to withstand extreme waves, by being massive or 
alternatively inexpensive enough that the financial loss is no too great; 
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 For sea wave floating systems, consider designing for 50-year freak waves (with an 
amplitude about 10 times the average wave with 100 times the wave energy); 
 For sea wave anchorage systems, design them to be oriented in the wave direction 
rather than across the wave front to reduce vulnerability to severe stresses; 
 Consider protection mechanism against storm surges such as automated lowering of 
expensive components to the sea floor; design devices which cope sufficiently 
seaworthy; disconnect or shut down devices so they are not operating during extreme 
events; 
 Raise level of barrage basin walls for tidal systems; 
 For OTEC, construct larger pipes to increase volume of water to the surface; 
 Design deep-sea pipes to withstand greater stresses. 
 
Non-engineering measures 
There is only one non-engineering measure that is relative to wave energy systems. The 
measure is to consider onshore or nearshore systems to produce electricity, because they are 
less vulnerable to storm damage, although the power available is less than further out at sea. 
 
Thermoelectric power plants (thermal cycle efficiency, cooling system, infrastructures) 
In this thesis thermoelectric power plants are all those plants which use a steam cycle 
(Rankine cycle) or a turbine (Brayton-Joule cycle) to produce electricity from an energy 
resource. Therefore, in this category we include: the normally-called thermal power plants, 
which use as fuel coal, oil and gas; nuclear power plants that use a steam cycle to produce 
energy and geothermal power plants. All these power stations present a thermal cycle, a 
cooling system and infrastructures, which are all vulnerable to climate change. Thus, they all 
should be adapted with engineering and non-engineering measures. 
Power stations and related infrastructures can operate for 50 years or more (nuclear plants 
for 100 years). Therefore, adaptation measures should consider a range of projections 
including gradual change and not only more rapid changes and additionally possible changes 
in extreme events over the period. The various measures for the various components and the 
various kinds of structures may be different but also may be very similar if not identical. In 
this way, we will distinguish the engineering from the non-engineering options, but we will 
not divide the measures for the different components and the different plants. 
 
Engineering measures 
 Develop and implement higher structural standards for new or renovated buildings; 
 Build concrete-sides buildings instead of metal because they are more resistant to 
wind and corrosion; 
 Raise level of structures; 
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 Develop flood control where floods are likely to increase. Implement embankments, 
dams, dykes, reservoirs, polders, ponds, relocated flood defense, barriers and higher 
channel capacity; 
 Construct improved coastal defenses (seawalls and bulkheads); 
 Improve drainage and reroute water pipes; 
 Protect fuel storage including stockpiles; 
 Change the cooling system from a once-through to a closed-circuit, withdrawing less 
water from source (Linnerud et al., 2011); 
 Redesign cooling facilities: recover water from condense and heat exchangers, reduce 
evaporative losses, increase secondary or wastewater usage, construct dry cooling 
towers; 
 Increase volume of water treatment works and develop new water sources;  
 Install additional cooling towers and modify cooling water inlets at coastal locations;  
 If cooling water is unavailable with climate change, air-cooled systems could be used; 
 Use dry or hybrid cooling systems with lower water requirements; 
 Develop more efficient pumps and heat exchangers. 
 
Non-engineering measures 
 Choose better locations (less exposed places) to build new thermal plants (Linnerud 
et al., 2011); 
 Concentrate investment in locations where temperatures are likely to be cooler; 
 Decentralize generation; 
 Invest in more cooling capacity and in different cooling technologies (Linnerud et al., 
2011); 
 Invest in more spare production capacity and more network capacity (Linnerud et al., 
2011); 
 Require more stringent safety investments; 
 Develop and implement higher structural standards for new or renovated buildings; 
 Incorporate gradual sea level rise, increased storms events and associated tidal surges 
into design criteria; 
 Formulate long-term strategies to respond to climate-related disruption; 
 Restore/afforest/reforest land. 
 
Fossil fuel extraction, production and refining 
For fossil fuel extraction and production we mean the extraction of coal and production of oil 
and gas. The facilities, the mines and the oil and gas fields are vulnerable to climate changes 
and they will need some engineering and non-engineering adaptation measures. 
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Engineering measures  
 Build or enlarge reservoirs of water to reduce flooding risk in new and existing mining 
developments; 
 Reassess flood-prone areas and elevating buildings or vulnerable components above 
the 100-year food contour level; 
 Build flood-proofing buildings; 
 Power plants and pumps should preferably be sited where there is an adequate supply 
of cooling water. Air cooling should be considered as an alternative to water cooling; 
 Build or improve onshore dykes, berms and spillways; 
 Build or enlarge reservoirs of water to reduce water shortages; 
 Develop or reroute water source; 
 Improve the robustness of designs, particularly offshore installation that are 
vulnerable to storms. 
 
Non-engineering measures 
 Site future mines in areas that have a limited exposure to flooding or drought risk; 
 Adopt techniques that slow, steer and block water flows; 
 Carry out flood hazard assessments; 
 Improve models used to predict storms 
 
Transmission, distribution and transfer of energy 
Transmission and distribution of energy refers essentially to the electricity grid system, 
whereas transfer of energy refers to the transportation of fuel fossils. Therefore, the 
adaptation measures regarding these two kinds of energy transfer are different. 
The measures for fuel transfer could be summarize in few words. The transfer of oil could be 
increased making more robust and structurally flexible the pipeline designs and increasing 
the reliability of the nodes of the pipelines (the valves and the pumping stations). The 
transportation of other fossil fuels by rail, boats, barges and trucks are principally vulnerable 
to floods: the adapting measure is fundamentally increase the protection against flooding. 
Improving the resiliency of electricity infrastructure, instead, involves preparing the 
transmission and distribution (T&D) systems to continue operating despite damage. 
Adaptation efforts should increase the system’s ability to return to normal operations rapidly 
if outages do occur. Specific options could always be divided into engineering and non-
engineering measures. 
 
Engineering measures 
 Reinforce existing T&D structures and build underground distribution systems; 
 Where stronger winds are expected, strengthen distribution poles with guy wires; 
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 Where lightning strikes may increase, include lightning protection (earth wires, spark 
gaps) in the distribution network; 
 Where higher temperatures may occur, specify more effective cooling for substations 
and transformers, including retrofitting measures, improved shading and choice of 
cooler locations where possible; 
 Design improved flood protection measures for the infrastructure and for the 
equipment mounted at ground level in substations; 
 Protect poles, antennae, switch boxes, aerials, overhead wires and cables from 
precipitation, wind, unstable ground conditions and changes in humidity; 
 Build a resilient high-capacity transmission system; 
 Change routes of overhead lines along roads away from trees and use covered and/or 
insulated conductors and more underground cables especially in wooden areas; 
 Use smart transformers which control the flow of electricity to stabilize existing aging 
power grids; 
 Develop and use smart grids; 
 Design more flexibility into T&D networks, allowing increased rerouting during times 
of disruption; 
 Reduce pressure on the grid through distributed, decentralized energy generation, 
although care must be taken to maintain grid stability. 
Non-engineering measures 
 Require higher design standards for distribution poles (usually wood) and towers 
(steel); 
 Specify more effective cooling for substations and transformers; 
 Invest resources into building a resilient, high-capacity transmission system; 
 Improve system management through investing in smart grids; 
 Forbid the construction of power lines near dikes and ban permanent trees next to 
existing dykes; 
 Specify Information and Communication Technology (ICT) components that are 
certified as resilient to higher temperatures and humidity. Design improved 
redundancy into ICT systems, including wireless transmission better able to handle 
high temperatures. 
  
6.1.3.3 The adaptation management 
In this part, we deal with those ways to adapt energy systems to climate change that are not 
closely related to a system vulnerability, as the demand side and supply side measures. Here 
we treat, among other things, the sharing of responsibility, the exploitation of opportunities 
and the integration of planning. 
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Sharing responsibility 
Adapting energy systems with measures to consequences of climate change prevents losses 
and risks. This is not the only way to adapt the energy system. The energy sector can share 
responsibilities for losses and risks by hedging weather events or diversifying the energy mix. 
 
In finance, a hedge is a position established in one market to attempt to offset exposure to 
price fluctuations in some opposite position in another market, with the goal of minimizing 
one’s exposure to unwanted risk. Specifically, the weather risk market makes possible to 
manage the financial impact of weather through risk transfer instruments based on a defined 
weather element, such as temperature, rain, snow, wind and so on. Weather risk management 
is a way for organizations and individuals to limit their financial exposure to disruptive 
weather events. 
Energy is a sector whose operations and profits can be significantly affected by weather: 
unexpected weather events can cause significant financial losses. The use of financial 
instruments, such as weather derivatives and insurance, provides a means to clients to protect 
themselves against adverse financial effects due to variation in weather and climate. 
 
Exploiting opportunities 
Sometimes adaptation can result in a win-win outcome: in this case, adaptation provides the 
reduction of the impact of climate change and the improvement of some other dimension of 
our well-being. 
An example of this kind of measure is the energy/water saving with demand-side 
management. These measures provide a cost-effective win-win solution for mitigation and 
adaptation concerns, in a context of rising demand and supply constraints. 
Another example is to decentralize energy. It would reduce the probability of suffering large-
scale outages when centralized power systems are compromised. It would base on locally 
available renewable energy sources situated in secure locations. 
More than a half of the world’s population now lives in cities: these cities are important and 
growing consumers of energy. Thus, urban policy and land-use planning will play an 
important role in improving the resilience of the energy system.  
 
Integrated planning 
Adaptation action may be required for an entire energy system or may involve interactions 
between different segments of the energy sector or other sectors, such as water or agriculture. 
Adaptation may involve not only different sectors, but also different agents. This happens 
because there are many indirect impacts of climate change in the energy sector, as well as 
indirect impacts on other economic sectors through impacts on energy. 
Integrated planning within energy sector and others such as water sector is therefore highly 
important. Energy and water systems are closely linked. The production/consumption of one 
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resource can not be achieved without making use of the other. In addition, climate change 
affects the supply of both resources. Therefore, policy makers cannot provide a good 
adaptation plan without integrating both sectors as parts of a single strategy. 
Integrated assessment tools can be used to evaluate different adaptation options. The main 
advantage of an integrated assessment is that it allows the examination of the adopting of a 
set of adaptation measures.  
When integrating climate risks into new investments, planners need to deal with the 
uncertainty related to climate scenarios. There is also a great deal of uncertainty about the 
evolution of technical and economic parameters used in the analysis, that further adds to the 
already high level of uncertainty of climate impact assessments. Usually uncertainty is taken 
into account by using scenarios where the model assumes perfect foresight. In reality, decision 
makers do not have full information about the technical and economic characteristics of the 
technologies and the constraints that energy system will face in the future. 
 
The Water-Energy-Food Nexus  
Water, energy and food are linked through numerous interactive pathways affected by the 
changing climate. The depth and intensity of those linkages vary enormously among 
countries, regions and production systems. Many energy sources require significant amounts 
of water and produce a large quantity of wastewater, that requires energy for treatment. Food 
production, refrigeration, transport and processing also require both energy and water. A 
major link between food and energy, as related to climate change, is the competition of 
bioenergy and food production for land and water. In addition, there is a link also trough the 
sensitivity of precipitation, temperature and crop yields to climate change.  
The consideration of the interlinkages of energy, food, water, land use and climate change has 
implications for security of supplies of energy, food and water, adaptation and mitigation 
pathways, air pollution reduction and health and economic impacts. This nexus is increasingly 
recognized as critical to effective climate-resilient-pathway decision making.   
 
Talking about biomass for energy and sustainability, to offset competition between energy 
and non-energy crops, it is important to invest in more efficient energy and fuel conversion 
techniques to improve energy availability. This means to increase crop productivity, increase 
energy production per unit of biomass consumed and assure sufficient biomass supplies to 
convert into energy. Crop management practices such as irrigation, mechanized harvesting 
and development of new species through genetic improvements are good examples of 
practices that may work in favor of land productivity. 
 
Adaptation in sectors as agriculture, forestry and industry might have impacts on the 
freshwater system: therefore, it needs to be considered while planning adaptation in the water 
sector. For example, better agriculture land management practices can reduce erosion and 
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sedimentation in river channels, while controlled flooding of agriculture land can alleviate the 
impacts of urban flooding. Increased irrigation upstream may limit water availability 
downstream. (IPCC, 2014, p.257).  
 
The integration of energy and water resource management is also important. Worldwide 
water demand is expected to grow due to increasing population and affluence. Climate change 
may have some effects on freshwater systems that can aggravate the impacts caused by other 
stresses, such population growth, land use and urbanization. Thus, current water 
management practices may not be able to deal with these impacts, particularly due to the 
traditional assumption that past hydrological experience provides a good guide to future 
conditions. 
From an energy perspective, competition for water can create stress in a dryer climate due to 
the high water demand for power generation (hydroelectricity, thermal power and nuclear 
energy). The availability of water will have regional implications and directly affect the 
planning and siting of new capacity and the development of new technologies. Water resource 
management will therefore become an increasingly important tool for solving conflicts and 
optimizing the use of natural resources for energy and other uses. 
When it comes to thermal power plants, improvements in cooling system technologies are 
crucial for water management. Recirculating cooling systems are less vulnerable to 
modifications in water availability than once-through cooling systems, as the amount of water 
required in the former is smaller than in the latter. 
 
The combination between these three sectors is very significant. Some adaptation solutions 
or strategies in one or two areas could affect positively the others. An example of this 
correlation could be the implementation of Sustainable Urban Drainage Systems (SuDS) for 
food production (Girardi et al., 2014). The main targets of this strategy is to increase food 
production in urban areas and reduce dependency on the countryside and food imports, 
improving the recovery and management of water in cities. In this way, SuDS can reduce the 
likelihood of floods in areas at risk. The application of this strategy could bring benefits for 
climate change adaptation. The most evident effect will be the reduction of water use and the 
risk of floods. But as a result, these effects could bring other benefits in other sectors like the 
energy one, which is also affected by water scarcity and flood risk. A project designed for other 
purposes, which might not be energetic and might not focus on adaptation, may also deliver 
an increased resilience to climate change as a co-benefit, even without a specifically identified 
adaptive component. 
 
Other actions to support adaptation 
As we know, the energy supply chain is vulnerable to the consequences of global warming. To 
date, decision makers have focused on maximizing energy supply to satisfy industrial and 
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societal demand for energy, while they managed the risks perceived to be of immediate 
concern and not to be faraway. All available evidence suggests that managing the risks posed 
by current and future climate is not an optional add-on but a necessary management and 
planning concern, that is likely to become increasingly important as the consequences of 
climate change materialize. 
 
Adaptation is an expansive area, which covers many sectors and socioeconomic structures. 
Adaptation to the impacts to this area is likely to involve a drawn out process that requires 
major investments and strategic decisions. The World Bank in its study Climate impacts on 
energy systems: key issues for energy sector adaptation (Ebinger and World Bank, 2011) 
stressed some other actions in the short term to help mainstream climate considerations into 
energy sector planning and management. Some options have already been underlined during 
the thesis, especially talking about climate resilience.  
 
 Undertake climate impacts needs assessment 
Location specific adaptation requirements are dependent on an analysis of impacts. 
Climate impact analysis is the first step toward the development of adaptation 
strategies. Such an assessment should quantify the impacts and hence risks, giving 
data through the energy life cycle to guide adaptation practice in any country. It should 
incorporate and critique existing practices and potentially include an assessment of 
the associated costs of impacts. 
 Develop project screening tools 
Develop templates to screen individual energy projects for climate vulnerability and 
risks. Develop supporting guidance, information and simple decision rules for climate 
risk integration into decision-making. Simulation modeling could support the 
development of pertinent “what-if” scenarios. 
 Develop adaptation standards for the energy sector 
Such standards should cover engineering matters and information requirements. 
Though the development of standards is beyond the responsibilities of the UNFCCC, 
it could be handled through the energy sector itself, through international 
organizations such as the UN, International Energy Agency (IEA), International 
Renewable Energy Association (IRENA) and universities or research institutions. 
Some examples include: standards for robust coastal infrastructure that take into 
account the anticipated strength of extreme weather events; revised zoning standards 
to minimize climate risks for future assets; construction standards in traditional 
permafrost areas to accommodate changes in soil structural characteristics. 
 Revisit planning timeframes and the use of historic data for future investments 
Traditional planning approaches that use historic data may need to be revisited and 
Chapter 6 
206 
 
C 
adjusted to reflect anticipated climate trends. There is a need to review and implement 
changes in the use of historic data as a basis for future energy investments.  
 
6.2 The adaptation agents 
To address adaptation appropriately in the energy sector it is necessary to consider the 
perspectives of both the public and private sides. As recognized by the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC): 
 
“The private sector is expected to finance most of the measures required to mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the effects of climate change.” (Ebinger and 
World Bank, 2011, p.69) 
 
Private adaptation is the adaptation initiated and implemented by individuals, households or 
private companies: it is usually in the actor’s rational self-interest. Instead, public adaptation 
is initiated and implemented by government at all levels and it is usually directed at collective 
needs. The rational self-interest of the private sector normally extends into public-private 
partnerships and other agreements. There is the danger that adaptation costs, often allocated 
with greater proportion at the beginning of the project, may be neglected by the private and 
perhaps the public sector. This danger exists unless commitment length of a project is 
sufficient to incorporate discounting of adaptation costs and unless awareness of the 
adaptation issue is adequate. 
Enabling government policies are a key aspect of ensuring effective public-private links, 
including attention to adaptation, in all countries. However, even with the best government 
policies, financial rewards will always remain the prime motivator for investments. 
 
Energy regulators help manage the many positive and negative externalities facing the energy 
sector. Regulation can additionally support competition in transport networks and encourage 
risk management. Private economic agents (producers and consumers) benefit from energy 
security and reliability but do not pay for them in the absence of regulation and/or economic 
incentives. 
Global climate change may increase the need for regulation because: 
 
 Climate impacts and risks to energy security are expected to increase in the long-term; 
 Climate change may reduce energy security and reliability; 
 Decision uncertainty will rise with the higher frequency and intensity of extreme 
events; 
 Private investors will be faced with increased uncertainty on long-term investments; 
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 Climate policies that provide incentives for renewable energy generation and trading 
may affect energy transmission and market frameworks. 
 
Energy regulators will need to improve resilience in an increasingly uncertain environment. 
Regulators will also need appropriate climate information to support policy development. 
Thus, in the context of climate change, regulatory action could include: 
 
 Economic incentives and mandatory regulation to increase investment in flexible 
energy supply facilities to ensure a quick response to supply-side losses linked to 
extreme weather events; 
 Incentives for utility-led demand-side management programs; 
 Rules for prioritizing energy cuts during extreme weather events; 
 An auction system for consumers to allow them to bid for reduction in energy 
consumption during supply shortages; 
 Research on advanced systems for electro-mechanical energy storage; 
 Emergency biofuel stocks for supply interruptions during extreme weather events and 
to manage seasonal supply variations. Emergency stocks can be regarded as a public 
good, providing external benefits to private agents; 
 Reduce information gaps. Energy system information should be regarded as a public 
good. 
In any case and for any plan, there is a basic operation which must be implemented to support 
in the best way adaptation and the support decision making. This measure is the investment 
in observations and in weather and climate services. Information gaps could be filled in 
collaboration with existing international organizations and programs, such as the WMO, the 
Global Climate Observing System and the Global Framework for Climate Services. National 
hydro-meteorological service centers may not have the resources to fulfill all energy sector 
observational requirements. Although these climate observation networks are expensive to 
develop and maintain, they can provide essential inputs into planning for climate change. 
Some options to improve the quality and flow of such information to the energy sector could 
be to improve observation networks, support data rescue and archiving, upgrade resources 
for weather and seasonal forecasts and outlooks, build capacity to prepare projections of 
climate and associated impacts and support cross-sector dialogue.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART D 
CASE STUDY: ADAPTING SPANISH AND ITALIAN 
ENERGY SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 211 
 
CHAPTER 7 
THE SPANISH AND ITALIAN ENERGY SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part D, the final one of the thesis, supports the understanding of the entire work of the 
investigation. It puts into practices the method of analysis of a generic energy system 
elaborated during the entire composition. Besides, the examined case study is one of the 
primary purposes of the research. 
 
This case study discusses the adaptation of two specific electricity systems to climate change, 
the Spanish and Italian ones. It concentrates on the three main parts that constitute the entire 
investigation, but it follows a different outline. The framework of the case study will be a little 
different. The study will start with the analysis of the Spanish and Italian energy systems and 
not with the analysis of climate changes and climate impacts in the countries. Examining the 
systems before the changes and impacts, permits us to know which climate changes and 
climate impacts we have to focus on more. The second part of the case study consequently 
treats climate change and climate change’s impacts on energy systems. Finally, the last part 
explores the adaptation measures of the energy systems. 
 
Chapter 7, the first section of the case study, will be mainly focused on the description of the 
Spanish and Italian energy systems, paying special attention on the electricity systems. This 
characterization is useful to identify the vulnerabilities of the systems related to the projected 
climate change. 
In chapter 8 we will analyze the climate variability and future climate change in Spain and 
Italy. Then, we will describe the major impacts of climate change on natural system and the 
events which could affect the energy systems of the two countries. The basis of this analysis 
will be the diagram of the path of climate change introduced in Chapter 2. We will not examine 
in depth the climate impacts and their values, but we will only discuss their tendencies and 
trends. A most specific investigation will be made in Chapter 9. 
Finally, chapter 9 will summarize the adaptation measures and further the other parts of the 
study. We will include specific summary tables to recap the vulnerabilities of the energy 
systems, the projected impacts of climate change in the two countries and the possible 
adaptation options. 
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Specifically, Chapter 7 will focus on the energy systems of the two examined countries. We 
will start with an account of the overall energy balance of each country and with some historic 
data about the production and the demand. Then, we will analyze specially the electrical 
energy balance of the countries, putting greater attention on the installed capacity and the 
electricity production. Finally, we will delineate the transmission and distribution grids.  
 
7.1 The Spanish energy system 
7.1.1 The Spanish overall energy balance 
An overall energy balance is an accounting of all energy which enters, exits and is used within 
the national territory of a given country during a reference period. The energy balance 
expresses all forms of energy in a common accounting unit (thousand ton of oil equivalent, 
ktoe), and shows the relationship between the inputs to and the outputs from the energy 
transformation industries.  
 
In table 7.1 we can see an example of energy balance for the Spanish system edited by the 
International Energy Agency (“IEA - Report Energy Balance,” n.d.). In this balance we can find 
data about the supply of energy, the resources used for electricity production and the total 
final consumption for the country. 
Table 7.1 2013 Spanish Energy Balance in thousand tonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe) on a net calorific values basis, based on 
2013 Balances of IEA  (“IEA - Report Energy Balance,” n.d.) 
2013 COAL OIL1 
NATURAL 
GAS 
NUCLEAR 
RENE 
WABLE2  
ELECTRI 
CITY 
TOTAL 
PRODUCTION 1763 375 50 14784 17523 0 34496 
IMPORTS 8076 78843 30868 0 777 850 119414 
EXPORTS -506 -21814 -5073 0 -713 -1431 -29537 
BUNKERS3 0 -10744 0 0 0 0 -10744 
STOCK CHANGES 1673 1146 311 0 -32 0 3099 
TPES4 11007 47806 26155 14784 17555 -581 116727 
CONSUMPTION IN PLANTS5 -9362 -2753 -8752 0 -521 -3485 -23375 
OTHER CONSUMPTION6 -570 -5168 -2150 -14784 -11742 24018 -11896 
TOTAL FINAL CONSUMPTION 1075 39884 15252 0 5292 19953 81457 
INDUSTRY 938 2671 9033 0 1457 6018 20118 
TRANSPORT 0 26760 120 0 898 370 28147 
CIVIL7 96 4027 4689 0 2848 12898 24557 
PRIMARY SECTOR8 41 1878 940 0 89 667 3616 
NON-ENERGY USE 0 4549 470 0 0 0 5019 
Note. (1) includes crude oil and oil products. (2) includes hydro, geothermal, solar, biofuels, waste, etc. (3) includes 
international marine and aviation bunkers. (4) means Total Primary Energy Supply. (5) considers the consumption in plants 
to generate electricity. (6) considers consumptions in other facilities and sectors, like oil refineries, coal transformation, 
liquefication plants, etc. (7) includes residential, commercial and public services consumptions. (8) includes the 
consumptions in agriculture, forestry and fishing.  
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7.1.2 The Spanish energy context 
According to the Observatorio de Energía y Sostenibilidad en España. Informe basado en 
indicadores. Edición 2014 (Catedra BP de Energía y Sostenibilidad, 2015), the Spanish energy 
sector consumed 5.93 EJ of primary energy in 2013. 
 
Tables 7.2 and 7.3, and Figure 7.1 from the report La energía en España 2013 (Secretaría de 
Estado de Energía, 2014) represent the final energy consumption and the primary energy 
consumption in ktoe in Spain in 2012 and 2013, with the relative rates of change. 
 
 
Table 7.2 Final energy consumption (ktoe) (Secretaría de Estado de Energía, 2014, p.35) 
 2012 2013 RATE OF CHANGE % 
ENERGY USE 
COAL 1233 1369 11.0 
GASES DERIVED FROM COAL 274 263 -3.8 
OIL PRODUCTS 39917 39061 -2.1 
NATURAL GAS 14632 14653 0.1 
ELECTRICITY 20661 19952 -3.4 
RENEWABLE ENERGIES 6273 5329 -15.0 
TOTAL ENERGY USE 82990 80627 -2.8 
NON-ENERGY USE 
OIL PRODUCTS 5626 4358 -22.5 
NATURAL GAS 355 451 27.0 
TOTAL FINAL USE 88971 85436 -4.0 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 2013 Spanish final energy consumption (Secretaría de Estado de Energía, 2014, p.36) 
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Table 7.3 Primary energy consumption (ktoe) (Secretaría de Estado de Energía, 2014, p.36) 
 2012 2013 RATE OF CHANGE (%) 
COAL 15510 10531 -32.1 
OIL 53978 52934 -1.9 
NATURAL GAS 28184 26077 -7.5 
NUCLEAR 16019 14785 -7.7 
HYDROPOWER 1767 3163 79.0 
WIND, SOLAR, GEOTHERMAL 6679 7665 14.8 
BIOMASS AND BIOFUELS 7558 6383 -15.5 
NON-RENEWABLE WASTE 176 160 -9.1 
ELECTRICITY IMPORT-EXPORT -963 -579 -39.9 
TOTAL 128908 12119 -6.0 
 
By dividing the final and primary energy consumption for the gross domestic product, we 
obtain the value of energy intensity (Table 7.4 from La energía en España 2013). The final and 
primary energy intensities and their relative annual changes are useful indicators to quantify 
some peculiarities. For example, the improvement of the primary intensity in 2013 was higher 
than the improvement of final intensity: this diversity must be sought in the fact that the 
structure of electricity generation changed and the general generation efficiency increased.  
 
Table 7.4 Final and primary energy intensities (Secretaría de Estado de Energía, 2014, p. 37 and p.38) 
 
FINAL EN/GDP 
toe/million €2005 
FINAL EN/GDP 
annual change (%) 
PRIMARY EN/GDP 
toe/million €2005 
PRIMARY EN/GDP 
annual change (%) 
2000 114.8 1.6 160.9 -0.2 
2001 116.0 1.1 159.1 -1.1 
2002 114.4 -1.4 159.3 0.2 
2003 117.1 2.3 159.9 0.4 
2004 117.6 0.5 162.1 1.3 
2005 116.6 -0.9 159.5 -1.6 
2006 109.2 -6.3 153.1 -4.0 
2007 108.2 -0.9 150.6 -1.7 
2008 103.4 -4.4 143.9 -4.4 
2009 99.7 -3.6 137.0 -4.8 
2010 101.2 1.5 137.1 0.1 
2011 98.3 -3.0 136.4 -0.6 
2012 95.3 -3.0 138.1 1.3 
2013 92.6 -2.8 131.3 -4.9 
Note. Energy use and non-energy use are included In the final energy intensity 
 
In Figure 7.2 we can appreciate the evolution of the consumption of primary energy by 
different sources. 
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Figure 7.2 Primary energy consumption in Spain (EJ) (Catedra BP de Energía y Sostenibilidad, 2015, p.16) 
In 2013 oil consumption accounted for 51% of total primary energy consumption, following 
by natural gas, whose share has been increasing since 2000 to reach 22% between 2008 and 
2010, reaching now 18% of the energy mix. Most of the growth of energy consumption was 
absorbed by natural gas, as part of the reduction of coal consumption, which has decreased 
its share since 2000 from 17% to 7.7%. Coal consumption rebounded between 2010 and 2012, 
then returned to the 2009 level in 2013. Nuclear energy accounted for 10% of consumption 
in 2013. 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Composition of renewable energies in primary energy in Spain in 2013 (Catedra BP de Energía y Sostenibilidad, 
2015, p.16) 
Renewable energies have experienced a sharp increase of its contribution from 5.6% in 2000 
to 12.3% in 2013. Their increase helps natural gas to reduce the historic share of coal in the 
Spanish energy mix. The share of each renewable resource in the total amount of renewable 
primary energy remains similar to previous years. The pie chart of Figure 7.3 shows the 
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composition. Biomass is the principal renewable energy source (34%), followed by wind 
(28%) and hydro (18%). Hydro is followed by solar energy (17%) and then by biofuels (3%). 
Then the contribution of renewables sources to electricity production grew from 30.5% in 
2012 to 41.1% in 2013. 
 
7.1.3 The Spanish electrical system 
7.1.3.1 Electrical energy balance 
As for the energy system as a whole, it is possible to draw up a specific energy balance for the 
electricity system. In the IEA website (“IEA - Report Electricity Balance,” n.d.) we could find 
the statistics about the Spanish electricity sector about the year 2013, reported in Table 7.5. 
 
Table 7.5 2013 Spanish Electrical Energy Balance (“IEA - Report Electricity Balance,” n.d.) 
PRODUCTION ELECTRICITY [GWh]  CONSUMPTION ELECTRICITY [GWh] 
COAL 42425  IMPORTS 9887 
OIL 13763  EXPORTS -16638 
GAS 57094  DOMESTIC SUPPLY 276815 
BIOFUELS 4697  STATISCAL DIFFERENCES 338 
WASTE 1190  EN INDUSTRY OWN USE2 20126 
NUCLEAR 56731  LOSSES 25018 
HYDRO1 41071  FINAL CONSUMPTION 232009 
GEOTHERMAL 0  INDUSTRY 69981 
SOLAR PV 8297  TRANSPORT 4302 
SOLAT THERMAL 4395  RESIDENTIAL 72513 
WIND 53903  PUBLIC SERVICES 77461 
TIDE 0  AGRICULTURE/FORESTRY 3867 
TOTAL GENERATION 283566  OTHER NON-SPECIFIED 3885 
Note. (1) includes production from pumped storage plants. (2) energy industry own use also includes own use by plant and 
electricity used for pumped storage 
Analyzing the electricity energy balance, we could observe that Spain produced more 
electricity than its requirements: the balance between electricity imports and exports was 
negative (-6751 GWh). This fact indicates that Spain on that year was an electricity exporting 
country (generally it is always true). The data provided by the IEA about electricity production 
referred to the gross electricity production: the net electricity production is deduced by the 
energy industry own use (20126 GWh). The losses in the electricity grid settled on 25018 GWh, 
so the final consumption on 232009 GWh. Commercial and public services, residential and 
industry sectors consumed almost the all amount of the produced electricity.  
 
In the annual review of the Spanish electricity system composed by Red Eléctrica de España 
(2015a), we can find a lot of useful data about the Spanish electricity system. First, there are 
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more accurate information about the supply of electricity by different sources, updated to 
2014 and reported in Table 7.6. 
 
Table 7.6 2014 Spanish Electrical Energy Balance (Red Eléctrica de España, 2015ª, p.111) 
PRODUCTION ELECTRICITY [GWh]  PRODUCTION ELECTRICITY [GWh] 
HYDROPOWER 35860  SOLAR PV 8199 
NUCLEAR 57376  CSP 4959 
COAL 46480  THERMAL RENEWABLE 4729 
OIL/GAS 6663  COGENERATION 25887 
COMBINED CYCLE 25919  NET GENERATION 266853 
CONSUMPTION IN GEN1 -7317  PUMPING -5330 
HYDRO-WIND 1  BALANCE IMP/EXP -3406 
OTHER HYDRO 7071  DEMAND2 2014 258117 
WIND 51026  DEMAND2 2013 261077 
Note. (1) Consumption corresponding to hydraulic, nuclear, coal, oil/gas and combined cycle generation. (2) Demand at 
bus-bars (see footnote) 
 
Then, in the El sistema elcectrico español 2014. Síntesis (Red Eléctrica de España, 2015b) it is 
reported the evolution of electric energy demand at bus-bars1 (Figure 7.4), with the relative 
values of the last five years (Table 7.7). 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4 The evolution of electric energy demand at bus-bars in TWh (Red Eléctrica de España, 2015b, p.6)  
                                                    
1 The bus-bars demand is the energy produced by energy plants net of pumping consumption and exports. To know the 
final energy use we should detract the transmission and distribution grids losses. 
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Table 7.7 Annual evolution of electric energy demand in the Peninsula and in the non-peninsular systems (Red Eléctrica de 
España, 2015b, p.7)  
 
PENINSULAR BALEARICS CANARIES CEUTA MELILLA 
GWh Δ (%) GWh Δ (%) GWh Δ (%) GWh Δ (%) GWh Δ (%) 
2010 260527 3.1 5840 -2.5 8895 -2.3 218 2.8 213 3.6 
2011 255597 -1.9 5743 -1.7 8870 -0.3 203 -6.7 215 0.7 
2012 2552014 -1.4 5823 1.4 8893 0.3 212 4.5 217 1.1 
2013 246368 -2.2 5674 -2.6 8624 -3.0 202 -4.8 210 -3.5 
2014 243530 -1.2 5585 -1.6 8580 -0.5 212 5.1 210 0.1 
 
7.1.3.2 The coverage of the demand 
The pie chart of Figure 7.5 shows the distribution of the installed capacity in Spain at 31 
December 2014. We can observe that there is not a dominant technology: the diversification 
in electricity generation is remarkable. This diversification can be very useful for the 
adaptation issue because it allows flexibility to meet the demand. The pie chart of Figure 7.6 
instead displays how each technology helped to cover the total energy demand in 2014. From 
this diagram we can note a peculiarity: the electricity contribution of combined cycles is very 
scarce compared to their installed capacity. Between 2006 and 2010 the installed capacity of 
combined cycles grow by 63%2 (data obtained from the REE reports of Spanish electrical 
system from 2006 to 2010). The combined cycles’ generation has decreased every year from 
2009 to 2014: the values are very far from the rates of growth that this technology had during 
their first years of life. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5 Installed capacity at 31.12.2014 in the Spanish peninsular electrical system. Hydropower includes pumping 
(2517 MW). (Red Eléctrica de España, 2015a, p.11) 
                                                    
2 This percentage is calculated from the values of the installed capacity of combined cycles which are expressed in the 
REE Reports of the Spanish electrical system from 2006 to 2010. 
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Figure 7.6 2014 annual demand coverage in the Spanish peninsular electrical system. Hydropower does not include 
pumping (Red Eléctrica de España, 2015a, p.11) 
The bar charts of Figure 7.7 report the peninsular installed capacity and peninsular net 
electricity production of the last 5 years (Red Eléctrica de España, 2015b, p.8). Observing these 
diagrams, we could catch the evolution of the Spanish electrical system, especially regarding 
the energy generation. 
 
 
Figure 7.7 Evolution of annual installed capacity and annual demand coverage (Red Eléctrica de España, 2015a, p.8). Data 
collected from (Red Eléctrica de España, 2015a, p.32 and 33) 
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7.1.3.3 Regional analysis of the electrical system 
El sistema elcectrico español 2014 (Red Eléctrica de España, 2015b) supplies some interisting 
data about  Spanish regions (comunidades autónomas). It provides the data about the electric 
generation (Table 7.8) and the installed capacity (Table 7.9) for all the regions by type of plant 
in 2014. Using these information, it is possible to draw two bar charts (Figure 7.8 and 7.9) 
which show the structure of the installed capacity region by region and the structure of the 
net production of electricity. These charts are very useful to have a rapid look at the structure 
of the system, and to simply notice where the system could be vulnerable to various climatic 
agents. 
 
Table 7.8 2014 Spanish electrical energy balance for all regions (GWh) (Red Eléctrica de España, 2015a, p. 110 and 111)  
 
ANDA 
LUCIA 
ARAGÓN 
ASTU 
RIAS 
BALEA 
RES 
C. VALEN 
CIANA 
CANA 
RIAS 
CANTA 
BRIA 
CASTILLA 
LA MAN 
CASTILLA 
Y LEÓN 
CATA 
LUÑA 
HYDROPOWER 1001 3408 1688 - 1760 0 681 531 10233 4392 
NUCLEAR - - - - 9470 - - 8320 0 23769 
COAL 10070 5002 9244 2416 - - - 1035 8645 - 
OIL/GAS - - - 1298 - 4919 - - - 0 
COMBINED CYCLES 4539 232 311 458 4136 3401 - 1087 - 5216 
GEN CONSUMPTION -713 -450 -721 -297 -500 -425 -10 -737 -751 -1228 
HYDRO-WIND - - - - - 1 - - - - 
OTHER HYDRO 287 998 281 - 38 3 205 541 742 1176 
WIND 6450 4314 1141 6 2577 391 76 8388 12274 2867 
SOLAR PV 1574 297 1 123 549 282 2 1681 839 413 
CSP 2124 - - - 94 - - 734 - 66 
REN THERMAL 1420 349 644 2 41 9 86 183 249 150 
COGEN AND OTHER 5244 2383 652 281 1801 0 832 764 1682 4806 
NET GENERATION 31996 16534 13240 4287 19966 8580 1873 22528 33912 41626 
PUMPING -481 -441 -79 - -1576 - -851 -101 -1107 -361 
IMPORT/EXPORT 6488 -6239 -2820 1298 7817 - 3272 -11247 -19883 5010 
DEMAND (BUSBARS) 38003 9854 10341 5585 26206 8580 4294 11179 12923 46275 
 CEUTA 
EXTREM
ADURA 
GALICIA LA RIOJA MADRID MELILLA MURCIA 
NAVAR 
RA 
PAÍS 
VASCO 
TOTAL 
HYDROPOWER - 3106 8382 96 114 - 77 127 264 35860 
NUCLEAR - 15817 - - - - - - - 57376 
COAL - - 10069 - - - - - - 46480 
OIL/GAS 231 - - - - 215 - - - 6663 
COMBINED CYCLES - - 546 166 - - 2419 390 3018 25919 
GEN CONSUMPTION -19 -649 -629 -5 -2 -14 -83 -22 -60 -7317 
HYDRO-WIND - - - - - - - - - 1 
OTHER HYDRO - 49 1863 64 93 - 51 537 141 7071 
WIND - - 8314 948 - - 511 2425 344 51026 
SOLAR PV - 1071 19 129 93 0 800 298 29 8199 
CSP - 1899 - - - - 41 - - 4959 
REN THERMAL - 215 575 7 270 - 54 306 169 4729 
COGEN AND OTHER - 14 2147 57 736 9 1494 710 2273 25887 
NET GENERATION 212 21522 31287 1463 1304 210 5363 4772 3177 266853 
PUMPING - -71 -262 - - - - - - -5330 
IMPORT/EXPORT - -17160 -11575 187 27541 - 3205 -23 10722 -3406 
DEMAND (BUSBARS) 212 4292 19451 1650 28845 210 8568 4748 16899 258117 
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Table 7.9 Installed capacity in Spain in 2014 divided by regions (MW) (Red Eléctrica de España, 2015b, p.113)  
 
ANDA 
LUCIA 
ARAGÓN 
ASTU 
RIAS 
BALEA 
RES 
C. VALEN 
CIANA 
CANA 
RIAS 
CANTA 
BRIA 
CASTILLA 
LA MAN 
CASTILLA 
Y LEÓN 
CATA 
LUÑA 
HYDROPOWER 10510 1310 748 - 1279 1 389 781 4253 2104 
NUCLEAR - - - - 1092 - - 1077 466 3147 
COAL 2071 1101 2474 510 - - - 541 2735 - 
OIL/GAS - - - 877 - 1729 - - - 520 
COMBINED CYCLES 6035 1898 865 934 2902 918 - 771 - 4256 
HYDRO-WIND - - - - - 12 - - - - 
OTHER HYDRO 147 257 77 - 31 0.5 72 126 256 286 
WIND 3324 1797 476 4 1193 154 35 3800 5652 1284 
SOLAR PV 869 167 1 78 349 166 2 923 495 265 
CSP 997 - - - 50 - - 349 - 23 
REN THERMAL 291 87 87 2 26 3 13 58 45 75 
COGEN AND OTHER 932 599 156 86 654 33 312 466 642 1335 
TOTAL 15719 7217 4885 1490 7577 3016 822 8884 14543 13293 
 CEUTA 
EXTREM
ADURA 
GALICIA LA RIOJA MADRID MELILLA MURCIA 
NAVAR 
RA 
PAÍS 
VASCO 
TOTAL 
HYDROPOWER - 2292 3269 30 66 - 24 77 120 17792 
NUCLEAR - 2094 - - - - - - - 7866 
COAL - - 2049 - - - - - - 11482 
OIL/GAS 99 - - - - 85 - - - 3309 
COMBINED CYCLES - - 1268 799 - - 3318 1236 1998 27199 
HYDRO-WIND - - - - - - - - - 12 
OTHER HYDRO - 20 522 27 44 - 14 171 55 2106 
WIND - - 3362 448 - - 263 1016 194 23002 
SOLAR PV - 561 16 86 67 0.1 440 161 26 4672 
CSP - 849 - - - - 31 - - 2300 
REN THERMAL - 37 95 4 43 - 21 47 83 1018 
COGEN AND OTHER - 19 574 46 328 2 338 175 500 7196 
TOTAL 99 5873 11154 1440 547 87 4450 2884 2975 107954 
 
 
Figure 7.8 Structure of the 2014 Spanish net electricity generation by type of plant  (Red Eléctrica de España, 2015b, p.3) 
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Figure 7.9 Structure of the 2014 Spanish installed capacity by type of plant (Red Eléctrica de España, 2015b, p.3) 
Figure 7.11 (in the next page) then shows the location of the main thermal power plants of the 
entire Spain (peninsula, Canary Islands, Balearic Islands, Ceuta and Melilla) at December 
2014. The map also shows the installed capacity of wind generators, photovoltaic panels and 
thermal panels for each region. 
 
7.1.3.4 The transmission network  
Table 7.10 displays the length of the Spanish transmission grid and the installed transformer 
capacity in the grid at 31 December 2014 (Red Eléctrica de España, 2015a). Figure 7.10 instead 
exposes the evolution of the peninsular transmission grid (400kV and <200kV) from 1975 to 
the present. 
 
Figure 7.10 Evolution of the Peninsular Spanish transmission network (Red Eléctrica de España, 2015a, p.76) 
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Table 7.10 Spanish transmission network at 31 December 2014 (Red Eléctrica de España, 2015a, p.21) 
 
400 kV ≤ 220 kV 
TOTAL 
PENINSULA PENINSULA BALEARICS CANARIES 
Total cables (km) 21094 18811 1545 1289 42739 
Overhead cables (km) 20977 18096 1089 1023 41185 
Submarine cables (km) 29 236 306 30 601 
Underground cables (km) 88 479 150 237 954 
 
 
 
Figure 7.11 Main thermal power plants in Spain at December 2014 and renewable installed capacity per region (Red 
Eléctrica de España, 2015a, p.115)
  
 
 
Figure 7.12 Sankey’s diagram of the Spanish energy system (Catedra BP de Energía y Sostenibilidad, 2015, p.20) 
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7.1.3.5 Sankey’s diagram 
Finally, as a summary of the Spanish energy system, the Sankey diagram (Figure 7.12) realized 
by Catedra BP de Energía y Sostenibilidad in the Observatorio de Energía y Sostenibilidad en 
España. Informe basado en indicadores. Edición 2014 (2015), manifests the evolution of each 
primary energy flow to its conversion into final energy. The thickness of each flow is 
proportional to its magnitude, measured in EJ. 
 
7.2 The Italian energy system 
7.2.1 The Italian overall energy balance 
What is, what are its purposes and what is included and not included in an overall energy 
balance was already explained in Paragraph 7.1.1. Here we limit ourselves to report in Table 
7.11 the 2013 overall energy balance realized by the Italian Department of Economic 
Development (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 2014). The complete summary balance of 
the Italian Department of Economic Development includes the data about the year under 
review and the previous year, to make a comparison and calculate the percentage change of 
the various values. 
 
Table 7.11 2013 Italian Energy Balance in billion tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe), based on 2013 Balances of Ministero 
dello Sviluppo Economico (2014) 
2013 SOLID FUELS 
NATURAL 
GAS 
OIL 
RENE 
WABLE1  
ELECTRICITY TOTAL 
PRODUCTION 0.357 6.336 5.502 31.626 - 43.821 
IMPORTS 13.485 50.756 77.815 2.304 9.754 154.114 
EXPORTS 0.173 0.187 24.060 0.052 0.484 24.956 
STOCK CHANGES -0.494 -0.488 0.914 0.053 - -0.015 
TPES2 14.163 57.393 58.343 33.825 9.270 172.994 
LOSSES IN ENERGY SECTOR -0.142 -1.533 -3.822 -0.013 -40.897 -46.407 
TRANSFORMATION IN ELECTR -11.090 -16.876 -2.476 -25.901 56.343 0 
TOTAL FINAL CONSUMPTION3 2.931 38.984 52.045 7.911 24.716 126.587 
INDUSTRY 2.856 12.130 3.788 0.034 9.367 28.175 
TRANSPORT - 0.812 34.897 1.188 0.926 37.823 
CIVIL 0.003 25.463 3.427 6.682 13.935 49.510 
AGRICULTURE - 0.129 2.112 0.007 0.488 2.736 
NON-ENERGY USE 0.072 0.450 5.390 0.000 - 5.912 
BUNKERS - - 2.431 - - 2.431 
Note. (1): net energy (pumping not considered). (2): Total Primary Energy Supply=production + imports – exports - stock 
changes. (3): Total final consumption=TPES + losses in energy sector + transformation in electricity 
 
7.2.2 The Italian energy context 
In the report La situazione energetica nazionale nel 2014 (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 
2015) it is communicated the consumption of the entire Italian energy sector, which was 
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166.430 Mtoe (= 6.97 EJ: provisional data). In relation to the population, the website 
“Consumi di energia primaria” (n.d.), created by OPEF (Osservatorio sulla Politica Energetica 
Fondazione Einaudi), reported the fact that Italy has a quite low energy final consumption per 
capita. It was about 2.4 toe per capita in 2010, less than the average European value of 2.7 toe. 
 
Tables 7.12 and 7.13 and Figure 7.14 describe the final energy and the primary energy 
consumption of Italy in 2013 and 2014 in Mtoe. These information were extracted from 
Bilancio Energetico Nazionale 2013 (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 2014) and from La 
situazione energetica nazionale nel 2014 (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 2015). 
 
Table 7.12 Final energy consumption (Mtoe) (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 2014). Provisional data from (Ministero 
dello Sviluppo Economico, 2015, p.21)  
 2013 2014 RATE OF CHANGE % 
SOLID FUELS 2.931 2.892 -3.37 
NATURAL GAS 38.984 34.513 -11.46 
OIL 52.045 51.506 -1.04 
RENEWABLE ENERGIES 7.911 7.870 -0.5 
ELECTRICITY 24.716 24.023 -2.8 
TOTAL 126.587 12.804 -4.56 
 
Table 7.13 Primary energy consumption (Mtoe) (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 2014). Provisional data from 
(Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 2015, p.12)   
 2013 2014 RATE OF CHANGE % 
SOLID FUELS 14.163 13.466 -4.92 
NATURAL GAS 57.393 50.704 -11.65 
OIL 58.343 57.303 -1.78 
RENEWABLE ENERGIES 33.825 35.342 +4.48 
ELECTRICITY 9.270 9.615 +3.72 
TOTAL 172.994 166.430 -3.79 
 
 
Figure 7.13 2014 Italian final energy consumption (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 2015, p.21) 
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These data are useful to obtain the values of final and primary energy intensities. The 
economic recession, the re-composition of sectoral production and the higher energy 
efficiency decreased the 2014 energy needs of Italy by 3.8% (Ministero dello Sviluppo 
Economico, 2015). Whereas, the gross domestic product decreased only by 0.4%. These two 
values established a high reduction of energy intensity (-3.4% compared to 2013 energy 
intensity). The primary energy intensity’s estimates of previous years were almost the same, 
as we can observe in Table 7.14, because energy demand and gross domestic product 
decreased in the same way. The analysis of the energy intensity trend is useful to note if there 
have been changes in the energy sector. 
Table 7.14 Italy’s primary energy intensity (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 2015, p.13) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 20141 
GDP (M€) 1605694 1615117 1570372 1543702 1537125 
ENERGY DEMAND (Mtoe) 187.79 184.20 176.31 172.99 166.43 
ENERGY INTENSITY (toe/M€) 117.0 114.0 112.3 112.1 108.3 
Note. (1): provisional data for 2014. 
 
The bar chart of Figure 7.15 shows the evolution of the primary energy consumption by 
different sources in Italy. The necessary data for the development of this graph are gathered 
from the Italian overall energy balances from 2000 to 2013 and the document La situazione 
energetica nazionale nel 2014 (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 7.14 Primary energy consumption in Italy (Mtoe) from 2000 to 2014 
 
The 2014 Italian demand of energy was characterized, compared to 2013, by a stability of oil 
(from 33.7% to 34.4%) and solid fuels (from 8.2% to 8.1%) and by a reduction of gas 
0
50
100
150
200
250
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION, MTOE
Solid fuels Natural gas Oil Renewable energies Electricity
Chapter 7 
228 
 
D 
consumption (from 33.2% to 30.5%). The share of renewable resources continues to increase, 
passing from 19.5% to 21.2%. The pie charts of Figures 7.15 and 7.16 show the percentage of 
each renewable source in primary energy in 2012 and 2013 (data collected from Rapporto 
statistico. Energia da fonti rinnovabili. Anno 2013 (Gestore dei Servizi Energetici, 2015, p.21). 
 
 
Figure 7.15 2012 Share of renewable resources in Italian primary energy (Gestore dei Servizi Energetici, 2015, p.19). EE 
means “electric energy”, whereas TH means “thermal energy” 
 
 
Figure 7.16 2013 Share of renewable resources in Italian primary energy (Gestore dei Servizi Energetici, 2015, p.19). EE 
means “electric energy”, whereas TH means “thermal energy” 
7.2.3 The Italian electrical system 
7.2.3.1 Electrical energy balance 
In the report Dati statistici sull'energia elettrica in Italia – 2014 (Terna, 2015a) we can find a 
comprehensive electricity energy balance for the years 2013 and 2014, with, for each element, 
the relative percentage change (Table 7.15). 
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Table 7.15 2013 and 2014 Italian electrical energy balances (Terna, 2015a, p.12)  
GWh 2013 2014 2014/2013 
GROSS GENERATION 289803.2 279828.5 -3.4% 
HYDROPOWER 54671.6 60256.3 10.2% 
THERMAL POWER 192986.8 176171.2 -8.7% 
GEOTHERMAL 5659.2 5916.3 4.5% 
WIND POWER 14897.0 15178.3 1.9% 
PHOTOVOLTAIC 21588.6 22306.4 3.3% 
CONSUMPTION OF AUXILIARIES 10970.5 10980.7 -2.6% 
NET GENERATION 278832.6 269147.9 -3.5% 
HYDROPOWER 54068.4 59574.9 10.2% 
THERMAL POWER 183403.9 167080.2 -8.9% 
GEOTHERMAL 5320.1 5566.6 4.6% 
WIND POWER 14811.6 15088.6 1.9% 
PHOTOVOLTAIC 21228.7 21837.5 2.9% 
PUMPING 2495.2 2329.1 -6.7% 
DISPATCHED ENERGY 276337.4 266818.8 -3.4% 
IMPORTS 44337.9 46747.5 5.4% 
EXPORTS 2200.2 3031.1 37.8% 
DEMAND 318475.1 310535.2 -2.5% 
GRID LOSSES 21187.5 19451.7 -8.2% 
FINAL CONSUMPTION 297287.6 291083.5 -2.1% 
AGRICULTURE 5677.1 5372.1 -5.4% 
INDUSTRY 124870.8 122505.0 -1.9% 
TERTIARY 99756.5 98951.4 -0.8% 
DOMESTIC 66983.2 64255.0 -4.1% 
 
In the document Dati statistici sull'energia elettrica in Italia - 2014. Nota di sintesi (Terna, 
2015b) there is an account of the principle changes between 2013 and 2014. 
First of all, the electricity demand decreased by 2.5% compared to 2013. The overall electricity 
demand in 2014 was 310.5 TWh. Final consumption fell by 2.1%: industry consumption 
diminished by 1.9%, domestic consumption by 4.1%, tertiary (commercial and public 
services) by 0.8% and agriculture by 5.4%. The share of renewable sources to electricity 
requirement increased in these years: photovoltaic production grew by 3.3%, hydropower 
generation by 10.9% and biomass by 9.6%. However, the record in power generation still 
remains to natural gas with a share of 54.5% in electric generation. 
 
Table 50 of Dati statistici sull'energia elettrica in Italia – 2014 (Terna, 2015a, p.155) provides 
the country electricity demand for each year from 1883 to 2014. It also provides the balance 
between electricity imports and exports. With these data it is possible to design the graph in 
Figure 7.17 about the Italian evolution of electricity demand. 
 
7.2.3.2 The coverage of the demand 
The installed capacity for electricity production in Italy at 31 December 2014 amounted to 
121.762 GW, with a reduction of 2.753 GW (-2.2%) than 2013 capacity. This decrease was the 
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result of the disposal of some thermoelectric power plants. Vice versa, the photovoltaic sector 
increased by 2.3% than 2013, with 424 MW more. 
The reduction of thermoelectric capacity has not to suggest that other types of electricity 
plants are taking over the thermal generation. Thermoelectric generation settled at 62.1%. 
Among the fuels used for thermal generation, the primacy still remained to natural gas with 
91.1 TWh (the 54.4% of overall thermoelectric production). Gas is followed by coal, with a 
share of 22.8% (39.4 TWh, with a decrease of 3.4% compared to 2013). 
These data were collected from the document Dati statistici sull'energia elettrica in Italia – 
2014 (Terna, 2015a) and Dati statistici sull'energia elettrica in Italia - 2014. Nota di sintesi 
(Terna, 2015b). These statistics, with other deduced from previous Terna’s reports, were used 
to elaborate the diagrams in Figure 7.18 and 7.19, which portray the state of the electrical 
capacity and production in Italy in 2014, and their evolution in recent years. 
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Figure 7.17 Evolution of electric Italian energy demand in GWh (Terna, 2015a, p.157) 
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Figure 7.18 Installed capacity at 31.12.2014 in the Spanish electrical system: data in MW from (Terna, 2015a, p.31). 2014 
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Figure 7.19 Evaluation of annual installed capacity and annual demand coverage 
 
7.2.3.3 Regional analysis of the electrical system 
The Terna’s report Dati statistici sull'energia elettrica in Italia – 2014 (2015a) supplies not 
only information at national level but also at regional one. Table 27 at page 92, table 30 at 
page 98 and table 35 at page 113 of the Terna’s report were used to elaborate Table 7.16, which 
resumes the data about the electricity production for all Italian regions by type of plant for 
2014. Figure 7.20 describes in graphic form the statistics in Table 7.16. 
 
Table 7.16 Italian electricity generation for all regions (GWh) (Terna, 2015a) 
GWh HYDROPOWER 
THERMAL 
PLANTS 
WIND POWER 
PHOTOVOLTAIC 
PANELSS 
BIOMASS 
PIEMONTE 8778.0 12784.0 26.1 1646.5 1731.3 
VALLE D’AOSTA 3431.0 11.9 3.7 22.7 11.9 
LOMBARDIA 13977.0 26295.2 0.0 2046.1 4249.3 
TRENTINO A.A. 13287.9 1400.7 1.2 407.1 340.4 
VENETO 5559.1 11205.2 17.9 1784.1 1898.7 
FRIULI V.G. 2540.6 6123.3 0.0 509.3 706.1 
LIGURIA 350.4 6888.6 117.3 96.1 125.5 
EMILIA ROMAGNA 1301.7 13797.9 27.2 2093.1 2759.0 
TOSCANA 1060.7 13180.4 220.6 847.8 604.0 
UMBRIA 1824.4 814.1 3.0 526.6 223.5 
MARCHE 608.4 495.2 1.8 124.9 186.5 
LAZIO 1316.9 17280.1 87.1 1572.2 704.3 
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ABRUZZO 2142.3 1282.3 335.8 861.4 161.1 
MOLISE 240.7 1264.4 681.1 217.9 164.8 
CAMPANIA 1066.6 4835.3 2046.8 855.8 1026.4 
PUGLIA 4.4 30188.3 4297.5 3612.2 1650.4 
BASILICATA 314.5 531.3 825.6 481.3 214.0 
CALABRIA 1521.0 5592.8 1906.3 636.3 1024.3 
SICILIA 471.1 17249.2 2922.4 1893.3 259.2 
SARDEGNA 459.7 10867.2 1657.0 952.5 689.6 
TOTAL 60256.3 182087.5 15178.3 22306.4 18732.4 
 
 
Figure 7.20 Structure of the 2014 Italian gross electricity generation by type of plant 
 
Finally, Figure 7.21 shows the place of the principal hydro, gas, oil, wind, solar and biomass 
power plants on the territory. 
 
7.2.3.4 Imports and exports 
The amount of electricity exchanged with foreign countries is reported in detailed in the 
document Dati statistici sull'energia elettrica in Italia – 2014 (Terna, 2015a, p.20). In Table 
7.17 we display the imports and exports with other countries for the years 2013 and 2014. 
 
Table 7.17 Imports to and exports from the Italian electric system. Data collected from (Terna, 2015a, p.20) 
GWh FRANCE 
SWITZER 
LAND 
AUSTRIA SLOVENIA GREECE TOTAL 
2013 IMPORTS 12536.0 23341.5 1506.2 5316.5 1637.7 44337.9 
2013 EXPORTS 857.5 1094.7 20.1 132.5 95.4 2200.2 
2014 IMPORTS 15520.2 24414.2 1535.2 5170.0 107.9 46747.5 
2014 EXPORTS 732.7 819.7 27.5 117.1 1334.1 3031.1 
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In 2014 national electricity generation met the 85.9% of the electricity demand, for a total 
amount of 266.8 TWh, with a reduction of 3.4% related to 2013. The remaining share of 
electricity demand (14.1%) was covered by net electricity imports, for an amount of 43.7 TWh, 
3.7% more than the previous year. 
 
Figure 7.22 illustrates the exchanges of electricity energy with neighboring countries from 
1963 to 2014 (Terna, 2015a, p.21). 
 
 
 
Figure 7.21 Main power plants in Italy (“Enipedia Maps Sandbox,” n.d.). The symbols in the legend in order means: 
biomass, biogas, coal natural gas, geothermal, oil, hydro, nuclear, solar, waste, wave, wind. 
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7.2.3.5 The transmission 
network  
The Italian national 
transmission network 
(RTN: Rete di 
Trasmissione Nazionale) 
is composed principally by 
cables at 380 kV and 220 
kV. Actually, RTN is 
constituted by cables with 
operating voltage greater 
or equal to 120 kV. Three 
direct current lines 
(HVDC) also belong to the 
national transmission 
grid. These are the HVDC 
500 kV SA.PE.I between 
Lazio and Sardinia, the 
HVDC 400 kV line 
between Italy and Greece 
and the HVDC 200 kV 
SA.CO.I between Tuscany, 
Corsica and Sardinia. In 
Table 7.18 we resume the 
length of the network, 
while Figures 7.23 and 7.24 illustrate the Italian 380 kV grid at 31 December 2014 and the 
Italian 220 kV grid at 31 December 2014.  
 
Table 7.18 Italian transmission network at 31 December 2014 (Terna, 2015a, p.25) 
 380 kV 220 kV TOTAL 
Total cables (km) 10995.9 10935.2 21931.1 
500 kV DC SA.PE.I. (km) 949.2 
400 kV DC Italy-Greece (km) 254.9 
200 kV DC SA.CO.I. (km) 861.6 
 
7.2.3.6 Sankey’s diagram 
Finally, we can summarize the Italian energy system showing a Sankey diagram (Figure 7.25) 
realized by the IEA ( IEA Sankey Diagram - Italy Balance 2012, IEA, n.d.). 
 
Figure 7.22 Physical exchanges of electricity energy with neighboring countries from 
1963 to 2014 (Terna, 2015a, p.21) 
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Figure 7.23 The 380 kV Italian transmission grid at 31 December 2014 (Terna, 2015a, p.26)  
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Figure 7.24 The 220 kV Italian transmission grid at 31 December 2014 (Terna, 2015a, p.27) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.25 Sankey’s diagram of the Italian energy system (IEA, n.d.) 
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CHAPTER 8 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND CLIMATE CHANGE’S 
IMPACTS ON SPAIN AND ITALY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter of the case study focuses on climate change and climate change impacts on the 
Spanish and Italian energy system. This research is carried out using as guideline the structure 
of climate change impacts on energy systems developed in Chapter 2, represented by the 
figure of the paths of climate impacts (Figure 8.1).  
 
Figure 8.1 Structure of climate change’s impacts on energy systems. Created by author 
Differently from the general method, in this section we will not rest extensively on the 
magnitude of the various changes and impacts, but we will only assess their major trends.  
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As primary reference for this analysis, we use the information of the website of the Centre for 
Climate Adaptation (“Home - Climate Adaptation,” n.d.). The aim of this website is to 
summarize the impacts of climate change in Europe countries, collecting information from a 
large number of publications, including the IPCC Assessment Reports, the EU Reports of the 
European Environmental Agency and Joint Research Centre, National studies and scientific 
journals. Throughout the assessment we will refer also to other references which will be 
punctually reported. For further and more detailed information and data we refer to the 
summary tables in Chapter 9. 
 
The assessment will be divided in two parts, as in the global approach: the first one concerns 
natural and physical system, while the second one regards the impacts of climate change on 
the energy systems. 
 
8.1 Climate change in Spain and Italy 
The evaluation of physical impacts of climate change on the Spanish and Italian natural 
systems is the starting point of the assessment. Following the general pattern, we will give an 
account of the principal climatic consequences of climate change, which are the changes of 
temperatures, precipitation patterns and extreme events. 
 
8.1.1 Temperature changes 
As the general trend, the Global Mean Surface Temperature (GMST) is expected to rise in the 
next decades. The magnitude of the projections will depend on the model used to obtain the 
data, the considered scenario, the season in concern, the region and the time horizon.  
The study EURO-CORDEX: new high-resolution climate change projections for European 
impact research (Jacob et al., 2014) carried out climate change projections for various areas 
of the European continent. Three different areas could be found in the two countries we 
consider: the southern, the alpine and the Atlantic (the southern in Spain and Italy, the alpine 
only in Italy and the Atlantic only in Spain). They estimated a rise of the GMST at the end of 
the 21st century between 2 and 4°C in general, with higher values in the alpine region and 
lower in the Atlantic.  
In the Climate Adaptation website, it is reported that in Spain the temperature in the coast 
would rise by some 2°C less than the hinterland, reaching also +7°C than the temperature at 
the end of 20th century. Italy and also Spain will manifest different temperature rises 
throughout the seasons, with peaks during summers, and throughout the country, because 
the rise of temperature in coastal regions will keep on +2°C thanks to the sea. 
Also the study 21st century climate change in the European Alps—A review (Gobiet et al., 2014) 
strengthens the estimation of different GMST rises trough the seasons, with higher 
projections during summers. 
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The ocean and sea temperatures will be modified in the future. The Mediterranean Sea is 
warming in both shallow and deep waters: this warming is part of global climate trends and 
it is not a regional phenomenon. According to The future of the Mediterranean: From impacts 
of climate change to adaptation issues (IDDRI, 2009) the Mediterranean sea surface 
temperature will rise of about 2°C at the end of the 21st century. The Adriatic Sea will suffer a 
higher increase, reaching +2.5°C. 
 
Even the water of inland basins will rise its temperature. It is estimated that mean summer 
water temperature will increase up to 2.3°C at the end of the century comparing with the 
period 1971-2000. 
 
8.1.2 Precipitation changes 
Precipitation patterns will change in the future due to climate change. Nevertheless, 
projections do no always agree because they depend on several parameters, like temperature, 
water vapor (moisture) and energy, but also GHG concentrations and interactions between 
aerosols and clouds, which make difficult a unanimous interpretation. Having a look through 
the world, models indicate that precipitation generally increases at high latitudes, in both 
winter and summer seasons, and in areas of regional tropical precipitation maxima, with 
general decreases in the subtropics. Spain and Italy are among the northern latitudes and the 
tropics: this position creates some problems and disagreements over the projections. 
For Jacob et al. (2014), that divided Europe in five sub-regions for realizing their simulations, 
Spain will see an increase of precipitation in the Atlantic region, as Italy in the Alps, whereas 
the rest of the two countries will suffer a decrease of precipitation in a range between -0% to 
-27%. 
Gobiet et al. (2014) focused on Italy and especially on the Alpine region, predicting a low 
decrease in summer and a high increase in winter precipitation in the near term, while a high 
decrease in summer and a low increase in winter in the long term. 
In the Climate Adaptation website there is a more specific dissertation. Spain will suffer a 
decrease in precipitation all over the territory, which will accelerate at the end of the century. 
The south (Andalusia) will experience a high reduction of precipitation as the Pyrenees region. 
Italy will be subjected to an increase of precipitation in winter and a decrease in summer, and 
an increase in the north and a decrease in the south. 
 
8.1.3 Extreme events changes 
To make the analysis of extreme events easier, we could divide the extreme events into four 
categories: extreme events of temperature, precipitation, atmospheric circulation and sea 
level. 
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Temperature’s extreme events normally are evaluated considering future changes in warm 
and cold days. According to the study EURO-CORDEX (Jacob et al., 2014) in Spain there could 
be an increase of more than 100 warm days at the end of the century, as in Italy. The Atlantic 
and Alpine regions will be less affected than the rest of the countries. However, they imagined 
that one summer in two could be hot as the 2003 summer in 2100, and six winter in 10 as hot 
as record 2006-2007. 
Other reports recapped in the Climate Adaptation website (“Home - Climate Adaptation,” n.d.) 
studied specific region of the two countries. The Basque country in Spain will experience a      
-50% of frost days by 2100. Cold wave episodes (6 consecutive cold days) are expected to 
disappear beyond 2020. The north of Italy then will experience an increase of 3-5 weeks of 
heat wave days by 2060, whereas the coasts only two weeks. 
Differently from temperature, there are non-consensus on extreme precipitation changes. In 
accordance with Climate: Observations, projections and impacts – Spain (Met Office, 2011a), 
for example, there remains uncertainty over extreme short-term precipitation in Spain. 
Nevertheless, Jacob et al. (2014) projected an high increase of extreme precipitation in the 
Atlantic and Alpine region, whereas the intensification in the rest of the countries will stop at 
about +50%. 
Extreme atmospheric phenomena, like storms, are expected to relative change by the end of 
the 21st century relative to recent climate conditions. Mainland Spain, as Italy, will be not 
impacted by tropical cyclones as reported in ENSEMBLES: Climate Change and its Impacts: 
Summary of research and results from the ENSEMBLES project (van der Linden and Mitchell, 
2009). 
Extreme sea level rise impacts could be large in the absence of adaptation. It is considered 
that sea level rise has led to a change in extreme coastal water levels. On the basis of studies 
and observed trends, it is very likely that mean sea level will continue to rise in future. By the 
way, recent regional studies provide evidence for projected future declines in extreme wave 
height in the Mediterranean Sea.  
 
8.2 Climate change’s impacts on Spanish and Italian energy systems 
As previously stated during the analysis of a generic system, we consider the energy sector 
divided into three main aspects: energy resource, energy demand and energy supply. Water 
is considered as an energy resource but it is examined apart from this group because it has a 
great importance in the whole energy sector.  
The characterization of climate change impacts on the two specific energy systems will be 
done in a backward way, representing the information and trends in an effect-and-cause 
approach. 
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8.2.1 Impacts on water 
Looking at Figure 8.1 which represents the paths of climate impacts on an energy system, we 
could note that climate change, temperature changes and precipitation changes are the origins 
of the changes of the water system. 
The following description will concentrate on the alterations of water resource by these 
causes: we will refer to the cryosphere, evaporation, sea level, extreme events like floods and 
droughts, streamflows and salinity.  
 
8.2.1.1 Climate change’s impacts on water 
Climate change substantially modifies some aspects of the water system, which are the 
cryosphere and the evaporation. 
 
The cryosphere is composed by various elements set by different forms of water. Snow ice, 
snow cover and permafrost constitute the cryosphere: therefore, these elements are those 
affected by climate change in general 
For its latitude, Spain does not present large areas where ice or snow could last for long time. 
The only one is the Pyrenees region. Nevertheless, according to 21st century climate change 
in the European Alps—A review (Gobiet et al., 2014), the Pyrenees have lost almost 90% of 
their glacier ice and the rest may disappear within a few decades. The information in the 
Climate Adaptation website agree with this sentence. It says further that snow cover on 
mountains will probably be less in the future because, in most temperate mountain regions, 
the snow temperature is close to the melting point and is very sensitive to changes in 
temperature. 
Italy contains a large mountain chain, the Alps, where ice and snow could last much more 
than in Spain. Gobiet et al. (2014) estimated the disappearance of the smaller glaciers by 2050 
and the reduction of glacier cover by 80% by the end of the 21st century if temperature will 
rise about 3°C. According to other sources in the website, snow cover will almost not last 
under 1000m with a rise of +4°C and water in general will decrease up to -80% by 2100 at 
2500m. Summarizing, glacier and snow are likely to disappear in this area. 
 
The evaporation of water fundamentally increases if the temperature of air increase. Spain 
and Italy will be countries that will massively suffer from this situation. The Working Group 
II of the IPCC in the Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2014) summarized the future projections 
of water content jointly for Spain and Italy. Soil water content will decline; groundwater 
recharge and water table level would be significantly reduced by the end of the 21st century 
for river basins. Gobiet et al. (2014) focused onto the changes in relative humidity, declaring 
that in winter it will increase very little, whereas in summer it will decrease by more points. 
Even the report Climate change and the Mediterranean region (Karas, 1997), composed for 
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Greenpeace, concentrated on the moisture problem, explaining that soil moisture in southern 
Europe will decrease to -25% during summer. 
 
8.2.1.2 Impacts of temperature changes on water 
As already said, an evident consequence of climate change is the increase of temperatures of 
air and water resources. These increases provoke a correlated effect in the water system, 
especially in oceans and seas: the sea level is rising. 
There are two mechanisms that lead to the rise of sea level: one is the heat expansion and the 
other is the ice melting. These mechanisms are ultimately caused by the increase of 
temperatures. In the Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2013) the authors distinguished the two 
different mechanisms of rising when they referred to the Global Mean Sea Level, supplying 
detailed data and trends about them. When they referred to Europe they did not distinguish 
the trends, giving only overall ranges. They projected a rise of sea level in a range from +30cm 
to +80cm, depending on the chosen scenario. 
According to the European Environment Agency (2012), by the end of 21st century the 
Mediterranean sea will undergo an increase between +3 and +61 cm over the basin; instead, 
in accordance with IDDRI (2009), the rise will be higher since they projected an increase 
between +18 and +59 cm. Then the Met Office in Climate: Observations, projections and 
impacts – Spain (Met Office, 2011a) and Climate: Observations, projections and impacts – Italy 
(Met Office, 2011b) reported almost the same ranges of the IDDRI’s study, giving more details 
about the different climate scenarios. 
 
8.2.1.3 Impacts of precipitation changes on water 
Changes in precipitation patterns lead to several different events related with water. These 
events are floods, droughts, changes in freshwater resources and changes in salinity. 
 
As regards floods, there is no extreme certainty about future projections because they 
remarkably depend on precipitation patterns though they depend on other non-climatic factor 
like soil characteristics. Nevertheless, the Met Office, in its two reports about Spain and Italy, 
stated that in Spain uncertainty remains over extreme short-term precipitation and the 
associated pluvial flooding, whereas for Italy they suggested an increase in extreme flood 
levels across the country and a reduction in average annual flow. In 21st century climate 
change in the European Alps—A review (Gobiet et al., 2014), the authors declared that the most 
important winter flood in a century could be 5 times more frequent, becoming a 20 years 
event, assuming a +10% of precipitation. Other studies indicated in the Climate Adaptation 
website strengthened this last statement, but they also added that future flood risk in Italy is 
not univocal because different projections supply different trend, positive and negative. For 
Spain they said that, in those areas like Pyrenees where snowmelt floods are dominating, 
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extreme floods will decrease. They continued adding that flood hazard instead will increase 
during wetter and warmer winters when there will be more frequent rain and less frequent 
snow.   
 
Drought events have been studied by several research groups. For Gobiet et al. (2014) at the 
end of the century droughts events will be little more frequent, but the intensity will grow as 
the average duration. The Met Office (2011a) indicated that droughts in Spain could increase 
in frequency and magnitude, with the greatest impacts projected for the south of the country, 
along the Mediterranean coast. They reported also the projections of Climatic changes and 
associated impacts in the Mediterranean resulting from a 2 °C global warming 
(Giannakopoulos et al., 2009), which expressed that the number of dry days will increase to 
the order of 3-4 weeks during the 2031-2060 time horizon, and the longest dry spell will 
increase under a 2°C warming scenario. For Italy the Met Office (2011b) affirmed that 
droughts could increase in frequency and magnitude with climate change for the country as 
a whole. Recent droughts events highlighted that the north is susceptible to severe episodes: 
several national-scale studies agreed that the south is highly vulnerable to water stress and 
the number of dry days (days with daily precipitation less than 0.5mm) will increase. 
 
Freshwater resources include water in rivers, lakes and aquifers. The Climate Adaptation 
website (“Home - Climate Adaptation,” n.d.) shows data and trends about Spain and Italy. 
Spain will see a reduction of general freshwater resource from 5 to 14% by 2030, 17% by 
2060 and 22% by 2100. By the 2050 the potential groundwater recharge will decrease of 
about 70%, the water resource in the Pyrenees will diminish up to 20% and in the Ebro valley 
to 35% by 2050. For Italy they stated that in general groundwater recharge will decline up to 
30% by 2050.  
 
Figure 8.2 Future changes in resource availability in percentage. Data collected from (Instituto de Investigación 
Tecnológica, 2015, p.36) 
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The report Nuevas tecnologías de generación eléctrica a partir de la disponibilidad de recursos 
hídricos en enscenarios de cambio climático. Informe final (Instituto de Investigación 
Tecnológica, 2015) provided specific regional data about the future change of available water 
resource. They supplied percentages of changes of two different scenarios (1 and 2) which are 
a medium and a strict climate change scenario. Figure 8.2 shows the trends for the period 
2041-2070. 
 
Salinization occurs essentially near the coasts: freshwater inland resources can be 
contaminated to the intrusion of saline water, both underground and on surface. Salinization 
depends on various factors, climatic and non-climatic. The reduction of freshwater resources 
due to decrease of precipitation is one of the most impacted change. In Spain, according to 
(“Home - Climate Adaptation,” n.d.), salinization will occur in coastal aquifers due to sea level 
rise and aquifer depletion. In Italy, along the Adriatic and Mediterranean, problems of saline 
intrusion will be exacerbated by reductions in runoff. 
 
8.2.2 Impacts on energy resources 
All those sources that may be used to generate electricity are here considered as energy 
resources. We can divide them into two great groups: renewable and non-renewable 
resources. The focus is aimed at the energy endowment, i.e. the amount of primary energy 
available for every resource. 
 
In this section we consider that energy resources could be impacted by two agents as we can 
see in Figure 8.1, climate change and water. Actually, energy resources could be affected by 
more elements, as temperature, precipitation, water, energy and atmospheric circulation. But, 
to simplify the description, we aggregate the climatic consequences which affect the energy 
endowment under a unique parameter: the climate change. For hydropower endowment we 
do an exception: we consider it affected only by water system, to make visible the strong 
correlation between the water and the energy systems. 
 
8.2.2.1 Climate change’s impacts on energy resources 
The resources that we consider influenced by climate change are renewable and non-
renewable, and are wind, biomass, wave and tidal and fossil fuel. Following, we will 
concentrate only on wind energy and biomass energy because wave and tidal energy and fossil 
fuels are not so common in the countries we are taking in consideration. 
 
Talking about wind potential, in the near term in Spain and Italy there are no significant 
changes expected. In accordance with the Working Group II of IPCC (Field, 2014), after 2050 
a decrease in wind energy is expected in winter and summer in the south of Europe, except 
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for the Adriatic coast, where a significant increase during summer is possible. Gaudioso in 
L’impatto dei cambiamenti climatici sul sistema energetico italiano: verso una strategia 
nazionale di adattamento (Gaudioso, 2012) suggested that air density could be reduced in 
winter in southern Europe by the end of the century, adding that it could be negligible 
compared to climate variability. 
 
The biomass crop for energy use has been rather studied, focusing on the growth rate of yields 
and the suitable areas for growing biofuels crops. 
In the report Impacts and adaptation of European crop production systems to climate change 
(Olesen et al., 2011) it is affirmed that a reduction of crop yields is expected around the 
Mediterranean. In southern Europe, in particular, a decrease of spring-sown crops (maize, 
sunflower and soybeans) is expected. For autumn-sown crops (winter and spring-wheat), a 
strongly decrease of the yield is expected in the southern areas, except of the cooler areas like 
the north of Spain. 
In The potential distribution of bioenergy crops in Europe under present and future climate 
(Tuck et al., 2006), the authors projected a dramatic decline of the potential distribution of 
the studied bioenergy crops by the 2080s in Spain due to increased droughts. For Italy, they 
indicated as causes of the reduction of the yield of summer crops like sunflowers and soybeans 
the increase in the frequency of extreme climate events during specific crop development 
stages together with higher rainfall intensity and longer dry spells. For Spain and Italy in 
general, they projected a reduction of the 15% of the potential area for growing biofuel crops 
like oilseed rape, sunflower, sugarcane and maize. 
 
8.2.2.2 Impacts of water changes on energy resources 
The changes in the water sector produce an alteration of the hydropower endowment, which 
we could observe and weight looking at the changes in runoff. 
In the Climate Adaptation website this impact is well expanded. It is stated that in general the 
runoff will decrease. Summer flows may be reduced by up to 80% in some rivers in southern 
Europe. There could be a decrease of 23% of runoff by 2020s and a reduction of 36% by 
2070s. They continued saying that an increase of winter runoff and a decrease of spring runoff 
is possible and could be change the reservoirs’ management strategies. 
Two Spanish technical reports (Estudio de los impactos del cambio climático en los recursos 
hídricos y las masas de agua. Ficha 1: evaluación del impacto del cambio climático en los 
recursos hídricos en régimen natural (CEDEX, 2010) and Estudio de los impactos del cambio 
climático en los recursos hídricos y las masas de agua. Efecto del cambio climático en los 
recursos hídricos disponibles en los sistemas de explotación (CEDEX, 2012)) communicated 
respectively the future expected changes in runoff and the changes in global water resource 
for energy use, indicating a reduction of 28% of runoff by 2100 and a reduction of the 34% 
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of water resource by 2100. Then the report Nuevas tecnologías de generación eléctrica a partir 
de la disponibilidad de recursos hídricos en enscenarios de cambio climático. Informe final 
(Instituto de Investigación Tecnológica, 2015), which supplied data from the two CEDEX 
technical reports, provided future regional changes of runoff for two climate change scenarios, 
which are expressed in Figure 8.3.  
 
 
Figure 8.3 Future changes of runoff in percentage. Data collected from (Instituto de Investigación Tecnológica, 2015, p.36) 
Specific studies, examined by the Climate Adaptation website, analyzed specific Italian 
regions. Central Alps, for example, are projected to experience a +90% of winter runoff in the 
future and a -45% of summer runoff. The Crati river basin then will suffer a reduction of the 
40% of water by 2100. 
 
8.2.3 Impacts on energy demand 
The demand of energy is strongly affected by the changing climate. The evaluation of impacts 
and modification of energy demand is necessary for the management of the entire energy 
system and for the adaption of it to climate change.  
Climate change in general provokes the modifications, but specifically the changes in 
temperature and the changes in the water sector are the origins of these alterations. There 
will be a strong alteration in the heating and cooling demand in buildings, in the energy and 
water demand for industrial processes and for agriculture, and also in the demand of energy 
for water treatment for domestic use. 
 
In literature there are not so many documents which regard future impacts of climate change 
on energy demand in Spain and Italy. The general trends are known but specific data about 
these countries are missing. There is no information about the changes in industry energy 
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demand, neither about the changes in energy use for water treatment. Anyway, it is possible 
to give some facts about them. 
 
As regards heating and cooling demand in buildings, some projections are available. As 
mentioned by Gaudioso (2012), in the residential and tertiary sectors, with the rise of air 
temperatures, energy demand for heating purpose will decrease, whereas energy demand for 
cooling will increase. The magnitude of these modifications could vary depending on the 
season and region. Spain and Italy, which are located in the south of Europe, will experience 
a higher increase of maximum temperatures than minimum temperatures. Furthermore, the 
efficiency of cooling systems is lower than the efficiency of heating systems. These aspects 
lead to an increase of energy demand for cooling higher than the decrease of energy demand 
for heating. In the Climate Adaptation website, they talk about an increase of 50% of 
electricity consumption by 2080 in Italy and Spain (World Health Organization, 2007, 
Environment and health risks from climate change and variability in Italy), and an increase of 
114% by 2070 for cooling only for Madrid (Parry and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, 2007). 
 
Most of the energy used in industry is utilized for water heating. Climate change, which will 
rise the temperature of water resources, would likely reduce the use of energy in industry. 
But the use of water in industry will not decrease as the use of energy: on the contrary, it will 
rise for climate change. 
Concerning agriculture, the paper Water: A key resource in energy production (Rio Carrillo 
and Frei, 2009) declared that the 2030 projected Spain energy mix tends to be more water 
consumptive. This fact is due to the increase of use of biomasses, which are water intensive. 
This increase will be attested to +25%. 
 
The energy and water requirements to supply freshwater resources in Spain and Italy (but 
also in the world in general) have not been projected. 
 
8.2.4 Impacts on energy supply 
This section of the assessment of climate impacts on an energy system is the main one section. 
It concentrates on the impacts of climate change on the supply side of the energy system, 
which provides the necessary amount of energy for the comprehensive utilization. 
 
As we can see from Figure 8.1, energy supply could be affected by 5 parameters: temperature, 
water, extreme events, energy resources and climate change. Three connections out of five 
indicate a specific aspect of the energy supply system which is impacted by climate change. 
Temperature’s impacts refer to the changes in the efficiency of energy supply. Water’s impacts 
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refer to the changes in refrigeration. Instead, climate change impacts treat the mitigation 
projections in energy generation. 
 
Even in this case there are not so many available data about all these changing aspects, 
especially with regard to the changes by extreme events. It is difficult to predict extreme 
events like floods, droughts, gusts of wind, extreme temperature, extreme precipitations and 
hurricanes. This complication does not permit to find precise changes in the supply. For these 
alterations we refer to what we wrote in the general case. 
 
8.2.4.1 Impacts of energy resource changes on energy supply 
The energy resources we take in consideration for this analysis are water for hydroelectric 
production, wind for wind generation, biomass for biofuels or thermal production and solar 
energy for photovoltaic or solar panels. 
 
About hydropower production, in the long term the reduction of water resource, predicted in 
the south of Europe, will imply a decrease of hydroelectricity production and an increase 
attention on the variability of water flows across the seasons. The Working Group II of the 
IPCC in Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Part B, Regional aspects 
(Field, 2014) predicted a decrease of 5-15% of electricity production in southern Europe in 
2050. The projections for Alps’ generation are not better: the electricity production will 
decrease up to 36% by 2100. In general, the hydropower potential is predicted to diminish of 
about 50% in the Mediterranean Sea region by 2070. 
 
For wind, biomass and solar energy, as for water energy, the matter is always the same. The 
supply of electricity from these renewable resources depends on the availability of the 
resources themselves. The focus of this section is the assessment of the changes in energy 
production due to changes of resource availability. So, electricity production will vary 
proportionally to the amount of the resource. 
Wind resource will probably not change in the near future and consequently wind generation 
will not vary so much. Biomasses will decrease and, as results, the energy generation. Solar 
radiation will not vary, so the generation of energy from sun will not change due to solar 
energy changes. 
 
Regarding the impact of climate change on plants’ operation, Gaudioso (2012) said that the 
projected impacts on wind turbines, biomass installations, photovoltaic and thermal solar 
panels will be so small that they could be ignored for ordinary management and also for long-
term strategies. Climate variability will have a higher influence than climate change in the 
operation of these plants.  
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8.2.4.2 Impacts of temperature changes on energy supply 
As already said, the focal point of this segment is the efficiency of generation devices due to 
temperature changes. The analysis will concentrate on the efficiency of thermal and 
photovoltaic panels, thermal pants and the transmission and distribution grids. 
 
As stated by Gaudioso (2012), the efficiency of solar cells in the Mediterranean area will be 
reduced of about 1% with an increase of 2°C of air temperature. This effect will be 
compensated by an increase of solar radiation (due to less cloudiness) which increases cells’ 
performance. In the Climate Adaptation website (“Home - Climate Adaptation,” n.d.) it is 
reported that PV output is likely to increase by a few percent in Europe. 
 
About thermal plants and their efficiency, the changes depend on air temperature and water 
availability projections for the countries and on the type of thermal cycle used in the plants. 
The decline of efficiency, due to these aspects, is described in the general analysis and we will 
not focus more on that. What most concerns us is the summer average usable capacity of a 
thermal plant. Future increased temperatures will not allow to release huge amounts of heat 
energy due to environmental limitation: this leads to a decrease of usable capacity of a plant 
from 6 to 19% by 2031-2060 compared to 1971-2000 (Field, 2014, p.1282) 
 
The transmission and distribution grids are expected to suffer temperature increases. The rise 
of temperatures causes an increase of electric cables’ resistance and consequently an increase 
of transmission losses, because it makes difficult the dissipation of the generated heat. 
 
8.2.4.3 Impacts of water changes on energy supply 
This part concentrates on the refrigeration systems, especially of thermal plants. 
Thermal power cycles usually have a cooling system that uses water as refrigerant. The 
increase of air and water temperatures leads to an increase of water withdrawal or water 
consumption (depending on the type of cooling system) to refrigerate the plant. Recalling the 
information of the general chapter, a 1°C increase in water temperature reduces power output 
by 0.45%. 
In a study over Spain done by Rio Carrillo and Frei (2009), the withdraw and consumption of 
water for electricity generation is projected to decrease by 2030, due to a change in energy 
generation mixing. In the report Nuevas tecnologías de generación eléctrica a partir de la 
disponibilidad de recursos hídricos en enscenarios de cambio climático. Informe final (Instituto 
de Investigación Tecnológica, 2015) the authors defined the withdraw and consumption of 
water for energy generation in2050 in specific river basins for four different climate change 
scenarios. The data are reported in Table 8.1. 
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Table 8.1 2050 water consumption and withdraw in hm3 in Spain’s river basins (Instituto de Investigación Tecnológica, 
2015, p.47-49) 
BASIN 
WC1na WC2na WC1ca WC2ca 
CONS WITH CONS WITH CONS WITH CONS WITH 
GALICIA COSTA 173 1.163 243 1.120 127 2.149 131 1.889 
MIÑO SIL 230 2.891 219 2.197 469 5.441 360 4.727 
CANTÁBRICO OCC 157 1.131 224 1.524 128 2.380 202 2.455 
CANTÁBRICO OR 181 334 86 432 127 1.650 110 3.055 
DUERO 349 5.896 277 4.877 257 5.280 323 7.685 
TAJO 349 7.617 468 7.548 341 6.368 279 4.887 
GUADIANA 140 1.269 96 767 150 3.240 105 2.970 
TINTO, ODIEL Y PIEDRAS 58 327 39 232 61 1.337 52 417 
GUADALQUIVIR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GUADALETE Y BARBATE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MEDITER ANDAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SEGURA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
JÚCAR 169 4.624 128 3.565 120 3.355 114 1.761 
EBRO 303 9.844 301 9.497 305 5.273 363 4.410 
CATALUÑA 168 3.205 118 3.215 211 2.656 177 1.705 
Note. WC1na: medium climate change scenario without adaptation. WC2na: strict climate change scenario without 
adaptation. WC1ca: medium climate change scenario with adaptation. WC2ca: strict climate change scenario with 
adaptation 
8.2.4.4 Impacts of climate change mitigation on energy supply 
This section regards the countries’ strategies to reduce the GHG emissions from energy 
supply. The solution is quite simple: energy production from fossil fuels must be reduced 
whereas energy production with no-CO2 generation facilities must increase. The objective 
must be to convert the actual fossil fuel based system to a renewable energy based energy 
system. 
 
In Europe every country has to participate to the effort of reducing GHG emissions, 
implementing specific strategies to reach this objective. The purpose of this section is not to 
explain in detail the Spanish and Italian strategies, but only to give an account of them. 
With the Directive 2009/29/CE, the European Union set the so called “20-20-20 Targets”: the 
objectives were to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases of the 20% in 2020 relative to the 
1990 level, to generate the 20% of the energy requirements with renewable sources and to 
increase the energy efficiency of a 20%. The European Council then formulated another 
strategy: on 24th October 2014 it approved the EUCO 169/14 (European Council, 2014) in 
which it endorsed a binding EU target of an at least 40% domestic reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990. They highlighted that the target will be delivered 
collectively by the EU in the most cost-effective manner possible, with the reductions in the 
Emission Trading System and non-Emission Trading System sectors amounting to 43% and 
30% by 2030 compared to 2005 respectively. They also added that all Member States will 
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participate in this effort, balancing considerations of fairness and solidarity. This substantially 
means that all European countries, Spain and Italy included, must implement future 
mitigation strategies to reach the goal of at least 40% domestic reduction in GHG emissions 
by 2030. Even if the Directive treats domestic energy use, this target extends to the whole 
energy system. 
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In this last part of the case study, we will make a recap of what has been commented about 
the energy systems of Spain and Italy and about the climate impacts in the countries. We will 
compose specific summary tables about the vulnerabilities and climates changes that could be 
found in the two aforementioned energy systems. Then, we will end the analysis summarizing 
the possible adaptation options we can implement in the countries, using once again a 
summary table. 
The tables about Spain and Italy will be modeled from the general summary tables inserted 
through the thesis. Fundamentally, we will compare the vulnerabilities of the two examined 
energy systems, the impacts of climate change on the countries and the adaptation measures 
to the systems with the findings of the general analysis. 
 
Table 9.1 recaps the vulnerabilities of the Spanish and Italian energy systems. This table 
presents a distinctive characteristic. Differently from the summary table about general 
vulnerabilities, this one does not only indicate the vulnerabilities of the two systems, but it 
also points out the magnitude of them. A four-levels scale will state the extent of the 
vulnerability: the levels will be no, low, medium and high. The aim of this codification is to 
specify the degree of vulnerability of the components of our case study’s energy systems to 
choose the best adaptation measures for the systems. 
 
Tables 9.2 and 9.3 summarize the climate change’s impacts, respectively in Spain and Italy. 
These tables are filled by specific data, ranges and trends about the impacts in the two 
countries, even more specific than the general trends recounted in Chapter 8. 
 
Table 9.4 finally sums up the possible adaptation measures we can implement in our 
countries’ energy systems. The feasible measures are determined by the climate impacts, the 
vulnerabilities and their magnitude on each part of the system. We will use checkmarks and 
x marks to state if a precise adaptation measure is suitable or not in our energy systems.
  
Table 9.1 Vulnerabilities of the Spanish and Italian energy systems to climate change 
ENERGY SECTOR VULNERABILITY SPAIN ITALY CORRELATED VULNERABILITY SPAIN ITALY 
HYDROPOWER 
Water resource availability MEDIUM LOW Quantity of runoff and seasonal high and low flows 
Temperature 
Precipitation 
Evaporation 
Extreme events 
MEDIUM 
HIGH 
MEDIUM 
MEDIUM 
MEDIUM 
MEDIUM 
HIGH 
MEDIUM 
LOW 
LOW 
Reservoir storage LOW LOW 
Dependency: glacier – precipitation - runoff MEDIUM MEDIUM 
Infrastructure safety LOW LOW 
Floods 
Droughts 
Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF) 
MEDIUM 
HIGH 
NO 
HIGH 
HIGH 
NO 
WIND POWER 
Large dependence on variations in wind patterns MEDIUM - 
Impossibility to make adequate predictions of wind 
characteristics 
MEDIUM - 
Wind characteristics and patterns MEDIUM HIGH 
Carbon dioxide emissions 
Rise of temperatures  
Changes in vegetation 
Air density 
- 
LOW 
- 
- 
- 
LOW 
- 
- 
Impossibility of storage HIGH HIGH    
Infrastructure safety LOW LOW 
Hurricanes 
Sea level rise (offshore) 
Icing 
NO 
LOW 
NO 
NO 
MEDIUM 
LOW 
SOLAR POWER Photovoltaic cell temperature NO NO 
Irradiance 
Wind cooling 
Ambient temperature 
- 
- 
MEDIUM 
- 
- 
MEDIUM 
BIOMASS AND 
BIOFUELS 
Biomass resource availability LOW NO 
Temperature 
Precipitation 
Atmospheric concentration of CO2 
Extreme events: droughts, frosts, hurricanes 
LOW 
LOW 
- 
MEDIUM 
LOW 
LOW 
- 
MEDIUM 
Use in thermal plants and biofuel production MEDIUM MEDIUM 
Rise of temperatures 
Complexity in maintaining a constant temperature 
Water availability 
Water properties  
LOW 
LOW 
HIGH 
HIGH 
LOW 
LOW 
HIGH 
HIGH 
WAVE AND TIDAL 
ENERGY 
Availability of wind - -    
Large dependence on variations in wind patterns - -    
Wind characteristics and patterns - - 
Carbon dioxide emissions 
Rise of temperatures  
Changes in vegetation 
Air density 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Infrastructure safety - - Sea level rise - - 
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THERMOELECTRIC 
POWER PLANTS 
THERMAL CYCLE EFFICIENCY 
  Increase of ambient air temperature 
  Increase in water temperatures 
 
MEDIUM 
MEDIUM 
 
MEDIUM 
MEDIUM 
Location of water intake, location of outlet, fluid 
velocities, turbulence, pressure changes  
- - 
COOLING SYSTEM 
  Water availability 
  Water characteristics 
  Type (once-through/recirculating) 
  Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
 
LOW 
LOW 
- 
- 
LOW 
LOW 
- 
- 
Once-through cooling system: streamflow condition 
Recirculating cooling system: water consumption 
Location of the cooling water intake 
MEDIUM 
MEDIUM 
- 
MEDIUM 
MEDIUM 
- 
INFRASTRUCTURES 
  Safety 
  Site of building 
  Safety function of safety-related structure 
 
LOW 
- 
- 
 
LOW 
- 
- 
Climate change and extreme events 
Air and sea temperatures, Wind, Precipitation,  
Flow rate of rivers, Sea level, Storms 
LOW LOW 
FOSSIL FUEL 
Infrastructure safety - - 
Sea level rise, Storm intensity, Wave regime,  
Air and water temperature, Precipitation pattern,  
CO2 concentrations, Ocean acidity,  
Permafrost thawing 
- - 
Efficiency of equipment - - 
Rise of temperatures 
Water availability 
- - 
ENERGY TRANSFER 
Efficiency of transmission lines and transformers MEDIUM MEDIUM Rise of temperatures  
Extreme events, in particular icing and lightning 
Permafrost thawing 
MEDIUM 
LOW 
- 
MEDIUM 
LOW 
LOW 
Infrastructure safety LOW LOW 
Pipelines LOW LOW Climate phenomena 
Soil structure 
Erosion 
Subsidence 
LOW 
- 
- 
- 
LOW 
- 
- 
- 
Pumping stations and valves - - 
Means of transport - - 
Floods 
Water levels 
Droughts 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Note. This evaluation is personal, and it is based on the information collected about climate change and its impacts on Spanish and Italian energy systems. The levels of vulnerability were 
subdivided into no, low, medium and high. The sign (-) stands for the impossibility to give an evaluation due to limited information 
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Table 9.2 Summary specific table of climate change and its impacts on the energy system in Spain 
SPAIN’S IMPACTS PROJECTIONS / TRENDS REFERENCE 
C
LI
M
A
TE
 C
H
A
N
G
E
 
TEMPERATURE 
GMST 
Projections period: 2071-2100. Reference period: 1971-2000 
South: +2.0°C [1.9 to 3.2] (RCP4.5) +4.2°C [3.8 to 5.7] (RCP8.5) 
Atlantic: +1.7 [1.3 to 2.9] (RCP4.5) +3.2 [2.5 to 4.2] (RCP8.5) 
(Jacob et al., 2014) 
+0.4°C/decade in winter. +0.7°C/decade in summer 
Hinterland: +5-7°C in winter +3-4°C in summer by 2100  
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
OCEAN +2°C (21.7°C) by 2100 (IDDRI, 2009) 
WATER 
Reference period: 1971-2000 
+0.8 to +1.0°C for 2031-2060. +1.4 to 2.3°C for 2071-2100 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
PRECIPITATION 
PRECIPITATION 
PATTERN 
Projections period: 2071-2100. Reference period: 1971-2000 
South: -6% [-11 to 2] (RCP4.5) -10% [-27 to 0] (RCP8.5) 
Atlantic: +1% [-1 to 9] (RCP4.5) +4% [-2 to 9] (RCP8.5) 
(Jacob et al., 2014) 
2011-2040: -5% in central, N and E. -10% in SW 
2070-2100: -15%-25% in central and N. -20%-30% in S 
2100: -6%-14% Andalucia and Cataluña. +14% French border 
2050: -20% in summer -30% in winter in the Pyrenees 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
EXTREME EVENTS 
TEMPERATURE 
Projections period: 2071-2100. Reference period: 1971-2000 
Warm days per year: +34 [28 to 83] (RCP4.5) +124 [90 to 186](RCP8.5) 
Cold days per year: -5 [-3 to -6] (RCP4.5) -5 [-3 to -6] (RCP8.5) 
(Jacob et al., 2014) 
Basque Country: -50% frost days by 2100 
Cold-wave episodes: disappear beyond 2020 
Heat waves. Number of summer days. 16% by 2050 22% by 2100 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
PRECIPITATION 
Projections period: 2071-2100. Reference period: 1971-2000 
South: +36% [23 to 62] (RCP4.5) +49% [30 to 65] (RCP8.5) 
Atlantic: +36% [20 to 73] (RCP4.5) +71% [48 to 118] (RCP8.5) 
(Jacob et al., 2014) 
ATMOSPHERIC 
CIRCULATION 
Projections period: 2071-2100. Reference period: 1961-2000 
Relative changes of mean annual storm loss potential 
(van der Linden and 
Mitchell, 2009) 
+2-4% maximum wind speeds in NW by 2100 
Tropical hurricanes might become a serious threat for Western EU 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
W
A
TE
R
 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
CRYOSPHERE 
Snow cover will probably be less in the future 
Pyrenees: 90% of glacier ice already lost. The rest may disappear within 
few decades 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
EVAPORATION 
-15% to -25% soil moisture during summer (Karas, 1997) 
+15 to +20% evapotranspiration until 2100  
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
TEMPERATURE SEA LEVEL 
Projections period: 2081-2100. Reference period: 1986-2005 
+0.29 to 0.55 (RCP2.6) +0.36 to 0.63 (RCP4.5) 
+0.37 to 0.64 (RCP6.0) +0.48 to 0.82 (RCP8.5) 
(Field, 2014) 
Atlantic coast: +15cm by 2050. +50 to +100cm by 2100 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
Mediterranean sea: +18 to +59cm by 2100 (IDDRI, 2009) 
PRECIPITATION 
FLOODS The most important winter flood: 5 times more frequent (Gobiet et al., 2014) 
DROUGHTS 
Projections period: 2071-2100. Reference period: 1971-2000 
+4.7% (B1) / 4.7% (A2) number of drought events 
+89.9% (B1) / +143.1% (A2) average duration 
+375.2% (B1) / +467.4% (A2) average deficit volume  
(Gobiet et al., 2014) 
STREAMFLOWS 
-5% to -14% by 2030 -17% by 2060 -20% to -22% by 2100 
-70% potential groundwater recharge by the 2050s 
-15% to -20% water resources in Pyrenees by 2050 
-25% to -35% water resources in Ebro Valley by 2050 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
Water resources. Reference period: 1961-1990 
-16% (A2) / -21% (B2) 2011-2040 
-23% (A2) / -19% (B2) 2040-2070 
-34% (A2) / -20% (B2) 2071-2100 
(CEDEX, 2010) 
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EN
ER
G
Y
 R
ES
O
U
R
C
ES
 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
WIND 
Before 2050: no significant changes 
After 2050: decrease in wind energy in winter and summer  
(Field, 2014) 
BIOENERGY 
% of total land suitable are for growing biofuel crops 
Oilseed rape: 70% (1990) -5-15% (2020-2050-2080) 
Sugarcane: 10% (1990) -5-15% (2020-2050-2080) 
Maize: 75% (1990) -5-15% (2020-2050-2080) 
(Tuck et al., 2006) 
WATER RUNOFF 
Reference period: 1971-2000 
-13% to -15% for 2031-2060. -16% to -23% for 2071-2100 
Increase in winter runoff, decrease of spring runoff 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
Runoff: Reference period: 1961-1990 
-8% (A2) / -8% (B2) 2011-2040 
-16% (A2) / -11% (B2) 2040-2070 
-28% (A2) / -14% (B2) 2071-2100 
(CEDEX, 2010) 
EN
ER
G
Y
 D
EM
A
N
D
 
TEMPERATURE 
HEATING DEMAND 
-10% energy requirements by 2030 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
Reference: no climate change scenario 
Cold/wet scenario: -9% in 2030 / -19% in 2050 / -9% in 2010-2050 
Average scenario: -8% in 2030 / -19% in 2050 / -8% in 2010-2050 
Warm/dry scenario: -16% in 2030 / -28% in 2050 / -16% in 2010-2050 
Emissions reduction: -14% in 2030 / -9% in 2050 / -9% in 2010-2050 
(Dowling, 2013) 
COOLING DEMAND 
+50% electricity demand by 2080s 
+114% electricity demand for Madrid by 2070s 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
Reference: no climate change scenario 
Cold/wet scenario: 17% in 2030 / 39% in 2050 / 14% in 2010-2050 
Average scenario: 25% in 2030 / 52% in 2050 / 22% in 2010-2050 
Warm/dry scenario: 28% in 2030 / 66% in 2050 / 30% in 2010-2050 
Emissions reduction: 27% in 2030 / 38% in 2050 / 28% in 2010-2050 
(Dowling, 2013) 
AGRICULTURE -70mm/year of net irrigation requirement in the 2020s for W Spain  (Field, 2014) 
EN
ER
G
Y
 S
U
P
P
LY
 
TEMPERATURE 
EFFICIENCY   
 SOLAR POWER 
PV output from 2010 to 2080 is likely to increase by a few percent 
CSP is likely to increase by more than 10% 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
 THERMAL PLANTS 
+1°C monthly ambient temperature (Nuclear power supply) 
-0.7% production (near 0°C) -2.3% production (near  
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
WATER REFRIGERATION 
Projections period: 2031-2060. Reference period: 1971-2000 
-6% to -19% summer average usable capacity 
(Field, 2014) 
ENERGY 
RESOURCES 
HYDROPOWER 
-5% to -15% electricity production (2050 compared to 2005) (Field, 2014) 
-1.82% TWh by 2050 (-1.79TWh, reaching 96.60 TWh) 
(Hamududu and 
Killingtveit, 2012) 
WIND 
The potential for wind energy under climate change will probably not 
increase 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
BIOFUEL 
+400% water consumption by 2030 (Scenario: Reference Mix) 
+1600% water consumption by 2030 (Scenario: Biofuels Mix) 
(Rio Carrillo and Frei, 
2009) 
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION -40% domestic reduction in GHG by 2030 compared to 1990 
(European Council, 
2014) 
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Table 9.3 Summary specific table of climate change and its impacts on the energy system in Italy 
ITALY’S IMPACTS PROJECTIONS / TRENDS REFERENCE 
C
LI
M
A
TE
 C
H
A
N
G
E
 
TEMPERATURE 
GMST 
Projections period: 2071-2100. Reference period: 1971-2000 
Alpine region: +2.4°C [1.8 to 3.6] (RCP4.5) +4.6°C [3.8 to 6.3] (RCP8.5) 
(Jacob et al., 2014) 
+1.2°C spring / +1.6°C summer and winter by 2050 
+2.7°C spring / +3.8°C summer by 2100 
(Gobiet et al., 2014) 
Reference period: 1961-1990 
+1.5°C to 2.0°C for 2021-2050 (up to +3.0 for summer, autumn, spring) 
+2.5°C for 2070-2099 during winter, spring and autumn 
+3.5°C to +4.0°C for 2070-2099 during summer  
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
OCEAN Adriatic Sea: +2.5°C (20.2°C) by 2100 (IDDRI, 2009) 
WATER 
Reference period: 1971-2000 
+0.8 to +1.0°C for 2031-2060. +1.4 to 2.3°C for 2071-2100 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
PRECIPITATION 
PRECIPITATION 
PATTERN 
Projections period: 2071-2100. Reference period: 1971-2000 
Alpine region: +5% [3 to 12] (RCP4.5) +14% [5 to 18] (RCP8.5) 
(Jacob et al., 2014) 
-4.1% in summer / +36% in winter by 2050 
-20.4% in summer / +10.4 in winter by 2100 
(Gobiet et al., 2014) 
Northern parts of Mediterranean sea: wetter. Southern parts: drier 
-10 to -40% in summer precipitation 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
EXTREME EVENTS 
TEMPERATURE 
Projections period: 2071-2100. Reference period: 1971-2000 
Warm days per year: +34 [26 to 69] (RCP4.5) +96 [73 to 162] (RCP8.5) 
Cold days per year: -5 [-3 to -7] (RCP4.5) -5 [-3 to -6] (RCP8.5) 
2100: 1 summer in 2 as hot as 2003 summer 
2100: 6 winters in 10 as hot as record 2006-2007 
2100: 7 springs in 10 as hot as record 2007 
2100: 6 autumns in 10 as hot as 2006 autumn 
(Jacob et al., 2014) 
Projections period: 2031-2060. Reference period: 1961-1990 
Hot days. 2 weeks along the coast / 5-6 weeks inland 
Tropical nights. 4 weeks everywhere 
Heat wave day.3-5 weeks everywhere 
Frost days. -35 day in 2070-2099 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
PRECIPITATION 
Projections period: 2071-2100. Reference period: 1971-2000 
Alpine region: +38% [24 to 7] (RCP4.5) +79% [41 to 119] (RCP8.5) 
(Jacob et al., 2014) 
ATMOSPHERIC 
CIRCULATION 
Future declines in extreme wave height in the Mediterranean Sea 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
W
A
TE
R
 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
CRYOSPHERE 
Rule of thumb: average level of snowline rises by roughly 150m/°C 
+2-4°C snowline shifts by 300-600m by 2100 
(Gobiet et al., 2014) 
Snow cover: -50% duration at 2000m with +4°C 
Snow cover: -95% duration under 1000m with +4°C 
Glacier cover: -80% by 2100 with +3°C 
Glacier cover: almost ice free by 2100 with +5°C 
Small glacier are expected to disappear by 2050 
Glacier volume: -30% to 70% for larger glacier by 2050 
The zone of warm permafrost (mean annual rock temperature 
approximately -2 to 0°C) which is more susceptible to slope failures than 
cold permafrost, may rise in elevation a few hundred meters during the 
next 100 years 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
EVAPORATION 
Relative humidity: -0.5% in winter / -1.4% in summer by 2050 
Relative humidity: +0.5% in winter / -3.9% in summer by 2100 
(Gobiet et al., 2014) 
Soil water content will decline, saturation conditions and drainage will be 
increasingly rare and restricted to periods in winter and springs 
(Field, 2014) 
TEMPERATURE SEA LEVEL 
Projections period: 2081-2100. Reference period: 1986-2005 
+0.29 to 0.55 (RCP2.6) +0.36 to 0.63 (RCP4.5) 
+0.37 to 0.64 (RCP6.0) +0.48 to 0.82 (RCP8.5) 
(Field, 2014) 
+20 to +70cm by 2100. The major coastal areas at risk of sea flooding are 
the Padano-Venetian, Versilia, Fondi and Pontina plains 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
Mediterranean sea: +18 to +59cm by 2100 (IDDRI, 2009) 
PRECIPITATION 
FLOODS 
The most important winter flood: 5 times more frequent (Gobiet et al., 2014) 
Projected return period of a current 100-year flood: less than 20 years 
Flood risk: -18% (-40% to +20%) by 2030. +100% or -75% by 2100 (not univ) 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
DROUGHTS 
Projections period: 2071-2100. Reference period: 1971-2000 
+4.7% (B1) / 4.7% (A2) number of drought events 
+89.9% (B1) / +143.1% (A2) average duration 
+375.2% (B1) / +467.4% (A2) average deficit volume  
(Gobiet et al., 2014) 
STREAMFLOWS 
-21% to -31% potential groundwater recharge by the 2050, with 1%/year 
CO2 increase 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
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CLIMATE CHANGE 
WIND 
Before 2050: no significant changes 
After 2050: decrease in wind energy in winter and summer  
(Field, 2014) 
BIOENERGY 
% of total land suitable are for growing biofuel crops 
Oilseed rape: 65% (1990) +5-15% (2020-2050-2080) 
Sugarcane: 35% (1990) +5-15% (2020-2050-2080) 
Maize: 65% (1990) +5-15% (2020) +16-30% (2050-2080) 
(Tuck et al., 2006) 
WATER RUNOFF 
Reference period: 1971-2000 
-13% to -15% for 2031-2060. -16% to -23% for 2071-2100 
+90% in winter runoff in the Italian central alps 
-45% summer runoff in the Italia central alps 
-16% to -23% by 2050 in the Candelaro catchment in southern Italy 
-25% to -41% for 2070-2099 compared to 1961-1990 for Crati river basin 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
TEMPERATURE 
HEATING DEMAND 
Reference: no climate change scenario 
Cold/wet scenario: -11% in 2030 / -21% in 2050 / -9% in 2010-2050 
Average scenario: -10% in 2030 / -20% in 2050 / -9% in 2010-2050 
Warm/dry scenario: -12% in 2030 / -23% in 2050 / -13% in 2010-2050 
Emissions reduction: -14% in 2030 / -7% in 2050 / -10% in 2010-2050 
(Dowling, 2013) 
COOLING DEMAND 
+50% electricity consumption by 2080s 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
Reference: no climate change scenario 
Cold/wet scenario: 24% in 2030 / 54% in 2050 / 24% in 2010-2050 
Average scenario: 50% in 2030 / 72% in 2050 / 43% in 2010-2050 
Warm/dry scenario: 36% in 2030 / 73% in 2050 / 35% in 2010-2050 
Emissions reduction: 54% in 2030 / 57% in 2050 / 46% in 2010-2050 
(Dowling, 2013) 
EN
ER
G
Y
 S
U
P
P
LY
 TEMPERATURE 
EFFICIENCY   
 SOLAR POWER 
PV output from 2010 to 2080 is likely to increase by a few percent 
CSP is likely to increase by more than 10% 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
 THERMAL PLANTS 
+1°C monthly ambient temperature (Nuclear power supply) 
-0.7% production (near 0°C) -2.3% production (near  
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
WATER REFRIGERATION 
Projections period: 2031-2060. Reference period: 1971-2000 
-6% to -19% summer average usable capacity 
(Field, 2014) 
ENERGY 
RESOURCES 
HYDROPOWER -6% to -36% electricity production (2071-2100 compared to present level) (Field, 2014) 
WIND 
The potential for wind energy under climate change will probably not 
increase 
(“Home - Climate 
Adaptation,” n.d.) 
BIOFUEL 
+400% water consumption by 2030 (Scenario: Reference Mix) 
+1600% water consumption by 2030 (Scenario: Biofuels Mix) 
(Rio Carrillo and Frei, 
2009) 
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION -40% domestic reduction in GHG by 2030 compared to 1990 
(European Council, 
2014) 
 
 
  
 
Table 9.4 Adaptation measures for energy demand and energy supply systems to climate change in Spain and Italy 
VULNERABLE 
ELEMENTS 
ADAPTATION MEASURES  
ENGINEERING MEASURES SPAIN ITALY NON-ENGINEERING MEASURES SPAIN ITALY 
D
EM
A
N
D
 
ELECTRICITY END 
USE 
 Increase generation (MWh) and capacity (MW) 
 Improve the energy efficiency of energy supply 
 Improve end-use efficiency for buildings, facilities and energy-intensive 
appliances and machinery 
 Reduce the need of cooling, increase cooling efficiency and decrease internal 
heat gains 
 Implement energy storage technologies as further option to shift electricity 
consumption away from peak hours 
X 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
X 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
 Require minimum energy performance standards for new commercial buildings  
 Require a wide range of electricity-using appliances with labelling and 
certification  
 Require and enforce energy performance standards 
 Develop legislation and access to finance for energy service companies 
 Set minimum standards for industrial electrical motors 
 Consider subsidized programs for mass replacement of incandescent lights, and 
replacing old inefficient refrigerators with never efficient models 
 Adopt the ISO global energy management standard 
 Consider the possible use of solar photovoltaic rooftop panels to reduce summer 
building cooling loads 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
SU
P
P
LY
 
HYDROPOWER 
 Design more robust dams for heavier flooding and extreme events 
 Increase dam height to accommodate increase river flow extremes 
 Construct or augment water storage reservoirs 
 Restore and better manage upstream land 
 Construct small dams in the upper basins if flow is expected to increase 
 Adapt or expand installed capacity to accommodate increase in flow regime 
 Modify canals or tunnels to better handle changes in water flows 
 Modify spillway capacities and install controllable spillway gates 
 Modify the number and type of turbines that are better suited for expected 
water flow rates and more resilient to performance reductions and turbine 
lifetime 
 Design regional integration through transmission connections 
 Siting plants in locations non-threatened by Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF) 
risks 
 Promote the development of smaller plants to respond to GLOF risk 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
 
√ 
X 
 
X 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
 
v 
X 
 
X 
 Analysis to estimate likely range of projected climate variations over hydro 
lifetime 
 Identify cost-effective designs (new plants) and modifications (existing plants) to 
deal with specific risks identified for the site 
 Adapt and implement in plant operation to account for changes in river flow 
patterns 
 Relocate based inflow on changes in flow regime 
 Optimize reservoir management and improve energy output by adapting to 
changes in rainfall or river flow patterns 
 Operational complementarities with other sources (for example natural gas) 
 Develop improved hydrological forecasting techniques and adaptive 
management operating rules 
 Develop basin-wide management strategies that take into account the full range 
of downstream environmental and human water uses 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
 
WIND POWER 
 Construct turbines that can operate at higher wind speeds and gusts 
 Design a foundation which support the turbine where there are changes in 
permafrost conditions 
 Design offshore turbines to withstand expected increases in wind-sea wave 
forces 
 Use taller towers to capture the stronger winds at higher altitudes 
 Consider the development and commercialization of vertical axis wind turbines 
 Consider the effects of extreme low and high temperatures in turbine  
 Implement passive and active methods to reduce icing. Passive method: design 
blades with reduced ice accumulation. Active method: blade heating 
 Integrate increased amounts of wind energy into the grid 
√ 
X 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
X 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
 Choose sites for new infrastructures, or relocate existing turbines in sites that 
take into account expected changes in wind speeds during the lifetime of the 
turbines, as well as sea level rise and changes in river flooding 
 Siting procedure to take into account expected changes in wind speeds and sea 
–level rise during the lifetime of the turbines 
 Ensure the presence of rapid emergency repair teams 
 Develop insurance schemes for long-term wind power yields and damages 
 Develop meteorology-based weather/climate forecasting 
√ 
 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
 
  
 
SU
P
P
LY
 
SOLAR POWER 
 Assure structures are strong enough to withstand higher winds 
 Specify stronger mounting structure, and cabling and components that can deal 
with high moisture content and flooding 
 Specify heat-resistant PV cells and module components designed to withstand 
short peaks of very high temperature 
 Use designs that improve passive airflow beneath photovoltaic mounting 
structures 
 Where snowfall are heavy or likely to increase, assure free space so that snow 
can slide off the panel 
 Where solar energy is likely to become more diffuse, with changes in cloud cover, 
rough surfaced photovoltaic modules are more efficient 
 Where clouds are likely to pass over modules more quickly, consider micro-
inverters for each panel to improve stability and increase power output 
 Consider distributed systems which can improve grid stability 
 For any tracking solar system for CSP, the motors and their mounting must be 
especially robust wherever stronger winds are expected 
 Avoid tracking systems where cyclones are expected to increase in strength (CSP) 
 Consider forced air and liquid coolant systems where temperature increase (CSP) 
 Where water shortages are expected consider air cooling (CSP) 
 Use evacuated tube collectors for thermal heating because they do not suffer 
from ambient temperature problems 
 Use engineer evacuated tube collectors with higher resistance to hailstorms 
 Use evacuated tube collectors than flat plate collector when there is more diffuse 
than direct insolation 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
 Develop meteorology-based weather/climate forecasting 
 Where possible, site solar photovoltaic, CSP and thermal systems where 
expected change in cloud cover are relatively low 
 Choose locations with lower probability of dust, grit and snow of practical 
 For locations where temperature increases or significant heat waves are 
expected, choose modules with more heat-resistant photovoltaic cells and 
module materials designed to withstand short peaks of very high temperature 
 For distributed solar systems, make available mobile repair teams to ensure 
functioning of systems after damage from extreme events 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
 
√ 
 
BIOMASS AND 
BIOFUELS 
 Expand irrigation systems or improve the efficiency of existing irrigation to 
counteract drought impact if sufficient water is available from sources outside 
drought-hit area 
 Use unconventional sources if there is no availability of conventional water 
resources 
 Protect against floods by building dykes and improving drainage 
 Expansion of rainwater harvesting, water storage and conservation techniques, 
water reuse and desalination 
 Improve water harvesting and use 
 Improve soil and nutrient management 
 Increase the robustness of biomass power plants 
√ 
 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 Use of salt-tolerant pants (halophytes) – including varieties of sugarcane, millet 
and corn that grow in brackish water on saline land 
 Adjust crop management and rotation schemes 
 Adjust planting and harvesting dates 
 Introduce soil moisture conservation practices to improve soil fertility  
 Relocate crops in areas with lower risk of flooding and storms 
 Implement early warning systems for seasonal rainfall and temperature 
anomalies 
 Support emergency harvesting of biomass in case of an imminent extreme event 
 Provide crop insurance schemes 
 Control pests and diseases because climate change appears to be altering them 
 Improve ecosystem management 
 Implement efficient harvesting and early transformation of agriculture produce 
to reduce post-harvest losses and preserve crop quantity and quality 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
WAVE AND TIDAL 
ENERGY 
 Devices need to be engineered to withstand extreme waves by being massive 
 For sea wave floating systems, consider designing for 50-year freak waves 
 For sea wave anchorage systems, design them to be oriented in the wave 
direction rather than across the wave front to reduce vulnerability to severe 
stresses 
 Consider protection mechanism against storm 
 Raise level of barrage basin walls for tidal systems 
 For OTEC, construct larger pipes to increase volume of water to the surface 
 Design deep-sea pipes to withstand greater stresses 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 Consider onshore or nearshore systems to produce electricity, because they are 
less vulnerable to storm damage, although the power available is less than 
further out at sea 
√ 
 
 
√ 
 
 
  
SU
P
P
LY
 
THERMOELECTRIC 
POWER PLANTS 
 Develop and implement higher structural standards for new or renovated 
buildings 
 Build concrete-sides buildings instead of metal because they are more resistant 
to wind and corrosion 
 Raise level of structures 
 Develop flood control where floods are likely to increase. Implement 
embankments, dams, dykes, reservoirs, polders, ponds, relocated flood defense, 
barriers and higher channel capacity 
 Construct improved coastal defenses (seawalls and bulkheads) 
 Improve drainage and reroute water pipes 
 Protect fuel storage including stockpiles 
 Change the cooling system from a once-through to a closed-circuit 
 Redesign cooling facilities: recover water from condense and heat exchangers, 
reduce evaporative losses, increase secondary or wastewater usage, construct 
dry cooling towers 
 Increase volume of water treatment works and develop new water sources 
 Install additional cooling towers and modify cooling water inlets at coastal 
locations  
 If cooling water is unavailable with climate change, air-cooled systems could be 
used 
 Use dry or hybrid cooling systems with lower water requirements 
 Develop more efficient pumps and heat exchangers 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 Choose better locations (less exposed places) to build new thermal plants 
 Concentrate investment in locations where temperatures are likely to be cooler  
 Decentralize generation 
 Invest in more cooling capacity and in different cooling technologies 
 Invest in more spare production capacity and more network capacity 
 Require more stringent safety investments 
 Develop and implement higher structural standards for new or renovated 
buildings 
 Incorporate gradual sea level rise, increased storms events and associated tidal 
surges into design criteria 
 Formulate long-term strategies to respond to climate-related disruption 
 Restore/afforest/reforest land 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
FOSSIL FUEL 
EXTRACTION, 
PRODUCTION AND 
REFINING 
 Build or enlarge reservoirs of water to reduce flooding risk in new and existing 
mining developments 
 Reassess flood-prone areas and elevating buildings or vulnerable components 
 Build flood-proofing buildings 
 Power plants and pumps should preferably be sited where there is an adequate 
supply of cooling water 
 Consider air cooling as an alternative to water cooling 
 Build or improve dykes, berms and spillways onshore 
 Build or enlarge reservoirs of water to reduce water shortages 
 Develop or reroute water source 
 Improve the robustness of designs, particularly offshore installation that are 
vulnerable to storms 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
 Site future mines in areas that have a limited exposure to flooding or drought risk 
 Adopt techniques that slow, steer and block water flows 
 Carry out flood hazard assessments 
 Improve models used to predict storms 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
TRANSMISSION, 
DISTRIBUTION 
AND TRANSFER OF 
ENERGY 
 Reinforce existing T&D structures and build underground distribution systems 
 Where stronger winds are expected, strengthen distribution poles with guy wires 
 Where lightning strikes may increase, include lightning protection 
 Specify more effective cooling for substations and transformers 
 Design improved flood protection measures for the infrastructure 
 Build a resilient high-capacity transmission system 
 Use smart transformers which control the flow of electricity to stabilize existing 
aging power grids 
 Develop and use smart grids 
 Design more flexibility into T&D networks, allowing increased rerouting during 
times of disruption 
 Reduce pressure on the grid through distributed, decentralized energy 
generation 
 Take care to maintain grid stability 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 Require higher design standards for distribution poles and towers 
 Invest resources into building a resilient, high-capacity transmission system 
 Improve system management through investing in smart grids 
 Forbid the construction of power lines near dikes and ban permanent trees next 
to existing dykes 
 Specify Information and Communication Technology (ICT) components that are 
certified as resilient to higher temperatures and humidity, and design improved 
redundancy into ICT systems, including wireless transmission better able to 
handle high temperatures 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
 
 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
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In this appendix we report all the vulnerability indicators presented by HELIO International 
in its book Climate-proofing energy systems (Williamson et al., 2009) and Michaelowa et al. 
in Use of indicators to improve communication on energy systems vulnerability, resilience and 
adaptation to climate change (Michaelowa et al., 2010). The indicators shown in Table I.1 can 
be divided in two groups. The ones which end with a number are the main indicators, while 
the others which end with a letter are expansions. 
 
Table I.1 Table of vulnerability indicators. Created by author collecting data from (Williamson et al., 2009, p. 31-32) and 
(Michaelowa et al., 2010, p. 12-15) 
SECTOR INDICATOR DESCRIPTION 
HYDROPOWER 
VH1 
Expected precipitation change over next 20-50 years (%) and/or 
probability of floods in each watershed 
VH2 
Projected flood frequency over the next 50 years (number of floods 
that have a greater intensity than a flood with a 100 year recurrence 
cycle) 
VH2b 
Describe what % of the water is used for: agriculture, power and 
drinking 
VH3 
Projected flood frequency over the next 50 years (number of floods 
that have a greater intensity than a flood with a 100 year recurrence 
cycle) 
WIND POWER 
VW1 Number of wind turbines at less than 1 m above sea level 
VW2 
Projected change of average wind speed over the next 20 years, based 
on regional climate models (%) 
VW3 
Projected share of average annual wind speeds over 25 m/s over the 
next 20 years (at this wind speed most wind turbines have to be 
switched off) 
VW4 
Projected likelihood of a storm with gusts over 70 m/s reaching areas 
where wind turbines are located (% over 20 years). At this wind speed 
destruction of wind turbines is likely 
SOLAR POWER 
VS1 Capacity of solar installations already in place (m2) 
VS1b Distinguish between PV (MW) and thermal (m2) 
VS1c 
Describe sites (quality of the insulation and of the building on which 
systems are installed) and type of ownership (private, government, 
public/private partnership, etc.) 
VS2 
Expected temperature (°C) increase in the next 20 years relevant for 
PV capacity 
VS3 Projected change in cloud cover over the next 20 years (%) 
VS4 
Projected likelihood of storm gusts over 70 m/s reaching areas where 
solar power plants are located (% over 20 years). At this wind speed 
destruction of plants is likely 
268 
 
BIOMASS AND 
BIOFUEL 
VB1 
Proportion of biomass used for energy purposes (%) in total biomass 
production 
VB1b 
If possible, distinguish between different sources and different 
applications – agricultural biomass harvest, electricity, heat 
VB1c Forest (as defined by FAO) biomass harvest, electricity, heat 
VB2 Expected precipitation change over next 20-50 years (%) 
VB3 
Probability of temperature increase beyond biological heat tolerance 
of relevant crop over the next 20 years (%). 20 years is the estimated 
average lifetime of biomass power plants. 
VB4 
Projected drought frequency over the next 20 years (number of 
droughts that would result in a reduction of crop yields by more than 
20%) 
VB5 
Projected flood frequency over the next 20 years (number of floods 
that would result in a reduction of crop yields by more than 20%) 
VB6 
Number of biomass power plants located at less than 1 m above sea 
level and situated in an area that has a 100 year flood cycle 
VB7 Share of sheltered storage 
THERMAL POWER 
PLANTS 
VP1 
Number of thermal (coal, oil and gas) power plants located at less than 
1 m above sea level and within the area that would be flooded by a 
flood with a current recurrence period of 100 years 
VP2 
Number of nuclear power plants located at less than 1 m above sea or 
river level and within the area that would be flooded by a flood with a 
current recurrence period of 100 years 
VP3 Number of incidents/accidents since the plant was built 
VP3b Describe the most significant incidents 
VP4 
Expected temperature increase of cooling water for thermal (including 
nuclear) power plants over the next 30 years (°C) 
VP5 
Expected number of droughts that would lead to a decrease in capacity 
of thermal power plants by more than 10% over the next 30 years. 
Thirty years is the typical lifetime of fossil fueled power plants 
VP6 
Number of thermal power plants located by a river fed by glacial 
melt where the glaciers are unlikely to vanish over the next 30 years 
FUEL FROM MINED 
RESOURCE 
VF1 
Share of offshore oil and gas installations likely to be hit by a storm of 
more than 70 m/s gusts over the next 20 years (%). The lifetime of such 
installations is not well known, but should be shorter than that of 
power plants. At a wind speed of 70 m/s destruction of plants is likely 
VF2 
Share/number of refineries likely to be hit by a storm of more than 70 
m/s gusts within the next 20 years (%) 
VF3 
Number of coal mines plants located at less than 1 m above sea level 
and situated in an area than has a 100 year flood cycle 
VF4 Number of days of available stored stock 
VF5 Share of protected storage in tanks or covered depots 
TRANSMISSION 
AND TRANSFER 
VT1 
Length of in-country, above-ground transmission and distribution lines 
(km) 
VT1b Distinguish between: high (transmission ); middle + low voltage lines 
(distribution) 
VT1c Describe any transnational lines 
VT2 Number and length of power cuts (differentiate between failures due 
to weather or equipment failure and those cuts due to rationing) 
VT2b Average hours of interruption per year 
VT3 Percentage of energy supply requiring regional transport over 50 km 
VT3b % that is transportation of fossil fuel 
VT3c % that is transportation of biomass 
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